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Abstract
After the Negotiations:
Understanding Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control
Stephen Herzog
2021
Why do advanced nuclear states agree to legally forswear nuclear weapons?
Many international relations studies have explored why states seek to develop
nuclear weapons. Yet, the literature does not address why states would participate
in multilateral nuclear arms control treaties that tie their hands against doing so.
This gap in the existing scholarship matters because nuclear weapons are one of
few tools that can effectively guarantee a state’s sovereignty and national survival.
My dissertation disaggregates the process of entering multilateral
nuclear arms control treaties into two phases. Previous studies have discussed
either treaty signature or ratification, overlooking the often lengthy delays between
them. However, motivations for signing and ratifying are often distinct because
these actions carry different legal weights and political consequences. I discover
that signing a treaty can reflect a variety of “type signaling” motivations about a
state’s views on the distribution of power the agreement reifies. Indeed, signatories
signal to the international community their advocacy for the treaty or subordinate
status to a powerful patron that compels them to sign. Non-signatories signal a
desire for enhanced status or interest in considering the nuclear option. But
ultimately, states will only engage in legal “commitment signaling” not to pursue
nuclear weapons through ratification if their security environment permits it.

Accession to a treaty once it has already entered into force—and signature is no
longer possible—requires a “joint signal” pertaining to both necessary conditions.
To demonstrate the applicability of my theory, I investigate four case
studies of states with advanced civilian nuclear energy capabilities or weapons
proliferation aspirations. I examine the causal pathways that led Brazil, Egypt,
Japan, and Romania to embrace the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of
1968 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. These
states acted in accordance with the two-step process of type and commitment
signaling described in my theory despite varying regime types, alliance
commitments, levels of industrialization, and more. The case studies shed new
light on international nuclear politics by drawing on diverse sources, including
archival documents and original elite interviews I conducted with decision-makers.
Taken together, this dissertation makes three primary contributions
to the scholarly and policy-making domains. First, it offers a new process-based
theory explaining an understudied phenomenon in international security. Second,
it provides evidence and insights that challenge dominant narratives surrounding
historical cases of legal nuclear forbearance. Third, it suggests novel approaches
to understanding incentive structures behind differing levels of commitment to
multilateral nuclear arms control.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
This dissertation focuses on the phenomenon of legally forswearing nuclear
weapons. States do so by joining multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. These
agreements seek to eliminate the weapons themselves or prohibit other vital
elements of proliferation like nuclear test explosions or fissile material production.
Despite vast refinement in the study of nuclear proliferation in recent years,
multilateral arms control remains both understudied and undertheorized. The
scholarly literature in international relations now has wide-ranging insights into
reasons why states seek to build the bomb. Yet, it lacks compelling explanations
for why capable and interested states might tie their hands against doing so.
Consequently, my project addresses two central and related research questions:
1. Why do advanced nuclear states agree to legally forswear nuclear
weapons?
2. Why do such states sign and ratify multilateral nuclear arms control
treaties?
The introduction to the dissertation moves forward in five sections.
First, I survey the broad base of scholarship in nuclear politics to identify a key
substantive gap in the literature. Second, I lay out relevant questions and puzzles
for investigation in detail. Third, I discuss shortcomings of existing explanations.
Fourth, I briefly summarize my argument, expressed in the form of a processbased theory of state entry into multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. Finally, I
offer a fifth section highlighting my analytical approach, previewing my comparative
historical case studies, and providing a roadmap for the dissertation.

1

The Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control Gap
Since the dawn of the U.S.–Soviet nuclear arms race, scholars have played an
integral role in nuclear politics. It is nearly impossible to chronicle nuclear strategy
and deterrence during the Cold War without referencing influential theoretical
works. Well-known early nuclear scholars include Bernard Brodie (1946a, 1946b,
1959, 1966), Herman Kahn (1960, 1962, 1965), Henry Kissinger (1957), Thomas
Schelling (1960, 1966), and Albert Wohlstetter (1958).
Nuclear arms control and proliferation arose as concerns during the
Cold War. Fears of nuclear instability and escalation led to policy desires for arms
control, culminating in such initiatives as the Limited Test-Ban Treaty (LTBT),
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II), and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty. These agreements greatly benefited from academic scholarship on the
objectives, design, and implementation of arms control (Bull 1961, 1976; Schelling
and Halperin 1961; Brodie 1976; Adelman 1984; Schelling 1985). Naturally, the
arms control literature of the era made assumptions of global bipolarity. Yet, the
rising importance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) coincided with new
studies attempting to understand why states that were not great powers sought the
bomb (Quester 1973, 1981; Epstein 1977; De Mesquita and Riker 1982; Meyer
1984). These studies identified security considerations as the predominant driver
of both bilateral arms control and nuclearization. Missing were state motivations
for participating in multilateral nuclear arms control treaties like the NPT.
Bilateral arms control remained alive and well in the academy in the
early 1990s as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) entered into force.
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Strains between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia led
Betts (1992) to advocate arms control measures to de-escalate disputes as the
Kremlin faced the task of state-building. Jervis (1993) agreed but argued that arms
control was insufficient to ensure peace and was but one tool among many for
managing tensions. Scholars also placed some initial emphasis on multilateral
agreements. Walker (1992) pointed to legacy Soviet nuclear deployments in
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as an imperative to design treaties inclusive of
rising nuclear powers. But by the mid-1990s, the scholarly emphasis on arms
control had faded as proliferation became the more pressing topic of interest.
The end of the Cold War saw the emergence of two intersecting sets
of proliferation threats: diversion from the former Soviet stockpile of weapons and
fissile materials, and aspiring proliferators. There was a growing need for academic
analysis of trends in expertise proliferation of unemployed Soviet nuclear scientists
(Nye 1992; Potter 1992; Moody 1996) and measures to protect against trafficking
of sensitive materials and technologies throughout the former USSR (Zagorski
1992; Ewell 1998). These trends were particularly concerning due to an increasing
number of new countries believed to be violating the norms and obligations of the
NPT: Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan (Litwak 2000).
Indeed, U.S. unipolarity incentivized many “recalcitrant states” to
consider nuclearization to insulate themselves against hegemonic pressure
(Monteiro 2011/2012, 2014). Scholars began to highlight the risk of proliferation
and the importance of its rigorous theorization (Mearsheimer 1990; Lavoy 1993;
Ogilvie-White 1996). This concern spurred a new wave of security-oriented

3

literature (Frankel 1993; Reiss 1995; Thayer 1995) as well as work on domestic
politics and international status (Sagan 1996/1997).
The growth of proliferation studies in the 1990s set the stage for the
current era, which Walt (2010) has described as a “renaissance” in nuclear security
studies. This renaissance has both methodological and thematic drivers. One
major factor underlying its development is the opening of Cold War archives (Gavin
2012; Rabinowitz 2014; Gerzhoy, 2015). A second is the application of statistical
(Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Miller 2014) and formal modeling
techniques to data (Coe and Vaynman 2015; Bas and Coe 2016). Another driver
has its roots in post-Cold War proliferation concerns among policy-makers.1
Today’s scholarship includes work on strategic interaction (Gartzke and Kroenig
2009; Monteiro and Debs 2014; Debs and Monteiro 2017) and supply-side
proliferation (Kroenig 2010; Fuhrmann 2012a; Gheorghe 2019; Gibbons 2020).
While nuclear proliferation is becoming a saturated field, arms
control remains mostly absent from the new wave of studies. This situation is
problematic as multilateral nuclear arms control treaties become increasingly
relevant. Such agreements include the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), nuclear-weapon-free zones
(NWFZs), and the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
Multilateral arrangements will grow in importance as the United States and Russia
reduce Cold War-era stockpiles and attempt to integrate other states into the arms
1

There have also been numerous studies discussing changes in nuclear strategy and deterrence.
[See, e.g.: Powell 2003; Lieber and Press 2006, 2009, 2017; Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013, 2017;
Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014; Narang 2014; Talmadge 2017].

4

control fold. Like their bilateral cousins, multilateral treaties of this nature promote
communication and shape the information environment through verification. Such
treaties are notably complicated because—unlike bipolar accords—they often
require non-nuclear states to commit not to pursue capabilities that could enhance
their power. Put simply: for states that do not possess nuclear weapons,
multilateral nuclear arms control is about legally forswearing the bomb.
Questions and Puzzles
Legally forswearing nuclear weapons can be much more challenging than entering
into a multilateral trade, environmental, or human rights treaty. The reason is that
nuclearization may help ensure state survival against external threats (Waltz 1981;
Monteiro 2014). However, a decision to remain in nuclear forbearance at any given
time is not equivalent to ruling out the nuclear option with a treaty commitment.
Table 1 (p. 7) highlights the challenges entailed in entering into
multilateral nuclear arms control. It displays NPT and CTBT signature and
ratification/accession data for several states that had advanced civilian nuclear
energy programs or nuclear weapons aspirations. These states are thus “hard
cases” for multilateral nuclear arms control. After all, the NPT involves their
indefinite legal commitment to remain non-nuclear.2 The CTBT prohibits nuclear
explosive tests, which are a vital component of developing a nuclear weapon.3
Many of these states delayed signing or ratifying the agreements.
2

See: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (July 1, 1968), 729 UNTS 161, 7 ILM
809.

3

See: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (September 24, 1996), 35 ILM 1439.

5

Interesting pathways to embracing or avoiding arms control also
appear in Table 1. States may quickly sign and then ratify treaties. Or, they may
delay either signature or ratification. Sometimes states wait to join a treaty until it
has entered into force, whereby they must accede, which carries the same legal
weight as ratification (Aust 2010, 2013).4 At other times, they may choose to sign
and not ratify. Of course, they could also decide never to sign in the first place. The
result is a dizzying array of wildly varying timelines to sign and ratify multilateral
nuclear arms control treaties. The patterns are not consistent across space and
time, regime types, economic strength, and other common political science
variables. They suggest that a more complicated phenomenon is at play.
The time-lags between signature and ratification indicate that the
processes likely have different underlying motivations. But yet, the few
international relations studies addressing multilateral nuclear treaties focus on
either signature or ratification (Way and Sasikumar 2004; Sagan 2011; Coe and
Vaynman 2015; Fuhrmann and Lupu 2016). They do not attempt to rigorously
differentiate between the processes. The result is that the field views arms control
as binary: States are either members of treaties, or they are not.

This

oversimplification obscures much of the richness of arms control discussions.

4

For example, Article IX, para. 1 of the NPT reads: “This Treaty shall be open to all States for
signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry-into-force in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.”
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Table 1: Status of the NPT of 1968 and the CTBT of 1996 in Select States5

Two research questions motivate this dissertation. First, and most
simply: Why do advanced nuclear states agree to legally forswear nuclear
weapons? Many scholars have researched why states build nuclear weapons, but
I seek to understand why they commit to treaties that tie their hands against doing
so. Second, per Table 1: Why do such states sign and ratify multilateral nuclear
arms control treaties? The answers to these questions matter for scholars and
policy-makers alike. This dissertation aims to provide a more in-depth analysis of
the understudied process of multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament. It
does so by evaluating states’ entry into the NPT and the CTBT, the most universal
5

Data from: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, “Disarmament Treaties,” updated as of
March 9, 2021, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/.
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of these agreements.6 In studying this topic, I seek to build bridges between the
robust, ongoing study of nuclear proliferation and the somewhat dormant field of
nuclear arms control. Additionally, a carefully researched account of multilateral
arms control could help decision-makers better understand how to structure sticks
and carrots approaches to encouraging legal nuclear forbearance.
Existing Explanations
Does the study of international security need another large-scale project on
nuclear politics? Given the growing number of scholars in this field, it is imperative
to identify space for a notable contribution. There is, however, considerable room
for new projects on nuclear arms control, particularly on multilateral treaties. As I
discussed above, the literature has provided deep insights into the causes of
nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, there is a paucity of systematic
investigation of the opposite phenomenon. Rationales for why states choose not
to develop nuclear weapons do not fully explain legal hand-tying. A technically
proficient state may not have the motivation to make a drive for the bomb presently,
but this does not explain why its leaders would eliminate the option for the future.
There is, after all, uncertainty in the international system; threats to state survival
can and do evolve (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Participation in multilateral
nuclear arms control is, accordingly, a different dependent variable than nuclear
proliferation. Given the benefits that nuclear weapons can have for state survival,
this is an important puzzle both at the academic and policy levels.
6

The broad membership base of these treaties has also resulted in a plethora of available primary
and secondary sources on various states’ decision-making.
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It would be misleading to suggest that there has been no research
on multilateral nuclear arms control in the past two decades. Early work on the
subject highlighted the importance of treaties and attempted to apply Cold War
lessons to new regional agreements (Larsen 2002; Larsen and Wirtz 2009).
Scholars began to ask: Do these treaties achieve their objectives? Thus far, all
studies on this subject have analyzed it in the context of the NPT, the cornerstone
of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Some scholars have examined
the relationship between the NPT and nuclear forbearance (Jo and Gartzke 2007;
Miller 2014, 2018) without directly attempting to identify causality. There is
disagreement between those who argue that the NPT has had no independent
effect on proliferation (Betts 1999; Hymans 2006; Solingen 2007) and those who
contend that the treaty has created a powerful and efficacious norm (Sagan
1996/1997; Rublee 2009; Budjeryn 2015, 2016).
However, these studies primarily investigate the process of entering
into the NPT as epiphenomenal to nuclear proliferation. Whether the treaty has a
causal impact on nuclearization is a different question than why states opt to sign
and ratify it. In fact, studies showing that states decided to forgo nuclear weapons
before joining the NPT (Hymans 2006; Solingen 2007) point to one possible reason
why such countries might have accepted the treaty.
There has also been some work dealing specifically with the question
of entering into the NPT. Unfortunately, these studies do not break the process
down into its constituent elements of signature and ratification, thereby overlooking
differential motivations for decision-making and various levels of commitment to
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arms control. They do, however, offer useful insights into some potential
explanations for state decision-making. Each carries considerable limitations, but
the existing scholarship provides a starting point for an in-depth look at multilateral
nuclear arms control. The literature contains five different “camps” of explanations.
The first camp deals with international norms as a motivation for
participating in such agreements. It is possible that norm cascades (Finnemore
and Sikkink 1998) and transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1999)
may encourage signature and ratification. In the nuclear domain, Rublee (2009)
and Budjeryn (2015, 2016) look at state decision-making and conclude that
international norms were responsible for many decisions to join the NPT. Similarly,
Fuhrmann and Lupu (2016) argue that understanding states’ latent treaty
commitment preferences on trade and human rights issues is essential to
determining whether or not they will accept the NPT. Their study is thus—for the
most part—a story of conformity with international institutions and norms. But the
common signature–ratification time gap poses a serious challenge to these types
of explanations. If norms and latent preferences inspired states at the first step of
the process (signature), why would the second step (ratification) frequently take
many more years to occur?
The second camp views superpower pressure as the primary
determinant of why states select into multilateral nuclear arms control. Coe and
Vaynman (2015) point to U.S.–Soviet collusion to draft and gain acceptance of the
NPT as the reason many “hard case” states joined the regime. Gerzhoy (2015)
and Gibbons (2016) describe U.S. pressure as pivotal in convincing states to
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participate in treaties. Heterogeneous arms control outcomes in NATO give cause
to doubt the superpower pressure explanation. For instance, Germany and Italy
quickly signed on to the NPT, but their ratification debates took five to seven
years—unlike Denmark and Norway. France did not sign the treaty, despite U.S.
pressure, and wound up acceding years later. In Asia, U.S. allies Japan and South
Korea also did not have straightforward timelines for signature and ratification.
Conversely, the USSR’s client states all quickly fell into line and embraced the
NPT. Perhaps coercive explanations for states joining nuclear treaties apply in
some cases but not in others.
The third camp offers analysis of treaty-contingent benefits.
Literature in international relations (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Vreeland 2008; Hyde
2011; Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2015) has shown that states are
willing to incur sovereignty costs to signal compliance with democratic and human
rights institutions. In the context of multilateral nuclear treaties, the contingent
benefit is usually unrestricted access to the civilian nuclear energy market. For this
reason, scholars like Paul (2000) and Gheorghe (2013a, 2014) have argued in
case studies that states accepted the NPT to ensure market access. However, this
explanation does not always generalize. Some states perceive international
nuclear treaties as pathways to market access. Others have resisted these
accords, considering them discriminatory mechanisms for great power control and
domination of technologies.
The fourth camp attributes decisions to domestic politics, whether
political party dynamics, power brokers, or public opinion (Solingen 2007; Hymans
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2011). These explanations are at odds with several major international relations
theories that give no weight to domestic politics (Krasner 1978; Waltz 1979;
Mearsheimer 2001). There are two main issues with the domestic politics
explanations. First, it is critical to examine the content of such signature and
ratification debates, which frequently deal with topics related to the international
system. This debate content is unsurprising for nuclear arms control treaties.
Second, domestic politics arguments offer limited utility in understanding cases of
delays between signature and ratification. There are numerous incidences of
delays when the regime is an autocracy with a rubber-stamp legislature (e.g.,
Egypt) or the democratic executive and the legislative majority are from the same
party (e.g., Japan). Again, signing and ratifying appear to be distinct decisions.
Finally, a fifth camp specifically addresses security considerations as
a possible cause for treaty decision-making. Scott Sagan (2011) observes that
regional rivals frequently wait for one another before joining the NPT. His argument
is one of very few in the multilateral arms control domain that pertains to security.
Recent bilateral nuclear arms control work by historians revisits Cold War treaties
through a competitive security lens (Cameron 2017; Maurer 2018). Likewise, a
recent political science study suggests that the security dynamics of verification
may be influential in shaping broader arms control initiatives (Coe and Vaynman
2020). Yet, the multilateral literature primarily deals with the norms, superpower
coercion, treaty-contingent benefits, and domestic politics explanations above.
Sagan’s point also does not clearly indicate why one of the rivals would take the
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first step toward entering a treaty. Further work lies ahead to understand the
substantive context and policy process.
Lastly, there is one quantitative piece that offers a hybrid explanation
for why states sign the NPT. Way and Sasikumar (2004) suggest that states
seeking security will not sign, but states seeking energy resources will sign. Their
quantitative analysis has some shortcomings when compared to the historical
record. Many states in challenging security environments have received nuclear
umbrella guarantees (Debs and Monteiro 2017) and had little reason to remain
outside of the NPT. And others that wanted nuclear energy (e.g., Brazil)—as
mentioned above—did not want to participate in the treaty because they saw it as
a discriminatory institution. Likewise, this study also does not attempt to explain
the time-lags between signature and ratification.
Taken together, the existing literature offers many fascinating and
theoretically-driven possibilities for why states join multilateral nuclear arms control
treaties. However, the problem of not differentiating between signature and
ratification plagues the existing literature and its conclusions. Another significant
issue is that existing studies make persuasive claims for single cases that rarely
generalize to a multitude of others. Given this situation, is it even possible to create
a generalizable theory of entry into multilateral nuclear arms control? I argue that
the answer is “Yes,” but the theory requires an extensive in-depth focus on process
that is not yet present in the literature.
I contend that states may enter into these agreements for various
reasons that are often consistent with the five aforementioned camps. But more
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importantly, the underlying logic behind both signature and ratification is both
identifiable and generalizable. It provides the basis for a new process-based theory
of multilateral nuclear arms control. Such a theory would subsume much of the
previous literature, accommodating diverse national narratives while also providing
a new, generalizable social scientific theory.
The Argument in Brief
The existing literature is rife with case studies and loose theories that vacillate
between identifying motivations for either signature or ratification. Such
explanations are diverse, covering many different schools of international relations
theory. This dissertation takes as its project the investigation of various nodes of
the process of multilateral nuclear arms control. If there are patterns behind
signature decisions and patterns behind ratification decisions, it is important to
systematize the discipline’s understanding.
After treaty negotiations end, a game of political posturing and diplomatic
signaling begins. My dissertation focuses on the substantive content of national
treaty debates. I explore implications for countries that were players in the
aforementioned diplomatic game: 35 states with advanced nuclear capabilities or
proliferation aspirations that considered building the bomb.7 The players are
limited. Small states lacking status aspirations and civilian nuclear energy
7

This set of states offers a broad cross-section of all potential proliferations. The states are: Algeria,
Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Ukraine, USSR/Russia,
United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia. These states are identified in the relevant
literature. [See, e.g.: Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Bleek 2017; Gheorghe 2019].
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infrastructure receive scant attention from great powers and other interested
players. For example, Malawi (1992) and Oman (1997) waited decades to accede
to the NPT and did not face diplomatic pressure. Meanwhile, Brazil (1998) faced
significant nonproliferation pressure for three decades and had a civilian nuclear
program alongside contentious internal debates about the treaty.
This context raises a distinction: pro forma and protracted treaty
debates. Oftentimes a lack of interest or internal resources for processing a treaty
extends a state’s time to accession. When the ratification debate occurs, it may
still be pro forma and lacking in substantive content. Simple timelines to enter into
treaties thus do not serve as a useful explanatory metric. Otherwise, Oman (1997)
and Brazil (1998) appear nearly observationally equivalent in an NPT context.
Their history with the treaty could not be more different. Brazil had a vigorous
discussion about the treaty characterized here as a protracted debate.
Departing from past work in the discipline that views treaty entry as
a binary outcome, this theory looks at two distinct phases of multilateral nuclear
arms control. There is often considerable lag-time between the opening for
signature of these accords, when states opt to sign them, and when they deposit
their ratification instruments. Sometimes states never sign, and other times sign
but decline to ratify, indicating dissimilar motivations underlying these decisions. I
argue that signature is a diplomatic “type signal” and ratification is a “commitment
signal.” Both are costly, but ratification carries more sovereignty costs. It bears the
full legal weight of treaty verification, punishments for withdrawal, and pivotally,
legally closing the door on the nuclear option. Signature carries costs as well, such
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as the status or security costs entailed in signaling that a state likely does not
intend to join the nuclear club.
I begin with signature, which is a diplomatic type signal. While a state
has not formally tied its hands with ratification, its decision to sign a treaty (or not)
broadcasts its intentions to its allies, adversaries, and neutral third-parties. This
statement of the country’s position on acquiring nuclear capabilities is intimately
tied to leadership views on the regional and global environment.
To better understand the signature process, I identify two groups of
states: signatories and non-signatories. First, treaty signatories are either
advocates or subordinates. Advocates accept the distribution of power codified by
the treaty and may even believe it enhances their long-term security. These states
also do not fear that nuclear treaties will limit their status aspirations and access
to civilian nuclear technologies. Subordinates have concerns about the treaty’s
distribution of power but lack the relative power to resist a patron’s demands to
sign. Second, treaty non-signatories are either status dissenters or weapons
dissenters. Status dissenters are interested in global prestige and status; they fear
that unequal treaties will limit their presence on the international stage (often
associated with civilian nuclear energy programs). Weapons dissenters view
nuclear weapons as a means of security and have concerns about treaty
limitations on their ability to acquire them.
My argument is that the process of signing a treaty provides a type
signal related to forswearing nuclear weapons. Consequently, great powers and
other interested players will bargain with non-signatories—who have status or
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weapons aspirations. Bargaining may include both sticks and carrots, ranging from
sanctions and abandonment to preferential trade deals and extension of a nuclear
umbrella. Only after a change in the leadership’s perceptions and/or favorability
toward the distribution of power can non-signatories become advocates or
subordinates that sign the treaty.
After signature comes ratification, which is a firmer commitment
signal. In the case of multilateral nuclear arms control, states subject themselves
to substantial costs. First, there is a sovereignty cost associated with forswearing
nuclear weapons. Second, states face intrusive verification and international
inspectors on their territory. Third, exercising nuclear treaty withdrawal clauses is
also costly given the signals it sends about proliferation intent.
Table 2: Considerations for Ratifying a Treaty

Unlike treaty signature, ratification is a decision dominated by
security considerations. The process that brought a state to sign a treaty is not,
however, independent from ratification. Barring changes in their security
environment, former status dissenters will have much less motivation to resist
ratification than former weapons dissenters. Does the state face a serious security
threat to its survival? If the answer is “No,” it will ratify the treaty. If the answer is
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“Yes,” but the state has credible protection from a third-party patron, it will ratify. If
the answer is “Yes,” and the state does not have credible protection from a thirdparty patron, the security environment must change before it ratifies. This change
can occur in three ways: threat dissipation, gaining a new patron or more credible
commitments, and patron abandonment threats that change the national decision
calculus. Table 2 depicts the possible state decisions regarding treaty ratification.
Finally, the process of treaty accession requires explanation
because it has a slightly different causal logic. If a country does not sign a treaty
before its entry-into-force, the two-stage signature and ratification process is no
longer possible. Instead, the state must accede, which carries the same legal
weight as ratification in a single action (Aust 2010, 2013). Consequently, I argue
that accession is a joint signal that encapsulates motivations for both signature
and ratification. To accede, a state must not lack protection against serious
security threats, and it must not have reasons to be a status or weapons dissenter.
The process-based logic of the theory generalizes to issues beyond
multilateral nuclear arms control. Type signaling via signature and commitment
signaling via ratification also apply to treaties on international trade, human rights,
and other subjects. Yet, the decision to legally forswear nuclear weapons is unlike
any of these other topics. A trade agreement or human rights treaty is unlikely to
have implications for state survival. For this reason, while the theory provides a
useful framework to the broader discipline, further work is required to assess the
unique rationales for signature and ratification in non-nuclear domains. Decisions
about treaties pertaining to milk powder pricing, climate change, or even election

18

monitoring are considerably less likely to be determined by the presence or
absence of serious security threats. Although past studies in other areas of global
affairs have suggested that joining international agreements is “cheap talk”
(Vreeland 2008; Hyde 2011), arms control is costly. The frequent delays between
when a treaty opens for signature, when states sign, and when states ratify
confirms this fact.
Methods, Cases, and Roadmap
This dissertation offers the first process-based theory of multilateral nuclear arms
control. To do so, it uses a range of qualitative methods to reconstruct decisionmaking timelines about treaty signature and ratification. In this sense, it takes its
inspiration from “big theory” building rather than empirical hypothesis testing.8 The
dissertation is an exercise in process tracing and identification of causal
mechanisms (George and Bennett 2004; Collier 2011; Bennett and Checkel 2015)
underlying signaling behavior in multilateral nuclear arms control. I draw on
observational data pertaining to four comparative historical case studies to provide
generalizable conclusions about state behavior.
While

multilateral

arms

control

remains

understudied

and

undertheorized in political science, there is certainly previous scholarship on the
topic. Aside from political scientists, many international historians have written
single-case studies related to the NPT. Studies of the nuclear history of countries
are beneficial because they almost inevitably address treaty decision-making,
8

On the problems associated with an overreliance on hypothesis testing in international relations
see: Mearsheimer and Walt 2013; Monteiro 2014.
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even if this is not their primary area of focus. My dissertation draws heavily on such
histories, particularly those of experts who have done extensive primary source
research or were present as the events under consideration unfolded.
Further, the dissertation research process involved extensive
archival research of my own. I conducted original research on thousands of
documents at archives in Brazil, Japan, and the various institutions of the United
Nations (UN). One of the benefits of the digital age, of course, is the online
cataloging of historical documents by organizations like the UN, the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, the National Security Archive (NSA) at
the George Washington University, and the U.S. State Department through its
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. Online documents have
become a lifeline for qualitative researchers during the COVID-19 pandemic. As
theorists of historical methods would predict (Bloch 1954; Hill 1993), my reading
of archival documents yielded new findings that are not present in the literature.
Additionally, this dissertation involved original elite interviews with
diplomats, policy-makers, and scientists with first-hand national and international
experience with multilateral nuclear arms control. Conducting these elite interviews
required a delicate balance of showing knowledge and deference, “snowball”
networking to gain access, and reading in-between the lines (Aberbach and
Rockman 2002; Tansey 2007; Harvey 2011).9 But in the end, I was rewarded in
some cases with information not found in the extant literature. For example, to my
knowledge, this dissertation contains the first detailed academic interview
9

See also: Leech 2002; Mosley 2013.
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reflections from Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso on entering into
multilateral nuclear arms control. The former head of state was responsible for
Brazil’s entry into both the NPT and the CTBT during the 1990s.
Another important consideration is determining what constitutes the
standard of proof in such research. Many objections have been raised regarding
the reliability of qualitative interview data (Kvale 1994). Inevitably, some
interviewees naturally had a propensity to engage in post hoc rationalization or
self-aggrandizement. I was cognizant of the need to cross-validate the qualitative
data (Elliott and Timulak 2005). That is, I opted not to use data unless I could
situate it in the historical record as determined by analysis of other sources:
archival materials, published works, and further interviews. I also interviewed many
scholarly authorities on particular cases to gain additional detailed insights into my
interview data’s context and validity.
All in all, the dissertation uses a variety of sources and methods to
interrogate decision-making about multilateral nuclear arms control. The data
availability for cases varies based on the recency of decisions, state secrecy
procedures, and the level of document digitization. More recent decisions—and
those taken by authoritarian regimes—may be subject to document classification
issues. However, they also provide a more extensive base of experts with
memories of the critical events. The COVID-19 pandemic naturally made physical
archival access and elite networking increasingly difficult. Regardless, in each
case, the evidence I obtained illuminates the processes of arms control.
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The dissertation includes four comparative historical case studies,
each representing an initial state type related to signing the NPT. The cases are
drawn from the previously mentioned group of 35 potential proliferators identified
in the extant literature. They are: Egypt, an advocate; Romania, a subordinate;
Brazil, a status dissenter; and Japan, a weapons dissenter. In the dissertation, I
evaluate why these states made decisions about signing and ratifying the NPT and
the CTBT. This dissertation thus draws on decades of decision-making in different
contexts to build a generalizable theory.
The main objective is to capture changes over time that permitted
each state to sign, ratify, or accede to multilateral arms control treaties. While all
four states wound up ratifying or acceding to the NPT, there were times when
signature or ratification was not desirable or possible. My process-tracing
approach is analogous to time series data, as causal process observations can
identify catalysts for changing dependent variable outcomes. They help answer
the essential question for my theory: What conditions were necessary to generate
the relevant mechanisms for moving forward on arms control?
There are additional reasons why these cases are collectively of
interest and offer enormous variation across a range of critical dimensions:
● Extended signature and ratification timelines provide ample evidence for
process tracing of changes;
● Within and cross-case variation of signature, ratification, and accession
decisions;
● Multiple geographic regions, security alliances, and regime types;
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● Varying levels of experience with, and interest in, nuclear technologies;
● Shifting regime types, civilian and military nuclear technology interest, and
security environments allow case movement between representative and
outlier status on certain measures, enabling identification of the impact of
covariate changes over time.
Beyond validating the theory, my original research provides new insights that, in
some cases, challenge existing accounts of nuclear decision-making.
The first case is Egypt. Egypt was a strong proponent of the NPT and
signed it on July 1, 1968, the day it opened for signature. Cairo was an advocate
for the treaty that signed with very little pressure because Egyptian leaders
believed the nonproliferation regime would constrain Israel—particularly in the
wake of the 1967 Six-Day War. Yet, Egypt waited until 1981 to ratify. During this
13-year gap, Israel continued to advance its nuclear weapons program and
defeated Egypt in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
While the existing literature primarily attributes Cairo’s eventual
commitment signaling to a desire to obtain nuclear power reactors (Kats 1985;
Barnaby 1989; Solingen 2007), I find that security considerations mattered more.
Today, Egypt does not have a single nuclear power reactor on its sovereign
territory. It was not until the Camp David Accords in 1978 that Egypt’s security
environment began to change in a way that provided a path to ratifying the NPT.
Israel soon also dropped its opposition to Egyptian proposals in the UN for an
eventual Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (MENWFZ). Although Egypt
ratified the NPT in 1981, Cairo was again disappointed by Israel not following suit
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in the years afterward. Egypt signed the CTBT in 1996—once again issuing an
advocate’s type signal—but has not ratified to this day due to the security
environment created by Israel’s non-participation in the NPT.
The second case is Romania. To many leaders’ surprise, Romania
broke with the Warsaw Pact during the negotiations on the NPT. Bucharest
frequently sided with developing state critics of the treaty during the negotiations.
The Romanian concern was that the NPT would allow unequal access to civilian
nuclear technology and hinder national growth. Regardless, Bucharest signed the
accord the day it opened for signature in 1968 and ratified in early 1970. The
Romanian commitment signal even came a month before the Soviet Union ratified.
Existing literature describes Romania as having significant autonomy
from its Warsaw Pact allies. While it recognizes that Soviet coercive attempts
occurred, it points to a desire to obtain civilian nuclear technologies (Gheorghe
2013a, 2014) and be part of a successful treaty (Crump-Gabreëls 2017) as the
main rationales for the Romanian about-face. Interestingly, Romania’s first nuclear
power reactor did not achieve criticality until 1996—nearly 30 years after the NPT
opened for signature. In contrast, I find that Romania was a subordinate state, and
pressure from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact members shaped its
decision-making. The Warsaw Pact tolerated Romanian autonomy on some
issues, but the NPT was not among them. Signing and ratifying the CTBT in the
1990s as an advocate was more straightforward, as Bucharest had already legally
forsworn nuclear weapons and had no proliferation aspirations.
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The third case is Brazil. A status dissenter, Brazil was among the
chief critics of the NPT. Its officials frequently characterized the treaty as locking
in an unequal power distribution and depriving states of civilian nuclear energy
access. The country’s authoritarian leaders refused to sign, even after the United
States and its allies applied significant nonproliferation pressure. Brasília sought
nuclear energy for prestige and national development while having great difficulty
obtaining foreign technology. This situation triggered renewed efforts through
indigenous development in both civilian and military settings. Brazil mastered the
fuel cycle in 1987 under a new democratic administration, and together with its
regional rival Argentina, joined the nonproliferation regime during the 1990s.
Prominent explanations for why Brazil reversed course—both
acceding to the NPT and ratifying the CTBT in 1998—usually pertain to Brazil’s
democratization (Graham 2002; Goldemberg, Alvim, and Mafra 2018) or
nonproliferation norms (Rublee 2010). Yet, I find more persuasive nuanced
explanations pointing to Brazil’s mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle (Patti 2012; Debs
and Monteiro 2017). But even these studies overlook the implications of a
changing NPT. Issues with Iraq and North Korea changed global perceptions of
non-parties to the treaty. The civilian nuclear program was no longer threatened
by the treaty, and being in the accord would now enhance—rather than diminish—
Brazil’s international status. Brasília could even hedge as a latent nuclear state
with the ability to develop the bomb should it ever become necessary.
The fourth and final case is Japan. Despite the legacy of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, the extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan’s Three Non-
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Nuclear Principles, Tokyo had marked difficulty accepting the NPT. Non-nuclear
norms and the Japanese “atomic allergy” (Rublee 2009; Akimoto 2020) do not
satisfactorily explain this period of behavior. While other studies point
predominantly to a desire to have equal treatment with European countries in the
realm of nuclear safeguards (Quester 1970; Paul 2000), I agree with accounts that
security was the most crucial concern (Akiyama 2018; Abe 2020). I offer new
evidence and historical analysis demonstrating that security concerns provide the
most compelling explanation for Japan’s NPT decision-making.
Japanese leaders initially type signaled as weapons dissenters and
held out on signing the NPT for nearly two years. During this time, there were
frequent discussions of the security risks of forswearing nuclear weapons, and the
government commissioned multiple secret studies to assess the feasibility of
proliferation. Ultimately, Japan signed the treaty in 1970 once the government
concluded in principle that nuclearization was not the best path forward. Yet, it was
not until 1976 that Japan abandoned the nuclear option by commitment signaling
its ratification. Hardliners in the government and the Diet were unconvinced that
the treaty would serve Japanese security interests. There were also doubts about
the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. In the end, the necessary condition
for ratifying was a series of private and public gestures by the United States to
reassure Tokyo of the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence. Signing and
ratifying the CTBT came easily as Japan had long abandoned the nuclear option
and had firm U.S. nuclear security guarantees.
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This dissertation’s detailed coverage of national perspectives on
arms control in the pre-negotiation, negotiation, and post-negotiation phases is
unlike any existing international relations study. Its marshalling of documents and
data reconstructs narratives and decision-making timelines that are not present in
the extant literature. Based on the preceding discussion, my dissertation offers
three central contributions to the study and analysis of nuclear weapons:
1. A novel process-based theory providing a compelling explanation for an
important but understudied phenomenon in global politics;
2. Extensive new evidence, data collection, and historical analysis that provide
insights that challenge existing theories and case studies;
3. Policy-relevant implications related to understanding differing levels of state
commitment to multilateral nuclear arms control.
To examine legal nuclear forbearance, this dissertation proceeds in
six further chapters. Chapter 2 introduces my process-based theory of multilateral
nuclear arms control in expanded detail. Chapter 3 analyzes the case of Egypt, an
early advocate of arms control that later faced great difficulties in commitment
signaling. Chapter 4 presents the case of Romania, a subordinate state whose
patron forced it to part ways with its foreign policy preferences on issues of nuclear
diplomacy. Chapter 5 chronologizes the case of Brazil, a status dissenter that took
decades to accept the treaties committing the state to a non-nuclear future.
Chapter 6 assesses the case of Japan, a weapons dissenter that required ironclad external security guarantees to permanently disavow the nuclear option.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the findings and implications of the dissertation.

27

Chapter 2 – A Theory of Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control
The study of nuclear proliferation has dramatically increased in breadth and depth
over the past two decades. New methods, theories, cases, and data have
contributed to compelling explanations for why states seek the bomb. In recent
years, the literature has expanded to include strategies states use to proliferate
(Narang 2016/2017) and the likelihood that would-be proliferators will succeed in
going nuclear (Hymans 2012; Braut-Hegghammer 2016). These scholarly findings
have implications not just for understanding proliferation; they also shed light on
why states do not nuclearize. A failure to proliferate may be a matter of a lack of
willingness and opportunity (Debs and Monteiro 2017), technical or managerial
ineptitude (Hymans 2012; Braut-Hegghammer 2016), or counterproliferation
efforts (Braut-Hegghammer 2011; Raas and Long 2017; Whitlark 2017).
However, the focus on why states choose not to proliferate—or are
unable to—leaves important topics unaddressed. This dissertation’s focus on
legally forswearing nuclear weapons is among them. In the atomic age, many
technically capable states permanently renounced the nuclear option through
multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. Such decisions are not equivalent to
choosing to engage in nuclear forbearance at a specific time in history. States that
join multilateral agreements may face both ex-ante and ex-post costs ranging from
diminished status to intrusive verification, even including harsh economic and
military punishments for withdrawal. Realist scholars have long argued that the
international system is chaotic, and today’s ally could be tomorrow’s adversary
(Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Since nuclear weapons can help guarantee
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state survival (Waltz 1981; Monteiro 2014), decisions to forswear them are
puzzling indeed.
The most common way states forswear nuclear weapons is by
joining multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. These arrangements include the
NPT, the CTBT, the TPNW, and a multitude of NWFZs. One future agreement
under consideration is a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Such treaties
serve notable functions in international security. For states that are not nucleararmed, they involve prohibitions on nuclear weapons or essential activities for
producing the bomb—like fissile material production or nuclear test explosions.
Multilateral treaties are also thought to establish norms of appropriate conduct
(Sagan 1996/1997; Tannenwald 1999, 2007; Rublee 2009; Budjeryn 2015, 2016)
and often have verification regimes to detect and deter non-compliance (Imber
1982; Blix 1992; Avenhaus et al. 1996; McGrath 2009; Dahlman et al. 2011; Brown
2015; Persbo 2016; Herzog 2017; Carnegie and Carson 2019).
Despite their continued relevance, academic literature on these
treaties is limited. This gap contrasts with bilateral arms control studies, which are
beginning to make a resurgence (Cameron 2017; Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz
2018; Maurer 2018). Although many scholars have concluded that multilateral
treaties can often achieve their principal objectives (Coe and Vaynman 2015;
Fuhrmann and Lupu 2016; Herzog, Ko, and Lee 2021), the literature pays scant
attention to how these regimes gain members.10 The result is made plain in a telling
10

Others, statistically looking only at the NPT, conclude that this treaty may have had mixed or
negative effects. [See: Kroenig 2009; Bleek 2010b; Fuhrmann and Berejikian 2012; Bleek and
Lorber 2014; Brown and Kaplow 2014; Horowitz and Narang 2014; Miller 2014].
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statement by Scott Sagan (2010, p. 34): “I am struck at how little we know about
why different governments joined the NPT.” And the discipline has far more
knowledge about the NPT than it does about other related treaties.
Of particular interest are the activities of the 35 states identified in
Chapter 1 and the previous literature as potential proliferators due to historical
capabilities and interest in the bomb (Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007;
Bleek 2017; Gheorghe 2019). This expansive universe of cases includes those
states with capabilities and/or intent to develop nuclear weapons, making them the
most relevant states to study for understanding legal nuclear forbearance. These
countries do not just include well-known proliferators like Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Also
on the list are states such as Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan.
As discussed in the previous chapter, potential proliferators
frequently have a time-lag between signing and ratifying treaties. It is unsurprising
that states with advanced nuclear capabilities or interest in developing nuclear
weapons would struggle to legally forswear these armaments. Yet, the often yearslong gaps between signature and ratification point to differential reasoning behind
these nuclear choices. The delays consistently appear regardless of variation in
regime types, economic strength, alliance arrangements, regions of the globe, and
much more. Thus, common political science variables do not appear to describe
the phenomenon under discussion.
My dissertation seeks to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing why
advanced nuclear states legally forswear nuclear weapons. Its core assumption is
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that after negotiations, decisions to participate in such agreements involve two
separate but interrelated phases: signature and ratification. This focus is distinct
from innovative new work looking at the design of arms control treaties (Reddie
2019).11 Drawing conclusions about the subject of inquiry requires a detailed
understanding of conceptual differences between motivations underlying state
signature and ratification decisions.
Toward that end, this chapter offers a novel theory of multilateral
nuclear arms control. It explains that participation in treaties is not a simple binary
process wherein a state is either inside or outside a regime. Rather, arms control
is multi-phased and consists of different sequential decision points.
To develop the theoretical logic of my dissertation, this chapter
proceeds in six sections. First, I explore the complexities of multilateral arms
control, identifying several distinctions between these initiatives and their bilateral
cousins. Second, I highlight the scope and importance of policy decisions that
states can make in the aftermath of arms control negotiations. Third, I lay out the
processes by which states may opt to sign on to treaties and provide an original
explanatory typology of state postures on arms control. Fourth, I consider the
nature of ratification debates following signature and highlight variables predicting
state behavior. Fifth, I discuss the phenomenon of accession, which occurs when
a treaty has entered into force and a state may join but can no longer sign. I
11

Of course, scholars can learn many things about a state’s posture vis-à-vis an arms control treaty
by studying negotiation records. While I draw on these records in the subsequent chapters, my
purpose here is limited to understanding state entry into relevant arms control regimes, not causally
dissecting how negotiations impact the design of treaties.
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conclude by offering insights into pathways for achieving participation in
multilateral arms control and comment on the theory’s broader generalizability.
The Multilateral Arms Control Context
The process of negotiating multilateral nuclear arms control treaties is often long
and arduous. Negotiations on the NPT took place in the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva from 1965–1968.12 Before then, it
took years for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree to a framework for
negotiating the accord. And in fact, the NPT’s roots date back even further—to the
calls for verifiable nuclear disarmament under international control of the U.S.
Baruch Plan and Soviet Gromyko Plan of 1946.13
The NPT opened for signature on July 1, 1968, dividing the world
into the five permitted Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) of Britain, China, France,
the United States, the USSR, and the remaining Non-Nuclear Weapon States
(NNWS). The treaty prohibited the NNWS from seeking the bomb (Article II) and
barred the NWS from helping the NNWS proliferate (Article I). It also established
treaty-based obligations for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards to prevent diversion of fissile materials from civil pursuits to weapons
12
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programs (Article III). But in exchange, the NNWS received guarantees of access
to peaceful nuclear energy (Article IV) and NWS commitments to eventually
eliminate nuclear arms (Article VI). The NPT was thus a wide-ranging treaty
involving legal commitments to forswear nuclear weapons. It entered into force on
March 5, 1970, and was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995.
Likewise, the CTBT of 1996 was not solely a product of the post-Cold
War era. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had first proposed a “standstill
agreement” to prohibit nuclear explosive testing in 1954 (Mackby 2016, p. 262).
Nehru’s proposal was considered the next year at a Sub-Committee of Five
(Britain, Canada, France, United States, USSR) meeting in London but failed to
attain consensus. The CTBT negotiations in the 1990s were a culmination of
stepwise limitations on nuclear tests, predominantly agreed to in a U.S.–Soviet
framework: the LTBT of 1963, the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974, and
the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1974. A total of 61 states
participated in the CTBT negotiations from 1993–1996 at the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.14 The treaty opened for signature on September
24, 1996, banning all nuclear explosions underground, underwater, and in the
Earth’s atmosphere. To this day, it has not entered into force.
A common theme among the NPT and the CTBT is the significant
number of players at the bargaining table. Involved states had diverse security
environments, government types, and histories with military and civilian nuclear
technologies. Complicating the process of legally forswearing nuclear weapons
14
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was the complex entry-into-force language negotiated for each treaty (Herzog
2021). The NPT required the ratifications of Britain, the United States, the Soviet
Union, and 40 additional states.15 The CTBT is more elaborate. It requires the
ratification of 44 “nuclear-capable” states with research reactors or civilian nuclear
energy programs before entering into force.16 Currently, there are eight holdouts
among the 44: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the
United States. Some of these states have signed but not ratified; others have not
signed. Clearly, there are different levels of test ban participation.
Existing models of nuclear arms control do not focus on this
multilateral context. Since the models are predominantly from the Cold War, they
draw on the rich history of U.S.–Soviet negotiations. Accords like the ABM Treaty
of 1972 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 were
two-player games. Such treaties came to fruition because both sides agreed on
guidelines for armament reductions and verification. In two-player games, strong
disagreements may lead to a breakdown of negotiations. Such was the case in the
dispute between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail
Gorbachev over the testing of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star
Wars.” Their inability to compromise at the 1987 Reykjavík Summit prevented the
realization of a bilateral nuclear disarmament pact (Schlesinger 1986; Perle 1987;
Adelman 2014). Further, bilateral arms control usually requires a simple exchange
15
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of diplomatic notes to enter into force after both parties ratify (Herzog 2021). This
entry-into-force situation stands in stark contrast to that of the NPT and the CTBT.
The number of players in n-sided multilateral talks increases the
probability of unsatisfied participants for even successfully negotiated treaties.
Consider the NPT and CTBT negotiations. These discussions were not merely
limited to 18 and 61 players, respectively. Both treaties involved the states at the
table consulting with countless allies. And each accord has global application. The
odds of state participants—and non-participants—in arms control dialogue being
dissatisfied increases for countries that are not what Monteiro (2014, p. 46) terms
“major powers.” States in this category “possess sufficient defensive capabilities
to inflict heavy costs on any state that decides to attack them.” Non-major powers
usually lack the leverage to shape talks or stonewall discussions.
Still, states that refuse to participate in negotiations lose their seat at
the table. Dissenting parties may thus instead opt to express their reservations in
other ways besides abstaining from talks. These methods include attempting to
derail the negotiations or to “water down” the final agreement. At other times,
states may confront pressures to join treaties they had no role in negotiating.
In short, multilateral nuclear arms control deals with the difficult state
decision of legally forswearing nuclear weapons. It also involves a high likelihood
that many states will object to a final agreement that opens for signature. For this
reason, perhaps it is no wonder that the histories of the NPT and CTBT are rife
with states delaying their signature, waiting years between signature and
ratification, acceding decades after treaty entry-into-force, or simply declining to
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sign or ratify. Legally forswearing nuclear weapons is no easy task, especially for
capable and interested states.
The existing literature discussed in the preceding chapter offers
initial theorizing into why advanced nuclear states enter multilateral nuclear arms
control. The scholarship breaks down into five camps regarding the NPT:
1. International norms (Rublee 2009; Budjeryn 2015, 2016; Fuhrmann and
Lupu 2016);
2. Superpower coercion (Coe and Vaynman 2015; Gerzhoy 2015; Gibbons
2016);
3. Treaty-contingent benefits (Paul 2000; Gheorghe 2013a, 2014);
4. Domestic politics (Solingen 2007; Hymans 2011);
5. Security considerations (Sagan 2011).
Each of the five camps offers a starting point for my study.17
The existing literature does, however, leave space for three critical
improvements. First, since national treaty narratives differ and these works
address a limited number of cases, the literature has generalizability shortcomings.
Second, they usually emphasize one particular cause even though multiple factors
may be at play. Third, they view the process of arms control as binary (a state
commits, or it does not) instead of disaggregating the two steps of the process.
Entry into treaties is a subset—not the primary focus—of these studies.
Accordingly, there is fertile ground for new research seeking to explain signature
and ratification decisions systematically.
17
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Potential proliferators contemplating their positions on multilateral
nuclear arms control face numerous systemic considerations. Their security
environment may include allies and adversaries alike. Each decision states make
in the domain of nuclear diplomacy sends signals to both sets of interested actors.
The need to focus directly on strategic considerations involving allies and
adversaries highlights just a sample of the interacting factors that influence arms
control decision-making. Technical aspects also matter because an advanced
nuclear state must determine how treaties will affect the balance of power and
capabilities.18 Such assessments are not limited to acquiring capabilities
themselves, as agreeing to permanently forswear nuclear weapons can change
perceptions of a state’s international status.
Nuclear arms control agreements also have diverse implications for
civilian atomic energy schemes. States must evaluate the consequences of these
treaties for the nuclear supply chain.19 For instance, many critics of the NPT
expressed disbelief at the promises of Article IV nuclear energy guarantees and
the superpowers’ civilian nuclear cooperation programs (Duarte 2016; Spektor
2016). Instead, these critics—usually from the developing world—saw arms
control and nonproliferation as a tool for creating a restrictive nuclear marketplace.
Peaceful uses of atomic energy do not just involve electricity or medical
radioisotope production. From the 1950s–1970s, several NNWS sought
18
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autonomous peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for excavating canals, extracting
oil and natural gas, and seismic sounding of the Earth’s crust and upper mantle.20
The NPT’s prohibition on the NNWS developing devices for PNEs drew protests,
as these explosions were seen as a tool to enhance international status and
achieve development goals (Popp, Horovitz, and Wenger 2017).
Pathways to Joining Treaties
The frequent and lengthy gaps between when states sign and ratify multilateral
nuclear arms control treaties illustrate the difficulty of legally forswearing nuclear
weapons. Interestingly, as Table 1 in Chapter 1 displayed, such delays are
commonplace irrespective of significant variation in political science variables.
Across both space and time, decisions to sign and ratify agreements appear to
have different drivers. If the necessary conditions were the same for both steps,
such time-lags would not occur; signature and ratification would take place almost
simultaneously. Yet, the existing literature addresses either signature or ratification
only, overlooking varying levels of treaty endorsement.
After negotiations end and an agreement opens for signature, there
are three potential routes through which states may join it. These options are open
to states whether or not they are parties to the treaty negotiations. Figure 1 depicts
each of the pathways for entering into multilateral nuclear arms control, and more
generally, most international treaties.
20
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Figure 1: Joining Multilateral Treaties

Note that the path to ratification remains unchanged for states that
signed before entry-into-force. Accordingly, the first two paths involve decisions to
sign a treaty and follow with ratification. In democracies, signature is an executive
function, whereas ratification usually requires a legislative vote. Autocratic regimes
have differing legislative participation levels in adopting treaties based on the
nature of state centralization. Even so, timelines to signature and ratification vary
wildly with no clear patterns across regime types. Chapter 1 also discussed the
importance of investigating the substantive content of treaty negotiations and
national debates. These domestic and international conversations—rather than
coding and analyzing government structures—are the most appropriate tool for
understanding treaty decision-making in advanced nuclear states.
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A third path also appears in Figure 1: accession. The procedures for
participating in a multilateral arms control agreement change once a treaty has
entered into force under international law, as the NPT did in 1970. Article IX of the
NPT and Article XIII of the CTBT both explicitly indicate that states may no longer
sign these treaties after entry-into-force. As noted above, states that have signed
but not yet ratified the treaty may still follow the path of signature and then
ratification after entry-into-force. States that have not signed must engage in the
act of accession. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 spells out
the procedures for acceding to treaties. The convention explains that accession
“has the same legal effect as ratification.”21
There is also wide variation in the timelines that states take pursuing
these pathways. Five potential trajectories again affirm that multilateral arms
control is not, in fact, a binary outcome. First, states may sign (sometimes with a
delay) and quickly ratify the treaty. Second, they may sign and wait many years to
ratify. Third, they may sign and then never ratify. Fourth, they may delay signature
until after entry-into-force and then accede. Fifth, they may opt to neither sign nor
ratify. Each trajectory showcases the non-binary nature of arms control due to
different motivations for signature and ratification as well as varying commitment.
This section’s closer look at the politics of entering treaties
demonstrates that it is essential to address the gap in the existing literature.
Current scholarship in nuclear politics often uses the terms “signature,”
21
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“ratification,” and “accession” to describe the act of joining treaties. But what are
the practical differences of these actions for multilateral nuclear arms control?
Fortunately, there is scholarship in other areas of international
relations—particularly human rights—that provides a point of departure for my
theory. Vreeland (2008, p. 78) points out that some dictatorships may sign human
rights treaties for “symbolic” reasons since their obligation level will be lower than
that of ratification. In doing so, these states send signals to their interlocutors. This
perspective also receives support from other political scientists, sociologists, and
international lawyers. Past studies in these fields have distinguished signature and
ratification as discrete processes implying different treaty commitment levels
(McDade 1985; Cole 2009; Aust 2013; Ryckman 2016). Cole (2009) posits that the
difference between signature and ratification is that the former entails a weaker
obligation than the latter. This depth of obligation argument stands in contrast to
Vienna Convention language requiring state signatories not to violate the spirit of
an accord prior to their ratification.22 McDade (1985) writes that states have
dissimilar obligations during the phases of signature and ratification.23
Taken together, my analysis of treaty decision-making yields useful
theoretical observations. Signature and ratification of multilateral nuclear arms
control treaties are distinct choices. Otherwise, the familiar signature–ratification
delays would not be so prominent in the historical record. Scholarship from outside
22
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the nuclear sphere indicates that ratification is a deeper, firmer commitment to a
treaty than signature. The reason for this is that ratification has greater compliance
obligations for states. When deciding to legally forswear nuclear weapons, the
contours of each step of the process will matter to states. A decision to sign will
not always guarantee a quick ratification—or ratification at all. In addition,
accession has the same standing as ratification, but acceding to a treaty is a onestep process rather than a two-step process. Accession decisions will need to
satisfy signature and ratification motivations simultaneously.
My contention after surveying the literature is that signature implies
an “expectation” of compliance, whereas ratification is an “obligation.” In an
interview, I asked Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), about the difference between
signature and ratification. Zerbo explained to me that it was simple. In his view,
states signing the CTBT are saying “No” to nuclear tests, whereas states ratifying
are saying “Never” to nuclear tests.24 This notion matches my interpretation.
Type Signaling and Treaty Signature
If treaty signature and ratification were essentially two sides of the same coin, the
aforementioned time-lags would not appear consistently. Put another way: If these
decisions shared a common set of underlying motivations, ratification would almost
always follow shortly after signature. This would be especially likely in cases where
a state achieved its aims at the bargaining table. The historical record, however,
simply does not show such a trend.
24
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To understand these distinctions of process, it is instructive to borrow
a well-known example from outside nuclear arms control. Recall U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in the lead-up to negotiate the Treaty of
Versailles.25 The League of Nations was the president’s brainchild, an organization
situated uniquely in the realm of the ideology now referred to as Wilsonian
idealism. Wilson promptly signed the Covenant of the League of Nations at the
Paris Peace Conference on June 28, 1919, signaling the U.S. intent to support the
organization. However, the U.S. Senate bitterly debated the global security
environment and the U.S. role in the world. Ultimately, the Senate rejected the
Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. Signature and ratification were
unquestionably different decision points.
The fate of the League of Nations is hardly an isolated example.
Similar situations have arisen in the realm of multilateral nuclear arms control. The
timing gaps are also cross-cutting, affecting advanced nuclear states in different
world regions with a diversity of descriptive covariates. For this reason, the
previous chapter highlighted the shortcomings of the literature on nuclear
proliferation in predicting legal forswearing of nuclear weapons. The field lacks
persuasive explanations for this process, which occurs through the steps of treaty
signature and ratification.
Decisions about treaty signature do not always occur expeditiously,
as governments have limited resources and complex policy agendas. For instance,
a Tongan diplomat noted that her country’s ability to join nuclear treaties was often
25
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dependent on government capacity and national priorities.26 Many developing
countries wait years to sign onto such treaties, precisely because—while signing
may be relatively costless for them—the treaty may bear little relevance to their
regional situation and interests. Smaller states also may face fewer arms control
pressures from great powers than their potential proliferator counterparts. Since
nuclear arms control has unquestionable implications for emerging nuclear states,
their governments are likely to consider the treaty’s content and stake out strong
positions either for or against it. These potential proliferators are the 35 states at
the heart of this dissertation. The actions of other states fall outside its scope.
An advanced nuclear state with the option to sign an agreement
legally forswearing nuclear weapons must navigate the strategic interaction of
adversary and allied pressures. Providing positions on treaties offers signals about
a state’s intentions (Goldsmith and Posner 2002; Martin 2005). Rivals may
demand that their adversary sign an arms control accord as a show of pacific intent
and mechanism for building transparency to overcome the security dilemma.27 The
provision of information and an initial commitment to forswearing nuclear
capabilities may also help rivals avert some of the most common causes of
interstate war.28 It is not uncommon to see enduring rivals sign multilateral nuclear
arms control treaties in close temporal proximity to one another (Sagan 2011). If
26
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Jervis (1993) is correct, and arms control intends to bring peace to rivalrous dyads,
signing such treaties may well be in the national interest.
Signing treaties and signaling intent can also improve relations within
alliances. States that take the first step toward legally forswearing nuclear
weapons suggest to their allies that the security partnership is not likely to result in
entrapment in a nuclear conflict. Signing a multilateral arms control treaty functions
as a strong signal to allied powers that a state seeks to forgo capabilities that could
raise tensions between the alliance and opposing factions. Such signals are likely
to increase a state’s ability to participate in transactions involving civilian nuclear
technologies and avoid technology denial sanctions (Miller 2014). Great power
patrons that successfully convince protégés to sign such accords reify existing
hierarchical relationships (Lake 2009). Persuasion indicates bloc cohesion,
demonstrating that a patron can control its clients.
As Trager (2010, 2017) explains, even diplomatic “cheap talk” carries
signals of a state’s intentions. Signing a treaty, however, is far from cheap. Treaty
signature (or non-signature) is a costly signal due to three associated costs:
1. Signatories that approve of principles many states perceive as unequal and
discriminatory incur a status cost;
2. Signatories suggest to their opponents that they will not pursue weapons
that would alter the balance of power in their favor;
3. Non-signatories with status objections risk other states mistakenly viewing
them as seeking the bomb.29
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Signature sends a signal that a state plans to adhere to the principles enshrined in
a treaty, even if its national commitment level stops short of ratification.
International legal history has countless examples of states signing multilateral
treaties without having any near-term plans to ratify.30
I argue that decisions by advanced nuclear states to sign—or refuse
to sign—treaties forswearing nuclear weapons signal their state “type.”31 Before a
treaty opens for signature, a state’s motives and intentions are not always clear.
Treaty proponents may even argue against the agreement during negotiations to
extract concessions. The result is information asymmetries during multilateral
nuclear arms control negotiations. Yet, a type signal regarding treaty signature
communicates insights about state intentions.
Nuclear weapons can have an enormous impact on a state’s national
survival. Endorsement of treaties that foreclose the nuclear option thus symbolizes
an acceptance of the balance of power codified by the accord. Signing creates
expectations of compliance with the treaty and indications that the state will likely
not attempt to challenge and overturn the nuclear status quo. Declining to sign a
treaty signals a rejection of the power dynamics enshrined in the agreement. It
creates unclear expectations among a state’s adversaries and allies. Given these
differences, I identify two umbrella categories of states: signatories and nonsignatories. Within these categories, there are further subdivisions for a total of
30

See, e.g.: Vreeland 2008; Ryckman 2016.

31

On type signaling see: Glaser 2010, p. 65.

46

four state types. Table 3 provides an explanatory typology. The examples are this
dissertation’s case studies.
Treaty signatories are emerging nuclear states that are willing to
make the first step toward legally forswearing nuclear weapons by signing
multilateral agreements. Signing means embracing the balance of power the treaty
would consolidate. States may have various overarching motivations for doing so.
Hence, within the category of signatories, it is helpful to distinguish between two
types: advocates and subordinates.
Table 3: Typology of Initial State Postures on the NPT

Advocates are states with leadership that is satisfied with the
accord’s distribution of power and view the treaty as an asset. They may believe
the agreement has the long-term potential to enhance their national status or
security. Even if advocates have concerns about subjects like access to civilian
nuclear energy technologies, the accord’s benefits outweigh these reservations.
For advocates, there seems to be little reason not to endorse a treaty that locks in
a favorable distribution of power, regardless of the eventual requirement to legally
forswear nuclear weapons. In many cases, advocates believe that multilateral
nuclear arms control will constrain their regional rivals, which is well worth the costs
47

of signature. If those rivals refuse to sign, however, treaty advocates might not
rush to push forward with ratification.
Subordinates, by contrast, are states that express consternation with
the balance of power and principles a treaty would formalize, but they lack
sufficient autonomy to oppose the accord. Such states usually rely on a powerful
third-party patron for their security. In cases where the security sponsor demands
that their client sign a treaty, subordinates will be unable to resist their patron’s
wishes. Subordinates fall in line and endorse the distribution of power supported
by their protector. On paper, subordinates may appear observationally equivalent
to advocates due to their usually rapid signature of treaties. Determining when a
state is one type or the other requires not just analysis of treaty negotiation records,
but importantly, documentation of domestic discussions and correspondence
between the state and its interlocutors. This dissertation assesses such evidence.
Non-signatories are states unwilling to sign a treaty that involves
forswearing nuclear weapons due to deep concerns about its implications for the
balance of power. Agreements that divide the world into groups of “nuclear haves”
and “nuclear have-nots” are particularly likely to draw resistance from advanced
nuclear states. Arms control treaties do not solely entail prohibitions on weapons
systems. The text of a treaty or a powerful state’s attempt to enforce its provisions
may create barriers to acquiring dual-use civilian nuclear technologies—from
reactors, to enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) facilities, to components for
carrying out PNEs. Leaders of non-signatory states see restrictions on military and
civilian nuclear capabilities as undesirable obstacles to national standing or
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security. Non-signatories can be classified into one of two different types: status
dissenters or weapons dissenters.
The central objection of status dissenters is that nuclear treaties are
discriminatory instruments that will deny them access to nuclear weapons or
energy technologies. Sagan (1996/1997) and Hymans (2006) contend that nuclear
weapons can bring prestige to a country that enhances perceptions of its power
and technological prowess. To status dissenters, treaties that forbid most states
from having nuclear weapons, but not others, divide the world into unequal factions
and freeze the distribution of power. For many status dissenters, this is a matter of
principle rather than an actual interest in the bomb. Likewise, early in the nuclear
age, there were global perceptions that civilian nuclear energy would revolutionize
and elevate societies. Treaties that may pose restrictions on obtaining such
capabilities will not appeal to status dissenters. Multilateral nuclear arms control
has the potential to cause advanced nuclear states to believe they suffer from what
Renshon (2017) terms a “status deficit.” States with this view will signal their
dissatisfaction by not signing onto treaties.
Weapons dissenters are the other type of non-signatory. Unlike
status dissenters, the emphasis of these states is on security rather than prestige.
Weapons dissenters usually have enduring rivalries that result in leaders
considering nuclear proliferation as a source of national defense. Considering the
nuclear option is not tantamount to a decision to pursue the bomb. States that are
weapon dissenters are likely to study the feasibility of autonomously developing
nuclear weapons. They will not sign treaties until their leadership has ruled out
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nuclearization in principle. States that refuse to sign agreements because they
would disarm their nuclear-armed security sponsors are also weapons dissenters
that focus on the bomb as a means of security.
Countries have multiple interests. Leaders could theoretically object
to arms control based on both status and weapons rationales. It is essential to
evaluate declassified documents and other materials to assess drivers of national
behavior and decision-making. When both motivations are present, credible
military concerns about national survival unsurprisingly supersede status
considerations. Types can nonetheless change over time.
Figure 2: Two-Step Process of Entering into Arms Control

As Figure 2 (with signature on the left-hand side) depicts, shifting
types are fundamental to non-signatories becoming signatories over time. These
changes only occur through transformation of national ambitions and perceptions
regarding a treaty’s balance of power. Both status dissenters and weapons
dissenters may eventually sign treaties as subordinates or advocates. The former
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occurs when a non-signatory is unable to resist overwhelming pressure to sign by
its patron. The latter transpires after increases in status or security, or decisions
that nuclear weapons and nuclear energy will not help achieve national objectives.
In this dissertation, I use process tracing to reconstruct states’ decision points
concerning the NPT and the CTBT. For advanced nuclear states that had much to
lose, I identify changing national positions and causal mechanisms enabling them
to come to terms with the new balance of power.
Commitment Signaling and Treaty Ratification
Following an executive signing a multilateral nuclear arms control treaty on behalf
of a state, officials may consider ratification. This action represents a more
extensive commitment to legally forswearing nuclear weapons. Ratification is
costlier than signature because it ties a state’s hands with military capability
restrictions and monitoring and verification. I refer to this costlier signal as a
commitment signal.
Commitment signaling represents a more credible commitment than
does signaling of a state’s type. States incur several costs of ratification they would
be unlikely to accept if they had no intention of complying with the treaty. These
costs are of both an ex-ante and ex-post character. The former include a
sovereignty cost due to intrusive verification, whether through IAEA safeguards,
on-site inspections (OSI), or required technology declarations. The latter include
the fact that the state is legally forswearing nuclear weapons that could contribute
to its survival. Withdrawing, which I discuss below, is particularly costly after

51

ratification due to what it may reveal or suggest about state intentions. Accordingly,
ratification of multilateral arms control treaties both screens and constrains.
As with any treaty, there will always be potential cheaters. However,
history bears out that costs associated with ratification sharply reduced incidents
of cheating and non-compliance (Müller and Schmidt 2010; Herzog, Ko, and Lee
2021). Additionally, ratification has more firmly set the course of nuclear policy than
signature. Countries like Japan, South Korea, and West Germany finally
abandoned considering the bomb after ratification, not signature.
Still, the gravity of agreeing to forgo weapons that would greatly
enhance state power, security, and survival prospects can result in debates lasting
many years. Even leaders who sign arms control treaties may not be prepared to
pursue ratification. Of course, ratification sometimes follows immediately or shortly
after signature. At other times, it never follows at all. Understanding the motivations
behind why states quickly ratify after signature, delay ratification after signature, or
decline to ratify after signature is critical to explaining how nuclear arms control
regimes gain members.
The historical record reveals two types of ratification debates on
multilateral nuclear arms control: protracted and pro forma. While domestic political
actors participate in these debates, neither outcome emerges purely from the
balance of party politics and veto players. Instead, discussions focus on
substantive matters of the national interest or procedural matters.
As illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure 2, serious security
threats have determinative impacts on state willingness to ratify multilateral nuclear
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arms control treaties. Such threats emanate from countries with greater relative
military power than—or a history of bellicose relations with—the state considering
ratification. The theoretical logic is similar to strategic interaction models of
proliferation developed by Monteiro and Debs (2014) and Debs and Monteiro
(2017). When a state lacks serious security threats or has credible third-party
protection against its rivals, the end outcome is a pro forma debate and ratification.
But when a state lacks—or has reason to question—credible third-party protection
against serious security threats, a protracted ratification debate about national
defense and survival will result. Other considerations from the literature, like treatycontingent benefits and norms, certainly may appear in ratification debates. My
comparative case studies show that security was the most essential and necessary
condition for facilitating commitment signaling.
There are three main reasons why a state that initially refuses to
ratify a treaty may eventually decide to deposit its instrument of ratification. First,
ratification becomes more palatable when threats to state survival dissipate.
Treaties of peace and friendship, confidence-building measures, or the adversary
facing a military defeat can all make ratification possible. Second, states have
incentives to pursue ratification if they gain credible protection against serious
security threats. Support from a powerful security sponsor, often coupled with
forward-deployed conventional or nuclear forces and joint operational planning,
attenuates the severity of threats. Capability limitations then become less harmful
to a state’s prospects for survival. Third, a patron can threaten abandonment if its
protégé does not ratify a treaty. Coercive threats force the protégé to weigh the
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benefits of non-ratification versus protection from its security sponsor, thereby
increasing ratification chances.
Legally forswearing nuclear weapons is a different dependent
variable than nuclear proliferation. A state decision to refrain from pursuing the
bomb at a given time is not the same as legally closing the door on the nuclear
option and accepting the ex-ante and ex-post costs of commitment signaling.
Leaders think hard about ratification decisions, and long-term perceptions of
patron credibility and rival intentions frequently matter more than “objective”
material realities. Of course, ratification decisions are not entirely independent from
a state’s initial type signaling behavior. Former weapons dissenters will almost
inevitably have more difficulty legally forswearing nuclear weapons than their
counterparts from the other three initial state types.
While protracted ratification debates focus predominantly on
security, pro forma debates focus mainly on procedural issues. The scarcity of
threats facing the states places ratification in the national interest. References to
endorsing the status quo and the norms of the treaty generally populate the
transcripts of pro forma ratification discussions. Countries that do not have civilian
nuclear energy programs or interest in nuclear weapons—those falling outside the
scope of the dissertation—are the most likely to have pro forma ratification
debates. But recalling my interview with the Tongan diplomat, ratification also
depends on government capacity and priorities. Pro forma discussions may
happen years after the executive signs a treaty. Determining the nature of a
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ratification debate requires evaluating the substantive content of discussions
rather than simply examining timelines.
In sum, without assurances of national survival, states lack
incentives to provide a commitment signal of their legal nuclear forbearance.
Uncertainty about the security costs and benefits of arms control can loom over
ratification discussions, irrespective of state motivations for signing a treaty. That
is why the historical record is littered with cases of advanced nuclear states waiting
years between signing and ratifying. Much of the impetus for delays often stems
from the difficulty of backing out of treaties post-ratification due to costs imposed
by the international community.32
International treaties usually contain withdrawal clauses in their text
(Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2003; Koremenos and Nau 2010). Negotiators
include these provisions to mitigate states’ uncertainty about the future
(Korenemos 2005). Multilateral nuclear arms control treaties are no exception. For
example, Article X of the NPT and Article IX of the CTBT contain identical language
stipulating that a state may withdraw if “extraordinary events, related to the subject
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” Yet,
withdrawals of this type are rare in the domain of nuclear diplomacy. The
international community usually interprets this behavior as a strong indicator of a
state’s intent to violate the accord’s guidelines.
32

On the costs of treaty withdrawal see: Helfer 2005.
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States that abrogate their nuclear treaty commitments may face
stiffer punishments for their behavior than their counterparts who were never
parties to the agreements. After North Korea’s 2003 withdrawal from the NPT and
subsequent nuclear test in 2006, the UN Security Council (UNSC) levied harsh
economic sanctions against Pyongyang.33 On the other hand, India and Pakistan
had never been NPT members when they tested nuclear weapons in 1998, but
each received only verbal condemnation from the same body.34 Cheating is also
costly, as even the mere suspicion of violating commitments to nuclear arms
control invites a spate of possible punishments in the form of shaming, technology
denial sanctions, counterproliferation strikes, and even invasion and regime
change (Litwak 2007; Miller 2014; Debs and Monteiro 2017; Whitlark 2017).
The virtual finality of ratification and these attendant consequences
may sow the seeds of doubt among governments in conflict-prone regions. Even
states with longstanding security sponsors may hold out on ratifying such treaties
until they receive more robust assurances. On this point, Downs, Rocke, and
Barsoom (1996) maintain that treaty compliance is usually high because states
select into agreements they intend to abide by in the first place.
Though the question of nuclear treaty withdrawal lies outside this
dissertation’s immediate focus, my theory does shed some light on North Korea’s
33

See: S/RES/1718. And for a detailed discussion of North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the
NPT see, e.g.: Litwak 2007.
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See: S/RES/1172.
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NPT withdrawal. By invoking its “supreme interests,” Pyongyang became the first
and only state to leave a multilateral nuclear arms control treaty. The theory would
predict that potential proliferators lacking credible protection against serious
security threats will withdraw when the benefits of pursuing prohibited nuclear
technologies outweigh the costs of punishments. If the consequences of
withdrawing were similar to cheating, why then would a state not just gamble and
covertly violate the treaty? The answer is that withdrawal introduces strategic
ambiguity about a state’s capabilities that may well bolster its ability to deter foes.
Joint Signaling and Treaty Accession
As discussed above, once a multilateral nuclear arms control treaty has entered
into force, states may no longer sign it. State signatories have the option of
ratification, but states that have not signed may only accede to formalize their arms
control participation. Accession is, therefore, what I term a joint signal. The
necessary conditions for both signature and ratification must be satisfied for states
to accede. While accession’s causal logic appears slightly different from the twostep process of signature and ratification, it is a related event. Figure 3 highlights
national decision-making processes that allow for treaty accession.
An accession is hardly a rate event. A total of 76 of the 191 States
Parties to the NPT became members through accession rather than via signature
followed by ratification. In practice, three types of states have acceded to treaties.
First, states that do not view the treaty as a priority before its entry-into-force
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oftentimes miss the window for signature and pursue accession as an alternative
pathway to joining. Second, newly independent states that did not exist before the
treaty opened for signature—like the post-Soviet states or former colonial
territories—find themselves in a similar position vis-à-vis the treaty. Third, and
most relevant to this dissertation, emerging nuclear powers that were status
dissenters or weapons dissenters at the time of entry-into-force must also decide
between accession and non-accession.
Figure 3: One-Step Process of Entering into Arms Control

Because accession carries the same legal weight and obligations as
ratification (Aust 2013), it can be a difficult choice for advanced nuclear states to
accept capability restrictions. Accession, like ratification, is the final step in legally
forswearing nuclear weapons. A state issues a joint signal equivalent to both type
and commitment signaling by acceding. Its leaders are accordingly making
definitive statements about their views on the treaty’s distribution of power and
their level of credible protection from serious security threats. While politicians may
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not conceptualize accession in this manner, national conversations about
acceding to agreements are likely to involve a mixture of discussion about treaty
principles and security threats. There are some cases where states delayed their
accession for reasons related to type signaling considerations, and there are other
cases where commitment signaling considerations were pivotal. Only the
achievement of both necessary conditions allows for joint signaling to occur.
Toward Arms Control and Generalizability
This chapter laid out a process-based theory of why advanced nuclear states
legally forswear the bomb by signing and ratifying multilateral nuclear arms control
treaties. The theory improves on the existing literature that can oversimplify treaty
behavior. It does so by pointing to differential motivations underlying state
decisions at each step of the process. And by acknowledging that arms control
decision-making involves multiple considerations, some more prominent than
others, the theory subsumes past scholarly endeavors. These studies may offer
accurate assessments of individual state decisions for signature or ratification. But
my theory, however, is broadly generalizable due to its emphasis on process.
Signing a treaty is a type signal related to approving or disapproving
of the balance of power codified by a nuclear accord. The event of signature can
arise from treaty advocacy or subordination to superpower pressure. Ratification
is a commitment signal that occurs when states either have an absence of serious
security threats to their national survival or have credible third-party protection from
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such threats. Accession is a joint signal encompassing the motivations for both
type and commitment signals.
The argument’s logic points to three theoretical lessons why states
may accept the constraints of legally forswearing nuclear weapons. First, having
few threats among one’s neighbors increases the chances of embracing a nuclear
arms control agreement and its capability limitations. A state’s maintenance of a
powerful military, or its location in a region with strong external sovereignty norms,
contributes to this propensity. Second, states with reliable allies are more likely to
accept multilateral nuclear arms control than states that lack them. Protection from
threats makes states more likely to sign onto initiatives due to their comfort with
the balance of power and to formalize their commitment through ratification.
Finally, secure access to the civilian nuclear market strengthens a state’s
willingness to participate in treaties. Suppose a government views civilian nuclear
technologies as stepping stones to prestige and enhanced presence on the world
stage. In that case, it will have great difficulty accepting treaties perceived to be
obstacles to this future.
The logic of type, commitment, and joint signaling have
generalizability to other areas of international affairs. Entry into multilateral treaties
is a process that involves different levels of commitment. Regardless, legally
forswearing nuclear weapons has unquestionable implications for state survival
that are likely not present in development banking, election monitoring, or other
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areas. Additional research could shed light on the unique rationales for treaty
decision-making in these domains.
While my theory focuses on signals sent by states, signaling is a
multi-party phenomenon involving a sender and recipient audiences. A key
consideration for arms control and avenue for future research is how allies,
adversaries, and non-aligned states interpret these signals. Because signature
and ratification are binary outcomes but encompass multiple state types,
misperception can be consequential. For example, a status dissenter and a
weapons dissenter may be observationally equivalent to a third-party. The efficacy
of signaling is outside the scope of this dissertation, but the potential for
misperception is a key policy implication of my theory.
Lastly, the theory diverges from past findings in non-nuclear areas of
global affairs indicating that—in many cases—joining international agreements is
cheap talk that confers benefits (Vreeland 2008; Hyde 2011). These studies often
predict quick near-universality of membership as a result. The signaling logic
outlined in this chapter is still present, but rationales for doing so are not the same
as those involved in renouncing the nuclear weapons option. I often observe
considerable lag in phases of participating in multilateral nuclear arms control
because neither signature nor ratification is cheap talk. Both are costly, but
ratification is costlier: It is the way of saying “Never” to nuclear arms.
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Chapter 3 – Egypt: Nuclear Hedging and Instrumentalist Arms Control
Egypt presents numerous puzzles for understanding why states legally forswear
nuclear weapons by signing and ratifying multilateral arms control treaties.35 They
span the tenure of every president from Gamal Abdel Nasser to current leader
Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. For instance, why did Nasser sign the NPT the day it opened
for signature in 1968? Nasser had expressed interest in nuclear weapons and
suffered a humiliating defeat to Israel in the Six-Day War just a year earlier. Why
then, after signing the NPT, did Nasser decline to pursue its ratification in the
Egyptian parliament? What changes caused his successor, Anwar Sadat, to
reverse course in 1981 despite Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons and
Jerusalem’s refusal to join the treaty?
NPT ratification is hardly the end of Cairo’s complicated nuclear
history. The next president, Hosni Mubarak, signed the CTBT just weeks after it
opened for signature in 1996. Yet, he delayed ratification of the treaty banning
nuclear tests, although the NPT already prohibited Egypt from proliferation.36
Presidents Mohamed Morsi and Al-Sisi followed suit, with Egypt remaining outside
the CTBT to this day.
Figure 4 shows that Egypt is an ideal country of study for this
dissertation’s research questions. There was a nearly 13-year gap between its
signature and ratification of the NPT, and the parliament has not ratified the
35

Egypt and Syria formed the sovereign state of the United Arab Republic (UAR) from 1958 until
1961 when Syria left the union. Regardless, Egypt maintained the UAR name until 1971. I refer to
the state only as “Egypt” in this chapter.
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See: NPT, Art. II.
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CTBT—signed 25 years ago by Mubarak. Throughout the decades under
consideration, Egypt has always had an autocratic regime. Leaders who sign
treaties could order ratification with relative ease. The associated signature–
ratification time-lags suggest differential motivations underlying these decisions.
Figure 4: Timeline of Egyptian NPT and CTBT Diplomacy

While the existing literature says little about Egypt and the CTBT,
numerous scholars have studied Cairo’s path toward the NPT. An Egyptian desire
to constrain Israel is the dominant explanation for Nasser signing the NPT (Einhorn
2004; Spaniel 2019). Ratification under Sadat is more ambiguous. The
conventional wisdom holds that Egypt eventually ratified the NPT to obtain nuclear
power reactors (Kats 1985; Barnaby 1989; Solingen 2007). However, even today,
Egypt has never operated a nuclear power plant on its territory. This chapter parts
ways with the literature’s emphasis on these treaty-contingent benefits, showing
that security considerations were paramount in Egypt’s NPT ratification. To do so,
I analyze a variety of UN treaty negotiation documents, declassified diplomatic
communications, and other historical accounts.
The evidence confirms that Nasser was willing to signal Egypt’s type
as a treaty advocate by signing the NPT in 1968. As the typology depicted in Table
3 in Chapter 2 explains, advocates accept the distribution of power codified by a
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treaty and view the agreement as a long-term asset. Nasser’s rationale for signing
was instrumental: to support a treaty Arab states believed would militarily constrain
Israeli nuclear ambitions. Cairo also had indications its own nuclearization would
be technically challenging and bear negative diplomatic consequences. Thus, it
was not difficult for Egypt to provide a type signal of its intent to forgo the bomb.
But when Israel failed to sign, Egypt delayed NPT ratification for over
a decade. Only after the Israeli security threat dissipated through the Camp David
Accords and Sadat’s separate peace with Jerusalem could Egypt offer a firmer
commitment signal. While Nasser’s type signal created an expectation of Egyptian
compliance with the NPT, Sadat’s commitment signal formalized that obligation. It
is true that other motivations, including a desire to obtain civilian nuclear energy,
contributed to NPT ratification in 1981. However, security considerations
predominated in the decision to legally forswear nuclear weapons that could help
ensure national survival. Mubarak’s decisions to type signal as an advocate in the
CTBT context in 1996 and subsequently withhold a commitment signal conform to
a similar logic. He aimed to pressure Israel, without success, into multilateral
treaties to roll back Jerusalem’s nuclear arsenal. Egypt will almost certainly be a
CTBT non-party until Israel reduces its atomic footprint in the Middle East.
This chapter explains Egyptian nuclear diplomacy on the NPT and
the CTBT in five sections. First, I chronicle the early history of Egypt’s rivalry with
Israel and the beginning of its nuclear program. Second, I show how these
elements affected decisions regarding the negotiation and signing of the NPT.
Third, I demonstrate through the historical record how motivations for ratifying the
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treaty differed from those for signing it. Fourth, I expand my analysis to the theory’s
applicability to Egyptian behavior on the CTBT. Finally, I briefly summarize the
findings and conclude the chapter.
Rivalry with Israel and the Early Nuclear Program
Studies of enduring rivalries trace enmity between Egypt and Israel to 1948, the
year of the latter’s founding (Goertz and Diehl 1993; Maoz and Mor 1996; Stein
1996). In 1947, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria voted against the UN plan
to create the state of Israel on the territory of the former British Mandate of
Palestine. Shortly after Israeli independence, these countries joined with Saudi
Arabia and Yemen to launch an attack on the new state. Despite their massive
troop advantage, the Arab states lost a humiliating defeat that also involved fighting
in Southern Lebanon and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula (Morris 2008; Bleek 2010a;
Spaniel 2019). The conflict solidified the Egypt–Israel rivalry, which would later
take on nuclear dimensions.
The Egyptian defeat also had lasting ramifications for the country’s
politics. It further discredited King Farouk—who depended on British support—
among nationalist military officers, including Lieutenant Colonel Gamel Abdel
Nasser and General Mohamed Naguib. Their Free Officers Movement overthrew
Farouk in a 1952 coup d’état,37 with Naguib becoming the first president of the
Arab Republic of Egypt and Nasser as his prime minister. Nasser would supplant
37

See: “The Military Coup in Egypt,” July 23, 1952, Office of Current Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room, General
CIA Records, Doc. CIA-RDP91T01172R000200280003-8.
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Naguib in 1954, pursuing a foreign policy of Pan-Arabism and hostility to Israel
until his death in 1970 (Stephens 1971; Aburish 2004; Gerges 2019).
The Egyptian nuclear program was born against this backdrop. After
U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s famous Atoms for Peace speech,38
Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, and the United States began
negotiating civil nuclear cooperation agreements. The Egyptian government
“showed immediate interest in nuclear energy” partnership with the United States
(Selim 1982, p. 135). In 1954, Nasser formally initiated Cairo’s nuclear program,
with the creation of the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) following a year later
(Solingen 2007).
Prior to the program, Egypt had fewer than 1,400 annual university
graduates in the sciences, a minimal number for a country of over 20 million people
(Bhatia 1988, p. 49). The nuclear program helped modernize Egypt’s scientific
research and education infrastructure. Cairo University soon offered graduate
coursework in nuclear physics (Selim 1982), and a new bilateral cooperation
agreement with Washington initiated construction on a radioisotope laboratory at
the National Research Center at Inshas in 1956 (Selim 1996). Such activities
continued into the late 1950s. Egypt sent its young nuclear scientists for training in
India, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Cairo signed technical agreements
with these countries alongside others like Norway and Yugoslavia (Walsh 2001).
By the end of the decade, Egypt seemed well on the way to a
successful nuclear energy program. It had a developing base of human capital,
38

See: Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace” (470th UNGA Plenary Meeting, New York,
December 8, 1953), https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech.
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while construction at Inshas was underway on the radioisotope laboratory with the
Americans and a two-megawatt light water reactor (LWR) for research with the
Soviets (Einhorn 2004). Furthermore, it had access to raw materials, as “a
comprehensive aerial and geological surveying program” located uranium deposits
in the north of the country (Selim 1982, p. 137). At this time, there were no
multilateral nuclear arms control treaties to restrict Egypt’s nuclear activities.
Publicly, civil-scientific pursuits appeared to motivate Nasser’s broad
support for the nuclear enterprise. AEA Secretary General Ibrahim Hilmy Abdel
Rahman actively promoted peaceful nuclear power generation and nuclear
medicine (Solingen 2007). Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Nasser’s long-time friend
and policy advisor, maintained that the president believed nuclear energy
represented a path toward Egypt’s rapid economic development and national
prestige. Heikal recalled Nasser stating emphatically, “We missed out in the steam
age, and also in the electricity age, but we ought not allow ourselves under any
circumstances to be left behind in the atomic age (qtd. in Walsh 2001, p. 145).” In
retrospect, it seems unlikely that the Egyptians would embrace any agreement that
would limit their development of atomic energy. However, the nuclear fuel cycle
involves dual-use technologies with civilian and military applications. It is this latter
context that has primarily shaped Egypt’s participation in nuclear diplomacy.
Historical accounts indicate Nasser prioritized civilian uses of nuclear
energy but hedged in the military domain.39 Despite reports that Egypt declined to
39

Narang (2016/2017, p. 134) codes Egypt as a “hard hedger” from 1955–1980, indicating Cairo
“attempt[ed] to become a threshold nuclear state with many of the pieces in place for a functional
weapons program (p. 118).”
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buy fissile materials from unscrupulous actors in the mid-1950s (Walsh 2001;
Rublee 2009), Nasser’s regime recruited former Nazi nuclear and missile scientists
to work in Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s (Feldman 1997).40 Rahman himself
reported receiving guidance in 1955 that “the focus should be on peaceful
applications, but that the program should be organized in a way that would
preserve a military option (Walsh 2001, p. 146).” When Rahman left the AEA in
1958 to pursue other responsibilities in the government, his replacement was
indigenous proliferation advocate Salah Hedayat. According to Hedayat, Nasser
ordered the onset of secret nuclear efforts before Egypt was ever aware of Israel’s
activities at Dimona. Solingen (2007, p. 234) thus notes that a “future threat” must
have motivated what she labels a “preemptive program.”
Yet, nuclear hedging need not arise from nuclear threats alone. It is
important to recall that Nasser was deeply moved by Egypt’s defeat in the 1948
war with Israel and faced aggression from Israel, France, and the United Kingdom
during the 1956 Suez Crisis (Kyle 1991; Kissinger 1994; Nichols 2012). Nasser
had nationalized the British-run Suez Canal, leading London and Paris to support
an Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula with the goal of regime change. Pressure
from the United States, the UN, and the Soviet Union—including a nuclear threat
from Moscow—foiled the plan. Nasser clearly also had reasons to pursue nuclear
weapons to deter conventional attacks. It is unlikely that the president would have
legally forsworn nuclear weapons in the 1950s.
40

Israel thwarted these plans with a large-scale Mossad counter-operation involving “bombings,
kidnappings, and assassinations.” The efforts were so effective that it became too dangerous for
German scientists to work in Egypt by 1964, resulting in a “mass exodus” of those who had come
to cooperate (Bahgat 2007, p. 411).
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But even as Nasser showed some early restraint toward the military
nuclear option, Israel rapidly developed its own program. Prime Minister David
Ben-Gurion received cabinet permission to secretly build a 24-megawatt nuclear
reactor at Dimona in 1957. Plans to construct facilities for the French-supplied
reactor were made shortly after Jerusalem decided to begin the long road to
nuclearization (Cohen 1998; Karpin 2006). Such plans were a direct Franco–Israeli
response to dissatisfaction at being unable to coerce Nasser in the Suez Crisis
(Shaker 1980b). Though Israel denied it was building a reactor (Nashif 1984),
Nasser’s intelligence services received worrisome reports in 1959 from Mohamed
Ezzat Abdelaziz, an Egyptian physicist at the Argonne National Laboratory outside
of Chicago. Abdelaziz claimed Israeli scientists were researching with Americans
behind closed doors at the lab’s classified plutonium section—a clear indication of
work toward the bomb (Walsh 2001).41
Egyptian Vice Chief of Intelligence Amin Howeidy quickly ordered
overflight surveillance of the Dimona site and became convinced of a covert
nuclear program (Walsh 2001). On December 21, 1961, under international
pressure, Ben-Gurion acknowledged the reactor construction while claiming it was
exclusively for research and civilian applications. The announcement still raised
alarm bells throughout the Arab world. Nasser publicly declared two days later “that
if Israel acquired nuclear weapons, Egypt would have to acquire them at any price
(Einhorn 2004, p. 45).” He further stated that Israeli proliferation would lead to war
“no matter how suicidal for the Arabs (Rublee 2006, p. 556).” In Nasser’s eyes,
41

Abdelaziz believed collaboration involved certain American scientists providing aid to Israel
atomic efforts, rather than a concerted U.S. government effort (Walsh 2001).
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Israeli nuclear weapons presented an existential threat to the survival of Egypt and
its Arab compatriots.
Behind the scenes, Nasser led a furious diplomatic engagement
effort on nuclear issues from 1961–1965, sending top diplomats to Washington
and receiving U.S. officials in Cairo. He pressured the John F. Kennedy and
Lyndon B. Johnson administrations to reign in Israel’s nuclear ambitions while
assuring them of Egyptian plans to remain non-nuclear (Elbahtimy 2018). For their
part, his American interlocutors shared “findings from inspections at Dimona, which
repeatedly failed to find evidence of reprocessing or other weapons-related
activities, in part because of an elaborate deceit and diversion campaign mounted
by Israel (Bleek 2010a, pp. 116–117).”42 Ben-Gurion even told Kennedy that the
reactor was for use in nuclear desalination of seawater.43 Nasser may have been
convinced, publicly saying in 1964 he did not believe Israel was pursuing nuclear
weapons at Dimona (Solingen 2007). It is unclear if this statement reflected his
actual views, given his longstanding distrust of Israel, or an attempt to de-escalate
tensions and avoid war.
What is clear, however, is that Dimona led Nasser’s government to
make forays into obtaining fissile materials to build the bomb. This drive to achieve
42
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nuclear threshold status or potential nuclearization occurred in spite of his nonnuclear pledges to Washington. Meanwhile, the Soviet-supplied research reactor
(ETRR-1) had come online at Inshas in 1961. Still, its two-megawatt capacity and
light water moderation meant it would produce insufficient plutonium byproducts
for a nuclear device (Shaker 1995). Egypt also lacked reprocessing capabilities to
separate plutonium for a bomb from the spent uranium fuel.
The beginning of operations at ETRR-1 led the AEA to increase
nuclear activities at the National Research Center. AEA leadership also sought
cooperation with Britain, Canada, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United
States, and West Germany to build additional facilities. The priority was to acquire
heavy water reactors (HWRs) and reprocessing technologies. Together, these
capabilities would enable Egypt to forgo uranium enrichment or foreign supply of
reactor fuel, relying on its own stocks of natural uranium near Rosetta. This setup
would allow for production of a plutonium-based nuclear device (Walsh 2001).
While Cairo signed contracts with firms from several countries, issues related to
proliferation risks, the Arab–Israeli conflict, and financing ultimately led them all to
fall through (Selim 1982; Einhorn 2004).
Nasser’s publicly stated intentions rarely deviated from ensuring
nuclear parity with Israel. While he told the Americans behind closed doors in the
1960s that Egypt would remain non-nuclear, he also unsuccessfully tried to
convince other Arab League members to jointly pursue nuclear weapons (BarJoseph 1982; Walsh 2001). And in 1966, he told the British Broadcasting
Corporation Cairo was “thinking of developing nuclear weapons to match Israel
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(qtd. in Walsh 2001, p. 172).” He also warned of Egyptian preventive strikes if
Israel successfully developed the bomb (Shikaki 1985).
The Egyptian government took steps to match Nasser’s rhetoric.
AEA scientists, Egyptian diplomats, and Nasser himself repeatedly asked the
Soviets, the Chinese, and the Indians for sensitive nuclear assistance in the 1960s
(Shikaki 1985; Solingen 2007; Gibbons 2016). Egypt even tried to purchase the
bombs themselves from China and the Soviet Union (Walsh 2001; Einhorn 2004;
Solingen 2007). In every case, Cairo’s requests were declined and the regime
urged to remain non-nuclear or rely on its indigenous knowledge and technology
base. As Barnaby (1989, p. 86) notes: “It learnt from bitter experience the rule that
existing nuclear-weapon powers are totally committed to keeping nuclear weapons
to themselves; the last thing they want to see is an expansion of the nuclear club.”
The Soviets ultimately offered vague security assurances to Egypt against an
Israeli bomb, though Nasser found these commitments lacking in credible
protection (Shikaki 1985; Khan 2002; Spaniel 2019).44
Despite Egyptian interest in the bomb, efforts to proliferate declined
sharply after Israel defeated Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria in the SixDay War of June 1967. Nasser and his Minister of Defense Abdel Hakim Amer had
mobilized troops in the Sinai Peninsula as border disputes drove tensions between
Israel and Syria (Oren 2002; Laron 2017; Fahmy 2020). While Egyptian military
documents indicate Nasser sought to deter Jerusalem from attacking a fellow Arab
state (Elbahtimy 2018), the move triggered an Israeli preemptive strike. The Israeli
44
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Defense Forces “practically demolished the entire Egyptian airforce in the first few
hours (Joshi 2000, p. 2104).” Israel won a stunning victory and occupied the Gaza
Strip, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.
In an interview with historian Avner Cohen, former U.S. National
Security Advisor Walt Rostow recalled that Israeli intelligence feared preventive
strikes threatened by Nasser.45 In the weeks before the conflict, Egyptian spy
planes conducted reconnaissance over Dimona. However, Elbahtimy (2018) found
no archival evidence of nuclear motivations underlying the mobilization of troops
in the Sinai.46 In fact, the flights were unauthorized sorties by young Egyptian pilots
who sought payback against Israel for invading their airspace (Cooper 2016).
Whether misperceptions over these missions truly altered Israeli intelligence
assessments and prompted the Six-Day War requires further investigation.
Regardless, the nuclear situation in the Middle East was forever
changed. Cohen (2007) argues that tensions leading up to the war prompted Israeli
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to make the final decision to assemble a bomb, just
one year before the NPT opened for signature.47 Before then, there may have been
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a possibility that Israel remained a threshold state. Meanwhile, Nasser froze his
nuclear program under the war’s economic strains and a need to rebuild the
Egyptian conventional military (Walsh 2001; Rublee 2006; Solingen 2007; Gibbons
2016). He did this instead of redoubling nuclearization efforts.
Egypt had abjectly failed to counter the Israeli nuclear program. After
the Six-Day War, it became clear Nasser could not credibly threaten to stop an
Israeli bomb. The AEA had also achieved only minor progress in the nuclear field,
leading Nasser to cut its funding after the war. Why had Egypt, with such a
pronounced security threat, made dismal strides to the bomb? Three possibilities
immediately come to mind given the evidence of the case. Each has merit, but I
find the technical and managerial ineptitude explanation most persuasive.
First is a series of sharp disagreements and management culture
tensions between scientists, civilian officials, and the military (Walsh 2001; Einhorn
2004). In summarizing the Egyptian program, Walsh (2001, p. 172) writes: “There
was no equivalent to the Manhattan Project [...] Instead, there was drift, delay, and
missed opportunities.” This analysis is in line with scholarship indicating certain
types of autocratic states and command economies may face great difficulty
proliferating (Hymans 2012; Montgomery 2013; Braut-Hegghammer 2016). It is
also the most compelling of the three explanations. In 1966, Egypt was among
allegedly observed at Argonne by Mohamed Ezzat Abdelaziz, likely allowed Jerusalem to be
confident in its weapon designs without conducting a full-fledged nuclear test.
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countries the U.S. intelligence community assessed “would need substantial aid in
virtually all phases of a nuclear program” but was unlikely to receive such aid.48
The second possible explanation is fear of a preventive strike given
Israeli military capabilities, particularly in the airpower domain. As Debs and
Monteiro (2017, p. 9) state: “Nuclear weapons may well be the weapons of the
weak, but the weak (and unprotected) cannot get them.” Egypt did lack a credible
security guarantee from a powerful patron against Israeli aggression. Given the
remarkably limited progress of the AEA, however, there is no evidence indicating
that fear of Israeli counterforce strikes deterred Cairo from building the bomb.
The third line of reasoning is that perhaps Nasser never actually
wanted the bomb and instead sought threshold state status and nuclear hedging.
Interviews by Walsh (2001) and Rublee (2006) with former Egyptian officials
suggest there was never a written plan to develop nuclear weapons or a budget
specifically allocated to this objective. Recent scholarship also indicates that
possession of a “virtual arsenal” may allow for deterrence or compellence of rivals
with veiled threats of nuclear proliferation (Fuhrmann and Tkach 2015; Fuhrmann
2017; Volpe 2017; Herzog 2020). Nasser issued many such threats. Yet, this
explanation is also unpersuasive since Egypt stopped short before making enough
progress in the nuclear field to have a legitimate hedge.
Regardless of the precise reason, or combination of reasons, for
Egypt’s failure to proliferate, the Six-Day War marked a definitive turning point in
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See: “National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, ‘The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation,’”
January 20, 1966, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Doc. 116887, Lyndon B.
Johnson Library, p. 11.

75

its nuclear policy. To stop the Israeli bomb, Nasser needed a new strategy.
Multilateral nuclear arms control, therefore, became the Egyptian vehicle to contest
Jerusalem’s nuclear weapons. Egypt faced great difficulty obtaining its own bomb
and would consider legally forswearing nuclear weapons if arms control would
militarily constrain Israel.
Negotiating and Signing the NPT
As conflict and confrontation between Egypt and Israel were taking place, the Cold
War superpowers were colluding on nuclear nonproliferation (Coe and Vaynman
2015). In December 1961, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) voted to establish
the ENDC.49 The ENDC met in Geneva and included Egypt among its members.
It sought to achieve the principled objective of “general and complete disarmament
under effective international control.” While non-aligned members wanted to curtail
proliferation and the arms race, the United States and the Soviet Union aimed to
use the body to limit the nuclear-armed club. A year before the ENDC’s
establishment, Kennedy had warned: “There are indications because of new
inventions, that 10, 15, or 20 nations will have a nuclear capacity, including Red
China, by the end of the Presidential office in 1964.”50
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See: A/RES/1722(XVI). The 18 member states were: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union,
Sweden, the UAR (Egypt), the United Kingdom, and the United States. The French seat remained
open at the talks due to Paris’s objections to U.S.–Soviet collusion on the treaty’s provisions.
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John F. Kennedy (Presidential Debate with Richard M. Nixon, Third Joint Radio–Television
Broadcast, ABC News, Hollywood, CA and New York, October 13, 1960),
https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/3rd-nixon-kennedydebate-19601013. Kennedy made this remarkable claim during a debate in his successful
campaign to defeat Richard M. Nixon for the presidency. At that point, only four states—France,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—had developed nuclear weapons.
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Moscow and Washington each submitted draft proposals for
disarmament to the ENDC in 1961 and 1962, respectively (Harries 2014).
Predictably, the non-aligned states, including Egypt, were skeptical of these first
proposals. Indeed, each superpower offered an unrealistic plan for immediate
nuclear disarmament to discredit the other’s leadership when they rejected it.
Domestic political support for these initiatives was also lacking, and the Cuban
Missile Crisis cast further doubts on the sincerity of such efforts.
But in 1965, the Johnson administration began reinvigorated
outreach to Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev on a hypothetical nonproliferation
treaty. Brezhnev and his advisors bought into the treaty for two primary reasons:
U.S. assurances to cancel the Multilateral Force (MLF) and the status benefits of
dividing the world between NWS and NNWS (Brands 2007).51 The United States
tabled its first draft of the NPT at the ENDC in August 1965, with the USSR
following suit a month later. From 1965–1968, the superpowers would preside over
the body’s formal negotiations on the NPT. During this time, the Americans and
Soviets regularly discussed issues and presented them to the other ENDC parties
for feedback about a provision’s acceptability. They then presented opposing
treaty drafts. The superpowers maintained a veto over all treaty text and often
rejected input from the other negotiating parties.
His predictions about China were correct, as Beijing carried out its codename Project 596 test at
the Lop Nur site in 1964. Detonation of a nuclear test explosion prior to January 1, 1967, was set
as the NPT’s benchmark for distinguishing between the five permitted NWS and the remaining
NNWS. [See: NPT, Art. IX].
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From the outset, Nasser’s diplomats embraced the negotiations. This
occurred even as Nasser hedged toward the bomb and publicly threatened to
develop nuclear weapons if Israel did so. While the regime’s behavior may appear
counterintuitive at first glance, the NPT framework offered the Egyptian
government continuous opportunities to stigmatize Israel and its activities at
Dimona (Rublee 2006, 2009). Unlike other non-aligned delegations at the ENDC—
like Brazil, for instance—Egypt’s representatives in Geneva rarely questioned the
motivation behind, and existential value of, the nonproliferation enterprise.
For Egypt, the value of the treaty was clear: the NPT offered a way
to lock in a balance of power that was preferable to a nuclear-armed Israel. As a
result, my theory would predict that Cairo would be an early advocate of the NPT.
And in fact, it seemed as if Egypt might reveal its type as an advocate by signing
the treaty, though Israel’s position would shape the Egyptian decision calculus.
Jerusalem consulted with Washington but was not a member of the ENDC.
In contrast to Israel, Egypt played an important role at the ENDC from
the very beginning of the talks on the NPT. When the eight non-aligned states were
dissatisfied with the U.S. and Soviet draft treaties of 1965, Egyptian representative
Ismail Fahmy made a statement of principles (Shaker 1980a).52 Fahmy highlighted
11 key points he believed were necessary for the treaty, including permanence of
the agreement, global universality, freedom from loopholes, protection of the
interests of NNWS, and eventual prohibition of all nuclear weapons.53 Ambassador
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Mohamed Shaker, a notable Egyptian official and historian of the NPT, writes: “The
statement aroused great interest among a considerable number of delegations,
especially the delegations of the other seven non-aligned members of the ENDC
(Shaker 1980a, p. 45).” A resolution later adopted by the UNGA included a
condensed version of Fahmy’s points, which became the basis for NPT dialogue
in the ENDC.54
Fahmy’s statement also offered a preview of Egyptian bargaining
strategy over the NPT: to seek concessions from the superpowers and
instrumentally leverage the negotiations against Israel. In fact, transcripts of
conversations between U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
Director William Foster and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin reveal
frustration with the oftentimes unrelenting Egyptian demands (Harries 2014). Over
and over again, Cairo would raise issues during the talks in Geneva that could
enhance its security and later be weaponized against Israel. These topics dealt
with each of the three pillars of the NPT—nonproliferation, disarmament, and
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States may argue over treaty wording and
definitions relentlessly in negotiations, with agreement sometimes taking years. In
the case of the NPT, the concessions from the NWS demanded by Egypt and other
NNWS caused precisely this type of situation to occur.
The ENDC records highlight two central Egyptians concerns
regarding the nonproliferation pillar of the treaty. First, officials in Cairo worried
about the diversion of nuclear materials from NWS to NNWS. This topic likely had
54
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its roots in the French collaboration with Israel at Dimona and led Egyptian
representative Ambassador Hussein Khallaf to call for IAEA safeguards to “be
extended to the transfer of nuclear material and to all nuclear activities, past and
present.”55 The Egyptian objection was unsuccessful and not incorporated into
NPT Article III due to U.S. and Soviet unwillingness to subject their military nuclear
activities to safeguards. Second, Khallaf argued that NPT Articles I and II had
loopholes because they did not require states to ensure that their citizens were not
engaging in illicit transfers of nuclear materials and technologies.56 His fear, often
repeated by Egyptian officials, was “companies, firms, and other bodies” that might
engage in proliferation activities.57 The concern was likely driven by the alleged
collaboration of U.S. and Israeli nuclear scientists at Argonne National Laboratory.
After the U.S. and Soviet delegates took great strides to clarify that the treaty did
apply to these entities, Khallaf dropped this objection (Shaker 1980a).58
It is also important to recognize that the prospect of joining the treaty
as a NNWS carried ex-ante costs for Egypt. “Nasser actively sought hegemony
over the Arab world (Solingen 2007, p. 239),” and forgoing capabilities Israel was
known to be developing came with status and security risks. Additionally, the Suez
Crisis and the attempted coercion by the nuclear powers still loomed in the
Egyptian national memory. With nuclear weapons of their own a seemingly distant
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possibility, the Egyptians intended to reify a maximally favorable balance of power
by taking an active role in the wording of the agreement. If Egypt was going to
legally forswear nuclear weapons, Nasser required concessions from the nuclear
powers on disarmament.
Harries (2014) extensively documents the making of NPT Article VI
and its pledge of “a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.” In doing so, he outlines the pivotal role of Egyptian
actions. The superpowers tried for years to sidestep non-aligned states’ calls for
disarmament language in the treaty, eventually inserting preambular language.
Yet, Khallaf pushed for its inclusion as a separate treaty article, strongly backing
forward-looking language on disarmament proposed by his Mexican counterpart
in the ENDC. These efforts were successful and such language became a part of
treaty drafts by Washington and Moscow. However, many non-aligned states were
displeased with the Mexican text, as it formed the basis for the ambiguous part of
Article VI: “undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith” on disarmament.59 The
Egyptian Foreign Ministry secretly cabled London to share such sentiments. Cairo
suggested “the best course would be to propose stronger language for inclusion in
the eventual [UNGA] resolution endorsing the treaty and making recommendations
to the ENDC for its next phase of work (Harries 2014, p. 126).”
Because the treaty, per Article VI, would not require immediate
nuclear disarmament, Cairo began a decades-long—and still ongoing—quest for
multilateral security assurances at the ENDC. Egypt supported two different UNGA
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See: NPT, Art. VI.
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resolutions calling for negative security assurances to protect the NNWS from the
threat or use of nuclear weapons by the NWS.60 Khallaf tabled an amendment at
the ENDC in March 1967 formally calling for these assurances, warning that their
exclusion from the NPT would “increase the striking power” of the NWS by giving
them “the monopoly of nuclear attack.”61 Egypt also backed the language of the
so-called “Kosygin formula” proposed by Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in
1966 (Shaker 1980b). In a message to the ENDC delegates, Kosygin suggested
“a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to
the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory.”62
But as former negotiators Bunn and Timerbaev (1993, p. 12) explain,
such language was intended to allow Moscow to exert coercive leverage over West
Germany “unless U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from its territory.” In a 1968
memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) cautioned that negative security assurances would hurt military flexibility and
the credibility of U.S. deterrence. Treaty language on this would have caused the
JCS to “strongly oppose the United States becoming a party to an NPT.”63
Instead, Washington advocated for positive security assurances as
proposed by Johnson to the ENDC in his pledge that “nations that do not seek the
60
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nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of
nuclear blackmail.”64 While Egypt also supported this language, contentiousness
over security assurances resulted in neither their positive nor negative variants
being a part of the final treaty.
Cairo had failed to obtain a pledge of protection from the
superpowers against Israel. The UNSC did provide some modest reassurance to
Egypt in a resolution on positive security assurances passed in the lead-up to the
treaty’s opening for signature.65 But Resolution 255 lacked the legal standing of a
treaty and “did not define the nature of action to be taken against the aggressor
state (Adeniji 1995, p. 103).”66
Egypt also sought for the treaty to be a permanent solution to the
proliferation threat. This vision matched Fahmy’s recommendations in UNGA
Resolution 2028. The language of Article X proposed in the U.S. and Soviet draft
allowed for a state to withdraw if it believed the treaty “jeopardized the supreme
interests of its country.” Further, Article X limited the agreement to an initial term
of 25 years.67 These clauses were unacceptable to Nasser, given the costs of
joining the treaty. From 1966 until nearly the end of the ENDC negotiations in 1968,
Egypt opposed the “supreme interest” provision as a threat to the treaty’s credibility
(Shaker 1980b). Khallaf also vociferously argued for an NPT of indefinite duration.
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In one meeting of the ENDC, he stated that Cairo would only support the treaty if
it “constitute[d] an effective and permanent brake on the dissemination of nuclear
weapons.”68 Egypt would only embrace Article X, he later declared, if it “cannot in
any way make possible the termination of the treaty twenty five years after its entryinto-force.”69 As with many arguments made by the non-aligned states, Egypt’s
demands for a treaty of indefinite duration without a withdrawal clause were
rejected by the superpowers. Such provisions would likely have made many states
reluctant to join the treaty, as withdrawal clauses help to mitigate state concerns
about the uncertainty of the future (Korenemos 2005).
Egypt was most successful when advocating for concessions in the
area of peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. These were non-trivial gains by the
Nasser regime, which desired the benefits of civilian nuclear energy and the
potential to hedge toward the bomb. In August 1966, the ENDC’s non-aligned
members issued a joint memorandum calling for increased assistance to
developing countries “to help accelerate their programmes of development of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes.”70 This memo led to subsequent discussions
and the language of Article IV ensuring “the inalienable right of all the Parties to
the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination.”71 Egypt also backed a failed Italian proposal to
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guarantee the NNWS access to special fissionable materials (Swango 2014),
which might be used in the field of nuclear medicine, for fueling research reactors,
or for conducting PNEs. In the end, the efforts of the Egyptian delegation and
others were successful in obtaining the Article IV language requiring “due
consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”
Taken together, Egypt achieved some victories—but mostly
defeats—at the ENDC negotiations. When the NPT opened for signature on July
1, 1968, Nasser’s diplomats had gained pledges of support for the flagging and
deprioritized AEA. They had made little progress in obtaining protection against
Israel, which they assumed already had the bomb or would assemble one in due
course. Timing is also a critical factor in understanding Egyptian views on the NPT.
At the beginning of the negotiations in 1965, Cairo’s team in Geneva had some
level of optimism about the dual strategy of nuclear hedging and preventive strikes
against Dimona.
By July 1968, Egypt’s situation had radically changed, making type
signaling the state’s non-nuclear intentions easier:
● The level of technical proficiency at Inshas was an international
embarrassment for officials (Fahmy 2020);
● Cairo had failed to obtain turnkey nuclear weapons or sensitive
nuclear assistance from China and the USSR (Walsh 2001; Einhorn
2004; Solingen 2007);
● The defeat in the Six-Day War required the rebuilding of the economy
and military (Solingen 2007; Gibbons 2016);
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● The preventive strike option against Dimona was no longer viable
(Elbahtimy 2018), especially given the nearly complete destruction
of the air force (Joshi 2000).
Unlike some members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, little pressure
was needed to secure non-aligned Egypt’s signature to the NPT (Coe and
Vaynman 2015). It is accurate that Nasser’s Soviet patrons encouraged him to sign
the treaty as early as 1965 (Rublee 2006). Still, no historical evidence has surfaced
of anything resembling coercion such as threats of abandonment. And even if
Brezhnev had attempted to exert this type of leverage over Nasser, Egypt was a
“loose ally (Debs and Monteiro 2017).” Moscow’s failure to intervene militarily on
Egypt’s behalf in the Six-Day War showed Nasser the limits of its vague promises.
Egypt would signal its type as a treaty advocate, not a subordinate with limited
autonomy, by signing the NPT.
There had been doubts about Nasser’s nuclear ambitions, as he had
threatened for years to proliferate to match an Israeli bomb. But in the end, as my
theory would predict, Nasser signed the NPT on July 1, 1968, the day it opened
for signature. Without the technical, military, or economic capabilities to compete
with a nuclear Israel, Egypt was an advocate of the distribution of power codified
by the treaty. The NPT offered a reinvention of Cairo’s strategy to counter Israel,
as there was a belief the treaty would enhance state security by pressuring Israel
to abandon its nuclear aspirations (Einhorn 2004). In the interim, the accord
allowed Egypt “to give Israel a political black eye, as the ‘rogue’ Middle East state
with nuclear weapons (Spaniel 2019, p. 86),” increasing Nasser’s “leadership in
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the Arab World (Rublee 2006, p. 560).” In this sense, far from decreasing Egypt’s
status as one might expect, the treaty could serve as a vehicle to expand Egyptian
influence in the Middle East. By type signaling as an advocate, Egypt gained
leverage over Israel in international fora and telegraphed its NNWS intentions to
the world. This signaling helped to begin improving ties with the great powers that
could protect Egypt against the Israeli threat. Nasser, long viewed as a potential
seeker of nuclear weapons, became an early champion of the treaty.
Yet, the decision of the Egyptian leader was hardly without cost.
Nasser faced domestic critics in Cairo before making his decision, including
Muhammad Izzat Abd-al-Aziz, who would later lead the AEA. Izzat testified before
the parliament that signature would be a mistake, as only nuclear weapons could
effectively counter Jerusalem (Bleek 2010a). Embracing the NPT also meant that
Nasser—a harsh critic of international nuclear safeguards—had to endorse the
IAEA system of controls. He did so in 1966 while demanding that Israel open
Dimona to inspectors from the agency (Einhorn 2004; Rublee 2006). In truth, this
rhetoric was further proof of the NPT’s instrumentalist value to Nasser, as he then
declined to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. To do so would have
entailed a sovereignty cost by subjecting the AEA to international oversight and
the intermittent presence of observers at Inshas.
The Americans had not expected Nasser to sign. Consistent with
Sagan’s (2011) argument that regional rivals wait for one another to join treaties,
the State Department predicted that Egypt would only sign if Israel did so.72 Yet,
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U.S. pressure on Israel to sign was unsuccessful both before and shortly after the
NPT opened for signature.73 What the Americans failed to realize was that
endorsing the balance of power enshrined by the NPT through signature was
Egypt’s best available strategy to gain leverage against their regional rival.
Ratification, however, was a different story.
The Separate Peace and NPT Ratification
By quickly signing the NPT and promoting the treaty, Nasser’s type signaling was
a significant step forward in multilateral nuclear arms control. Still, as my theory
and international law literature indicate (Aust 2013), treaty signature falls short of
the deeper, firmer commitment signaling of ratification. And it would be nearly 13
years until Egypt offered such a commitment signal to the international community
in 1981. Motivations were, as it turned out, different for the two signals. Ratification
would only occur after what my theory refers to as a protracted debate, one
focusing on key areas of security and the Egyptian national interest.
Nasser’s rationale for holding out on ratifying the NPT revolved
primarily around security concerns associated with the Israeli position. Even when
Egypt used its non-ratification as a bargaining chip, it did so to try to obtain U.S.
military aid and security commitments for protection from Israel (Spaniel 2019).
Ismail Fahmy had recommended “to refrain from ratifying it until Israel did so, in
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,’” July 15, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, Doc. 134060, RG 59, Entry UD-UP 140, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Reports
Coordination and Review Staff, Intelligence Reports, 1964–1965, box 1, Chron/July 1965 Research
Memos, p. 6.
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order to ensure parity in nuclear non-proliferation obligations and capacity (Fahmy
2020, p. 117).” The president, known for his enmity toward Israel, took Fahmy’s
advice. After all, Egypt lacked reliable protection against the serious security threat
presented by Israel. Its Soviet patron and other member states of the Warsaw Pact
frequently condemned Israeli aggression at the ENDC in the 1960s,74 but no
delegations referred to Dimona in official proceedings or publicly called for
Jerusalem to join the treaty. When Nasser died in September 1970, Egypt
remained a non-party to the NPT. He had maintained this position despite
ratification pressure from the superpowers in the lead-up to the treaty’s entry-intoforce in March of that year.
In his last years, the president focused on rebuilding the economy
and military in the aftermath of the Six-Day War. Rezek (2017, p. 200) notes
concerns Nasser’s confidants had about the effect of the 1967 war on his health:
“his hair ‘turned white’ and he lost the ‘spark’ in his eyes, subsumed as he was
with the bitterness of defeat.” Still, he remained dedicated to combating Israel,
saying, “There is no other way for us but force, we have no alternative to safeguard
our honour (Rezek 2017, p. 200).”
But in the nuclear domain, Nasser had chosen the advocate’s type
signal on the NPT instead of proliferation to combat the Israeli bomb. Although
Egypt’s limited nuclear capabilities were apparent to foreign intelligence services
long before Nasser signed the NPT, some ambiguity remained. Signature was an
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ENDC/PV.327;

ENDC/PV.381;

indicator of Egypt’s non-nuclear intentions, but it did not carry the same weight as
ratification. And Nasser’s contempt for Israel contributed to this lack of clarity.
Nasser formally launched the War of Attrition in 1969, involving
hostilities along the Suez Canal and commando raids and airstrikes on Israeli
positions. For its part, Moscow signed a defense pact with Cairo in 1969 (Gibbons
2016) and sent “10,000 men to protect Egypt against Israeli deep penetration raids
(Rezek 2017, p. 200).” A ceasefire took place on August 7, 1970, just weeks before
Nasser’s death, but the Israeli security threat remained high, and Moscow’s
protection had limits. Shortly before taking power, the new president, Anwar Sadat,
declared: “Don’t ask me to make diplomatic relations with [Israel]. Never. Never.
Leave it to the coming generation to decide that, not me (Rublee 2009, p. 116).’”
The Nasserist hatred of Israel now seemed a nearly inextricable element of the
successor government.
Sadat initially followed Nasser’s lead on the NPT. He never seriously
considered pursuing ratification of the accord in the early 1970s. Regardless,
Egyptian nuclear ambiguity did not stop Sadat and his advisors from instrumentally
stigmatizing Israel with the NPT. Sadat frequently urged the American
administrations of Richard M. Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter to pressure
Israel into the treaty. And in 1977, he would publicly call for Israel’s accession to
the treaty in a televised interview with ABC News (Feldman 1997). During the
1970s, Egypt and Iran also unveiled a proposal at the UNGA for a MENWFZ.75
The proposal was undoubtedly aimed at Israel, and its promotion remains a core
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part of contemporary Egyptian nuclear diplomacy (Karem 1988; Khan 2002;
Kubiak 2011; Fahmy 2020). All of these efforts, however, met with little success
vis-à-vis encouraging Israeli nuclear transparency, much less disarmament.
The nuclear program Sadat inherited from Nasser also remained
frozen with limited funding for the AEA. Yet, studies of nuclear development list
Egypt as having some level of interest in the bomb during the Sadat years (Singh
and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007). In reality, the AEA made no further progress
toward nuclearization under Sadat even though it continued civilian nuclear
collaboration with the Soviets and began cooperation with the Indians (Bhatia
1988; Gregory 1995). Many Egyptian nuclear scientists left for Iraq and Libya due
to the lack of opportunities to work on military projects (Walsh 2001).
Privately, Sadat decided that nuclear weapons lacked utility for his
main foreign policy goal: re-taking territory lost in 1967. But publicly, he continued
Nasser’s policy of warning that Egypt would follow suit if Israel built a nuclear
weapon (Einhorn 2004). His statements indicated that being an advocate of the
distribution of power codified by the NPT was not the same as ratifying the treaty.
Sadat also vacillated in his public positions on the Israeli program, sometimes
saying he knew Jerusalem had the bomb, only to walk back such claims shortly
thereafter.76 Analysts have interpreted his rhetoric as a tool intended to dissuade
Israeli pursuit of nuclear weapons on some occasions and to encourage pressure
on his rival to join the NPT on others (Shikaki 1985).
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The result of Sadat’s shifting rhetoric and opposition to ratifying the
NPT was confusion for other states. This stance was further intensified by his
declining to participate in the IAEA safeguards system. Because there was no way
to verify that Egypt was in-compliance with the treaty, many observers assumed
Cairo was either hedging or actively pursuing nuclearization (Spaniel 2019). But if
Egypt had been effectively pursuing the bomb, the Mossad would likely have
determined this, leading to an Israeli airstrike on Inshas. Regardless, there is no
clear evidence that Israeli counterforce capabilities deterred Egyptian proliferation.
As I discussed above, Egypt had already given up the quest for the bomb when it
signed the NPT as a treaty advocate. The commitment signaling of ratification
would have been a more transparent indication of Egyptian non-nuclear behavior
due to its legal weight and accompanying safeguards verification inspections.
Commitment signaling was, however, not yet possible due to the continuing
perceptions in Cairo of an existential Israeli security threat.
The internal shift away from nuclearization represented part of a
broader plan by Sadat to redefine management of the Israeli threat. Unable to
develop nuclear weapons or to stop Israel from getting the bomb, the Egyptian
security elite debated their options in the early 1970s. Fahmy, Heikal, and Defense
Minister General Mohammed Ahmed Sadek argued for further reliance on the
Soviets, possibly including forward deployments of nuclear weapons in Egypt. But
the Soviets were unequivocal in their rejection of the proposal, and Sadat no longer
wished for Cairo to be beholden to Moscow (Bar-Joseph 1982). In fact, Sadat
disliked the Soviets and believed Nasser’s alliance with them had done little to
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attenuate the serious security threat from Israel. He even told his advisors that
“they make my blood boil (Bahgat 2007, p. 415).” In 1972, he expelled Soviet
troops and military advisors from the country.
Instead, Sadat ordered his national security advisor Muhammad
Hafiz Ismail to request secret talks with the Americans (Gibbons 2016). Ismail
communicated to his counterpart in the Nixon administration, Henry Kissinger, that
Sadat wanted a long-term peace settlement with the Israelis.77 On Kissinger’s
invitation, Ismail traveled to the United States in February 1973, where he met with
Nixon and Kissinger. Nixon assured Ismail in a lengthy meeting of the U.S.
commitment to brokering a permanent peace between the rivals.78 Sadat became
frustrated when the backchannel did not quickly produce results, as Israel was
disinterested in returning territory to Egypt in exchange for peace. By May 1973,
U.S. State Department intelligence assessed that “mounting evidence indicates
that he is becoming ever more strongly tempted to resort to arms.”79 Meanwhile, a
U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Sadat sought to spark U.S. and
Soviet intervention and subsequent support for a peace deal with Israel.80
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As it turned out, the State Department had correctly predicted the
onset of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 but failed to avert it. On October 6, Sadat
launched a surprise attack across the Suez Canal and occupied the Sinai
Peninsula, and Syrian forces attempted to retake the Golan Heights (Rabinovich
2007; Fahmy 2020). Israeli airpower “was neutralised in the early part of the 1973
war” and “frontlines on the Golan Heights and the Sinai were similarly smashed by
Syrian and Egyptian armour (Joshi 2000, p. 2104).” Israel rallied and won a military
victory over the Egyptians, the Syrians, and coalition forces from other Arab states.
But the conflict shattered the perception of Israeli invulnerability, and leaders in
Jerusalem recognized the limited utility of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Arab
forces intentionally forwent crossing the border into Israel out of a fear of nuclear
escalation. Meanwhile, decision-makers in Jerusalem would not authorize the use
of nuclear weapons due to the conflict’s limited nature (Joshi 2000; Bleek 2010a).
The war had two important strategic implications. First, Sadat had
achieved his goal of getting total commitment from Washington in achieving a
lasting peace. Second, Egyptian policy-makers realized that they might have the
capacity to one day defeat Israel in a conventional conflict (Spaniel 2019). This
strategic reassessment served as a counterpoint to advocates of nuclearization,
who said Egypt must acquire the bomb to be victorious against Israel.
Consequently, the war essentially silenced the last elements in the government
supporting proliferation (Walsh 2001; Rublee 2006; Gibbons 2016).
The war also led to an oil crisis, which lasted from October 1973 until
March 1974. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
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had announced an oil embargo on the United States and other countries viewed
as supporting Israel in the war. They also cut their oil production. Together, these
efforts led to global shortages and triggered a four-fold worldwide increase in crude
oil prices (Merrill 2007; Corbett 2013). The war and the OAPEC boycott made clear
to Washington that there were costs to the continuing conflict between Egypt and
Israel. Egypt was also unable to regain its oil fields in the Sinai and witnessed the
vulnerabilities of oil dependence.
Mutual Egypt–U.S. interest in improved relations in the aftermath of
the Yom Kippur War led to the possibility of a nuclear energy deal. At first,
Washington had to compete with France, India, the Soviet Union, and West
Germany for an agreement to sell power reactors to Egypt (Walsh 2001). Egypt
opted for the U.S. offer made personally to Sadat by Nixon during a 1974 visit to
Cairo. Alongside the twin Westinghouse 600-megawatt reactors offered to Sadat,
Nixon was also willing to provide nuclear power to Israel.
However, the United States would seek the implementation of
safeguards on each state’s nuclear program. Sadat accepted the offer in principle,
as it would provide advanced energy technologies to Egypt, and Israeli
participation would finally mean transparency at Dimona (Barnaby 1989).81
American engineers quickly began working on site surveys in Egypt to construct
the reactors (Nashif 1984). But the Israelis viewed the offer as a Trojan Horse to
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force their entry into the NPT and only accepted the deal after it was re-written to
exclude inspections at Dimona (Rabinowitz 2018). In Egypt, the purchase of the
reactors also stalled, as Sadat rejected increasingly stringent U.S. safeguards
demands in the face of a perceived Israeli nuclear threat (Selim 1996). To accept
the American conditions would have meant full transparency at Inshas while Israel
pushed ahead with military nuclear activities at Dimona. Intensified U.S. pressure
from the Carter administration under the auspices of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act (NNPA) of 1978 would further complicate Egypt’s situation (Gibbons 2016). It
soon became apparent that only by joining the NPT could Egypt (and Israel) truly
gain access to foreign nuclear energy technologies.
Accordingly, many scholars (Kats 1985; Barnaby 1989; Solingen
2007) contend that Egyptian interest in nuclear energy and U.S. safeguards
pressure led to Sadat’s change of heart on the NPT. The historical record shows
that Sadat certainly wanted Egypt to have a vibrant nuclear energy program, but
this in itself was not a sufficient incentive for ratifying the NPT. If it had been, Egypt
would have accepted safeguards in the mid-1970s and quickly deposited its
instrument of ratification in the late 1970s. Cairo had already abandoned its military
nuclear pursuits for all practical purposes. But yet, Egypt waited for the outcome
of U.S. negotiations with Israel and would not accept full transparency at its extant
nuclear sites without a reciprocal pledge from Israel.82 Sadat could not accept
safeguards or ratify the NPT at this time while Egypt continued to face a serious
security threat from Israel. Cairo’s decision to delay ratification due to security
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concerns is in line with my theory’s predictions about the commitment signal that
ratification sends. When state survival is at risk, states may say “No” to nuclear
weapons, but will balk at saying “Never,” even at the cost of civilian nuclear energy.
Diplomacy

with

Israel—mediated

by

the

Nixon

and

Ford

administrations—produced some early success for Sadat from 1974–1975. The
resultant First and Second Disengagement Agreements “returned a narrow sliver
of the Sinai back to Egypt (Berenji 2020, p. 134).” But Sadat desired broader
territorial concessions, and the Israeli security threat remained. One of Sadat’s
steps in rapprochement with Washington was formally abrogating Nasser’s
defense pact with Moscow in 1976 (Gibbons 2016). This produced the inadvertent
consequence of swinging the regional balance of power heavily in Israel’s favor
when weapons exports from the USSR declined (Berenji 2020). Sadat also was
not content to rely only on the Americans, establishing a backchannel relationship
with Israel that paved the way for his historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977. There,
Sadat spoke to the Knesset and expressed his strong desire to conclude a peace
agreement (Berenji 2020). Additionally, there was a nuclear dimension to the visit,
as Sadat raised the issue of Israeli accession to the NPT with Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem Begin (Shikaki 1985). Both Sadat and Fahmy had previously stated
that this would be a precondition to a peace agreement (Einhorn 2004).
After Sadat visited Jerusalem, the Carter administration hosted the
1978 meetings that led to the Camp David Accords (Kamel 1986; Quandt 2015).
The resolution of territorial disputes was the central objective, but the parties also
discussed nuclear issues and the NPT. In the early stages of negotiations,
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Egyptian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Osama El-Baz said, “The (nuclear)
issue creates a special element of tension in the area. It gives psychological and
physical concern to both sides.”83 El-Baz proposed that both sides join the NPT, in
line with the original U.S. negotiating position. Cairo would also suggest that both
sides accept comprehensive safeguards on their nuclear programs—since Sadat
sought transparency at Dimona—and that Israel agree to a no-first-use of nuclear
weapons pledge regarding Egypt (Walsh 2001). Israel rejected each of these
propositions, confirming the long suspected nuclear threat to Egypt. For the
Egyptian negotiators, Jerusalem’s nuclear status increased the imperative to
achieve a peace deal (Nashif 1984).
Sadat was unhappy with the Israeli stance on nuclear weapons and
the NPT at Camp David, but he told Carter in a letter that this did not preclude
further negotiations:
The Israelis did not commit themselves to adhere to the treaty
on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. [...]
Nevertheless, I decided to proceed in the hope that these
shortcomings will be remedied in the future with the
progressive development of peace, as I have believed and still
believe that the real peace process starts only after the
signing.84
Sadat and Begin would go on to sign the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979
Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty. The countries agreed to normalize their relations and
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that Israel would return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt conditional on its
demilitarization.85 The treaty took effect in January 1980, and soon after that, the
parties opened their borders and established diplomatic representation. Not only
had the Israeli security threat attenuated, but normalization of Egypt–Israel
relations provided the opportunity for Cairo to negotiate a robust military alliance
with the United States. With an alliance in place, it would no longer be in U.S.
interests to allow conflict between Egypt and Israel. The Egyptians knew after the
Camp David process, however, that forging a partnership with Washington would
require its embrace of NNWS status. Sadat and the AEA had already abandoned
Egypt’s nuclearization goals, so the NPT offered a bargaining chip to enhance ties
with the Americans (Rublee 2009).
Sadat now had multiple reasons to revisit the Nasserist policy of
declining to ratify the NPT. These reasons included the pursuit of nuclear energy,
the possibility of an alliance with Washington, and mitigation of the serious security
threat from Israel. Jerusalem had rejected the NPT at Camp David, but the
Egyptian security situation had improved markedly. Sadat had regained the Sinai
and now faced a pathway to obtaining a new patron. Further, in 1980, Israel did
not oppose Cairo’s calls for a MENWFZ at the UNGA for the first time (Kats 1985).
Some Egyptian officials also believed that Israel might eventually accept the NPT
as part of the broader peace process.86 Commitment signaling to formalize Egypt’s
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legal nuclear forbearance now appeared possible, but a protracted ratification
debate would have to occur first.
In 1980, Sadat created a commission under former Foreign Minister
Boutros Boutros-Ghali to study the potential ramifications of ratifying the NPT.
According to Walsh (2001, p. 211) and his sources in the Foreign Ministry, “In its
deliberations, the commission explicitly examined whether Egypt could develop
nuclear weapons (‘how far can we go’) as well as whether the country should
develop nuclear weapons.” On balance, the commission concluded that ratifying
the NPT and forgoing nuclearization would be in the best interests of the state.
Some members supported joining the treaty to allow for increased nuclear exports
and hedging, but their views did not find favor with Sadat (Walsh 2001).
Support for NPT ratification, in principle, was not without its critics. A
minority of the Boutros-Ghali commission argued that Cairo should pursue the
bomb for its forward-looking security and remain outside of the NPT (Walsh 2001).
The future Foreign Minister (2013–2013), Nabil Fahmy, son of Ismail Fahmy, was
among the skeptics in the ministry who fought against ratification. In his memoirs,
Fahmy (2020, p. 118) writes that the eventual decision to ratify represented Egypt
“strategically damaging its national security and losing whatever leverage it had
[...] with Israel to pursue universal adherence to the treaty in the Middle East or as
a zone free of nuclear weapons.” Fahmy’s analysis sheds light on the notion that
legally forswearing nuclear weapons is not equivalent to “freezing” a nuclear
program. Because nuclear weapons can guarantee national survival, multilateral
arms control treaties like the NPT are not to be taken lightly. Sadat, however,
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believed his achievements at Camp David had monumentally improved Egypt’s
security environment.
Indeed, Sadat declared in December 1980 that Egypt would ratify the
NPT and conclude the long avoided safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As the
theory predicts, once the necessary security condition for ratification had been met,
the final commitment signal came shortly thereafter. The parliament finalized
ratification on February 26, 1981. Since Egypt’s main security issues had been
addressed in the years leading up to ratification, parliamentary discussions mainly
dealt with nuclear energy and future partnership with the United States. One
influential parliamentarian and committee chair, Sayed Nofal, also made the case
that ratification would give Egypt access to positive security assurances—per
UNGA Resolution 255—if the state ever faced a nuclear attack or blackmail
attempt (Kats 1985).
All things considered, mitigation of the Israeli threat was undoubtedly
the element that allowed Egyptian commitment signaling in the NPT context.
Access to energy technology was simply a treaty-contingent benefit. The nuclear
energy program itself was soon terminated due to “fear of dependence on the
West, high costs, and, in the wake of Chernobyl, concerns with potential
environmental hazards (Solingen 2007, p. 230).” Though the literature identifies
civilian nuclear energy access as the determinative factor behind Cairo’s
ratification (Kats 1985; Barnaby 1989; Solingen 2007), Egypt still has no nuclear
power plants on its territory to this day. The NPT commitment remains. Former
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U.S. arms control official Dean Rust (2006) highlights the importance of the causal
mechanism of an improved security environment:
Whoever thought that the strongest Arab state would disavow
weapons before Israel did. Nobody ever thought that. But
political changes can yield policy changes. Nonproliferation is
essentially an effort to hold the line, i.e. sustain a [sic]
international regime that satisfies those who have already
joined while offering a cost/benefit ratio to those outside that
can ultimately appeal under the right political leadership. Of
course, your general diplomacy aimed [sic] fostering stability
in volatile regions is one of the most important indirect tools
you have to foster nonproliferation. I am fond of saying that
the Camp David Accords were one of the biggest
nonproliferation events in the Middle East, as it led to a
negotiated peace between Egypt and Israel. And it led Sadat
to join the NPT in 1981, thus breaking a major taboo among
Arabs who had continued to resist the NPT while Israel was
outside the Treaty. The elimination of Egypt as a potential
nuclear competitor to Israel may also have contributed to
Israel’s continued willingness to keep its bomb in the
basement.87
Following Sadat’s assassination in October 1981, Hosni Mubarak
became the new president and continued Egyptian adherence to the NPT.
Mubarak’s relationship with the NPT was not without complications, as he publicly
stated Egypt might consider proliferating in the future when asked about threats
from Israel and Iran. Yet, when the military asked Mubarak to reconsider the
nuclear option in 1984, the president rejected the proposal as inconsistent with the
NPT and the national security interests of the country (Walsh 2001). The Mubarak
regime also threatened to prevent the indefinite extension of the treaty at the 1995
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Review Conference over Israel’s lack of compliance (Graham 2002) and has not
adopted an Additional Protocol with the IAEA allowing for more stringent
inspections (Gibbons 2016). As I explained in Chapter 2, withdrawing from treaties
after ratification is very costly. If Egypt were to leave the NPT and pursue
nuclearization, it would almost certainly invite international sanctions, a loss of U.S.
aid, and possibly an Israeli preventive strike.88
Deciphering the CTBT Conundrum
The CTBT presented Egypt with a somewhat different situation than the NPT did.
When the treaty negotiations began, Egypt had already signaled its commitment
to legally forswear nuclear weapons by ratifying the NPT. A treaty prohibiting the
testing of weapons Egypt was barred from having should not have been difficult
for Cairo to join. Nevertheless, the Egyptian pattern of behavior, signing almost
immediately as an advocate and then holding off on ratification, was similar to its
NPT decision-making.
The CTBT also aspires for universal membership like the NPT. It
bans nuclear test explosions and PNEs in all environments: underground,
underwater, and in the Earth’s atmosphere. There is a clear statistical relationship
between its opening for signature in 1996 and the downtrending numbers of
nuclear tests (Herzog, Ko, and Lee 2021). Only three states—India, North Korea,
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and Pakistan—have tested since 1996.89 Only North Korea has tested in the
twenty-first century.
At first, Egypt’s participation in the CTBT appeared promising.
President Hosni Mubarak signed the accord on October 14, 1996, just three weeks
after it opened for signature. Yet, even after type signaling as an advocate, to this
day Egypt has not provided a commitment signal by ratifying the treaty. Why has
a state that has chosen to legally forswear nuclear weapons via the NPT been
unwilling to fully accept the CTBT? Below I demonstrate that, again, an Israeli
security threat—and Iranian to a lesser extent—has motivated decision-making in
Cairo. Egypt’s refusal to ratify has existential implications for the CTBT, as it is one
of 44 “nuclear-capable states” that must ratify before the treaty enters into force.90
Egyptian government interest in nuclear explosions pre-dated the
negotiation of the CTBT by more than three decades. From 1959–1975, engineers
from the IAEA, the United States, the USSR, and most prominently, West
Germany, were consulted about using PNEs to excavate a canal from the
Mediterranean Sea to the Qattara Depression (Shaker 1980a, Nashif 1984, Walsh
2001). The plan was to use the considerable difference in elevation to produce
hydroelectric power from a new artificial lake, but it never proceeded beyond the
site survey stage.
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Egypt (and Israel) had also followed the lead of Britain, the Soviet
Union, and the United States by signing the LTBT in 1963 and ratifying it in 1964.91
The LTBT forbids atmospheric, underwater, and outer space nuclear tests. It
allows only underground test explosions due to concerns related to the
environment and international provocation.92 And in the late 1960s and early
1970s, Egypt proposed that a total ban on tests in the future might rely on a
verification regime consisting of OSI coupled with sharing of national seismic data
(Shaker 1980b, pp. 623–624).
These topics would return to the fore in nuclear diplomacy in the
1990s. After the end of the Cold War, the international community had new
optimism in the areas of nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.
At a 1991 conference to amend the LTBT, over 60 States Parties endorsed the
negotiation of a CTBT (Mackby 2016). The Soviet Union (later the Russian
Federation) had tested in 1990 and never would again, and President George H.
W. Bush ordered a national moratorium after carrying out the last U.S. test in 1992
(Herzog and Baron 2017).93 When President Bill Clinton stated the U.S. willingness
to pursue the CTBT, a three-year negotiating process began at the CD in Geneva
from 1993–1996. Detailed talks on the treaty’s provisions occurred from 1994–
1996. A total of 61 states negotiated the agreement (Mackby 2016). Clinton
referred to it as “the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms
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control” given the decades of international interest in such a ban (qtd. in Herzog
2017, p. 26).
The treaty negotiating record reveals a supportive Egyptian
delegation from the very beginning under Ambassador Mounir Zaharan.94 Cairo
had three key areas of interest. They included: the allowable yield threshold for the
treaty, its provisions for OSI, and its entry-into-force parameters. The commonality
of these three areas is their relationship to Israel, whose nuclear program the
Egyptians sought to constrain. Indeed, Jerusalem’s refusal to ratify the NPT after
Cairo offered its commitment signal had produced severe discontent in the
Egyptian foreign policy establishment (Fahmy 2020). They again viewed the Israeli
program as both a direct threat to Egypt and a potential catalyst for nuclear
proliferation dominoes among other states in the Middle East like Iran.
On the subject of the allowable yield threshold, it was not always
clear that the CTBT would be a “zero-yield” treaty barring all supercritical test
explosions. The five Permanent Members of the UNSC (P5) sought to preserve
“safety tests, low-yield and hydronuclear tests, laboratory experiments, simulations
and peaceful nuclear explosions (Johnson 2009, p. 58).” They argued for yield
threshold limits in the CTBT between 1.8 kilograms (United States) and “perhaps
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around 500 [tons]” (China) (Johnson 2009, p. 60).95 Cairo was an early supporter
of a complete prohibition on all nuclear explosions.96 The Egyptians joined Iran in
endorsing zero-yield language by Australia that was eventually adopted by the P5
and inserted into the treaty (Ramaker et al. 2003). Their concern lay in reports that
“Israel already possessed laboratory-based hydronuclear testing capabilities and
could thus benefit from a provision in the CTBT permitting hydronuclear
experiments below a certain threshold (Johnson 2009, p. 83).” Cairo had also tried
to ban all “tests,” including subcritical experiments that do produce a nuclear
explosive yield, but was rebuffed by the P5 (Ramaker et al. 2003).
The negotiating parties at the CD also developed parameters for OSI
in the test ban. Known as the treaty’s “final verification measure,” the OSI
provisions allow—after entry-into-force—a team of multinational inspectors to
investigate suspicious geophysical events that might be nuclear tests. A new
international organization called the CTBTO would conduct the inspections.
Debate arose in the CD over “red light” or “green light” procedures for voting on
OSI (Ramaker et al. 2003). Red light proponents like Egypt wanted inspections to
occur unless the elected governing body of the CTBTO, its Executive Council
composed of States Parties, voted against them. Green light proponents only
wanted OSI to be permissible if the Executive Council voted to support them. The
core difference was that negotiators believed the red light procedure would make
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the onset of inspections considerably easier, presumably in the case of Israel in
the imagination of Egyptian officials. In the end, the green light advocates were
victorious. China and Russia were members of the latter group and may have
derailed the treaty if they believed it would severely infringe on state sovereignty.
Lastly, Egypt had a strong interest in the CTBT entry-into-force
clause. Mubarak’s negotiators were familiar with the lessons of the NPT and did
not want another treaty that restricted Cairo but not Jerusalem. Consequently,
Ambassador Zaharan and his team argued for entry-into-force only after ratification
by all nuclear-armed states, including Israel.97 Such language was rejected by the
negotiating parties because it would theoretically permit aspiring proliferators to
remain outside the treaty. Other states at the CD tabled a range of further
possibilities for entry-into-force procedures.
Egypt thus supported one of the stricter paths to entry-into-force,
which formed the basis of official treaty language (Ramaker et al. 2003; Johnson
2009). Rather than a simple majority or required number of states, the accord’s
Annex 2 lists 44 specific countries that must ratify before the CTBT may enter into
force. These so-called “Annex 2 states” were the CD members who had active
research reactors or nuclear power reactors on their territory during the
negotiations. Both Egypt and Israel are in the group of Annex 2 states; neither
state may be bound by the treaty’s entry-into-force while the other enjoys the legal
freedom to conduct nuclear tests. However, Egypt also took an active leadership
role among the majority-Muslim Middle Eastern states, which prevented any
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language from becoming a part of the CTBT that might seem to legitimate the
Israeli nuclear weapon program (Horovitz and Golan-Vilella 2010b).
Once again, Cairo supported the balance of power defined by the
treaty, even as it pushed for more favorable terms. As discussed above, Mubarak
quickly type signaled Egypt’s status as an advocate for the CTBT. Entry-into-force
would constrain horizontal proliferation by new states like Iran as well as vertical
proliferation by Israel due to its implications for weapons development (Herzog,
Ko, and Lee 2021). Cairo supported these effects on the balance of power. But
like Nasser and the NPT, Mubarak declined to pursue ratification in the parliament.
Security concerns again stopped Cairo short of sending the binding commitment
signal of ratification. Egyptian officials are always quick to rhetorically support the
CTBT in multilateral fora, but caution they are unable to view it “as a secluded legal
instrument, isolated from other treaties (Horovitz and Golan-Vilella 2010a, p. 11).”
In the era after it ratified the NPT, Cairo has also come to see “Israel’s nuclear
superiority as intolerable [and] gradually conditioned all of its arms control progress
on Israel’s NPT accession (Horovitz and Golan-Vilella 2010a, p. 11).” Neither
Mubarak’s successor Morsi, nor current Egyptian President Al-Sisi, have deviated
from this course.
It has been 25 years since Egypt first linked its CTBT ratification to
Israel acceding to the NPT. Whether Egypt will ratify absent such a commitment
from Israel remains to be seen. History shows, however, that Egypt is willing to be
flexible on multilateral nuclear arms control when there are alternative means of
guaranteeing its national security (Horovitz and Golan-Vilella 2010a). Israel has
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signed but not ratified the CTBT and conditions its ratification on a list of three
challenging points, one of which may require the unlikely prospect of its diplomatic
recognition by Iran (Alon-Bar 2010). There are no indications that Israeli ratification
of the CTBT, absent NPT accession, would change Egyptian views on the test
ban. Likewise, an Iranian drive toward the bomb would also deter Egypt from
ratification. In the meantime, Egypt and Israel remain alongside China, India, Iran,
North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States as the holdouts to the CTBT entering
into force. Unsurprisingly, arms controllers frequently discuss the linkages
between these remaining Annex 2 states.
Egypt’s resistance to the CTBT poses potential hurdles to global
monitoring of nuclear tests. Even before the treaty’s entry-into-force, a network of
geophysical monitoring stations associated with the agreement is continuously
scanning the globe for nuclear explosions (Dahlman et al. 2011). This International
Monitoring System (IMS), which will consist of 337 seismic, infrasound,
hydroacoustic, and radionuclide stations and laboratories when complete,
detected all six North Korean tests (Herzog 2017). To date, 302 of the 337 facilities
are certified by the CTBTO and collecting data in real-time for global distribution.98
But Annex 1 to the CTBT’s protocol delineates the location coordinates for each
station, many of which are politically contentious.99 For its part, Egypt has so far
declined to install its planned IMS seismic stations at Luxor and Kottamya. Much
of the Middle East is a region of high seismicity (Gök et al. 2012), where
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discriminating between earthquakes and nuclear test explosions could prove
complicated in the absence of data from stations in Egypt.100 North Korea, on the
other hand, is an aseismic zone, where identifying tests is technically simple.
Installation of Egyptian stations is essential to preventing heated misperception,
such as when Egypt and Libya mistook a small earthquake on the Red Sea floor
for an Israeli test (Graham 2002).
Conclusion
Egypt appears, on paper, to be a puzzle in the domain of multilateral nuclear arms
control. It is a state that has quickly signed treaties and then waited more than a
decade to ratify. It is a state with proud nationalist leaders and a history of dreaming
about the bomb that nonetheless legally forswore nuclear weapons as its enduring
rival built them. It is a state that has agreed never to develop nuclear weapons but
refuses to give up the right to test nuclear weapons. Perhaps it is no wonder that
former U.S. arms control official Robert Einhorn (2004, p. 43) has aptly described
Egypt as “frustrated but still on a non-nuclear course.”101
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Yet for all the seemingly inexplicable elements of Egypt’s nuclear
diplomacy, Cairo exemplifies the logic of my process-based theory of multilateral
nuclear arms control. Nasserist Egypt was not forced into the NPT by its Soviet
patron. Instead, it type signaled as an advocate of the treaty, immediately signing
in 1968 because Egyptian leaders imagined a world where the NPT would delay
or roll back the Israeli nuclear program. Still, Egypt lacked reliable protection
against its nuclear-armed rival, Israel. And so long as a serious security threat
persisted, Cairo could not issue a commitment signal. This chapter demonstrated
that the reduction of the Israeli threat, not the quest for civilian nuclear energy as
identified in previous studies, was the most critical factor encouraging Sadat’s
ratification. Today, Egypt has no nuclear power reactors on its territory, but its
commitment to the NPT remains.
Only when Sadat had secured the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty and
the prospect of a military alliance with the United States could Egypt ratify the NPT
in 1981. Similarly, Egypt issued the advocate’s type signal on the CTBT when
Mubarak quickly signed in 1996. The treaty offered another step toward a world
free of nuclear advantages that Egypt had already committed not to possess. But
by that time, the Israeli nuclear arsenal was once again seen as a serious threat
in Cairo. Until the threat attenuates through Jerusalem’s accession to the NPT or
another credible means of enhancing Egyptian security, observers should not
expect the commitment signal of CTBT ratification.
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Chapter 4 – Romania: Foreign Policy Activism Meets Patron Coercion
During the Cold War, the USSR dominated its client states. Soviet protégés that
did not fall into line with Moscow’s wishes risked responses like the invasions of
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yet, the Socialist Republic of
Romania’s (RSR) foreign policy often differed sharply from other European satellite
states in the Soviet sphere of influence.102 Under Romanian Communist Party
(PCR) leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Bucharest pursued rapprochement with
the United States and other NATO states beginning in the early 1950s. The regime
also welcomed the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1958 and declined to participate
in many Warsaw Pact plans orchestrated in Moscow. Such activism also took
place in the nuclear domain, as Romania attempted to purchase civilian nuclear
technologies from a range of suppliers during the 1960s and 1970s. GheorghiuDej’s successor Nicolae Ceaușescu even ordered low-level exploratory nuclear
weapons research from 1983–1985. For these types of reasons, Eliza Gheorghe
(2012, 2013b) has described Romania as an “atomic maverick.”
The Romanian independent streak leaves the state’s multilateral
nuclear arms control behavior unexplained. Consistent with other actions, PCR
officials vehemently criticized the NPT in the ENDC negotiations on the treaty in
Geneva. Regardless, Ceaușescu still signed the NPT on July 1, 1968, the day it
102

Romania was officially the RSR from 1965–1989 but was known as the Romanian People’s
Republic (RPR) from 1947–1965. I use RSR throughout this chapter to refer to the state prior to its
transition to democracy at the end of the Cold War. The other European satellite states were:
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany),
Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Albania (1961; formal Warsaw Pact withdrawal in 1968) and
Yugoslavia (1948) would split from alignment with the USSR. Regardless, Moscow still maintained
some level of coercive influence in Tirana and Belgrade.
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opened for signature. Ceaușescu then asked his rubber-stamp parliament to ratify
the accord in early 1970. The result is that a simple analysis of NPT signature and
ratification dates, as shown in Figure 5, depicts Romania as nearly observationally
equivalent to the other states of the Warsaw Pact. However, Bucharest’s
outspoken opposition to the NPT stood in strong contrast to its allies’ support of
the agreement. Reading Romanian public positions and literature on the state’s
Cold War autonomy makes it challenging to understand why Bucharest reversed
course and legally forswore nuclear arms.
Figure 5: Timeline of Romanian NPT and CTBT Diplomacy

The extant literature mainly attributes the sudden Romanian aboutface on the NPT to a desire to obtain a civilian nuclear energy program (Gheorghe
2013a, 2014) or to claim partial credit for negotiating a successful treaty (CrumpGabreëls 2017). Both explanations pertain to benefits derived from NPT
participation while recognizing the occurrence of Soviet pressure. Still, neither fully
captures the extent to which Soviet diplomatic coercion constrained the RSR’s
aspirations for autonomy. Why then did Romanian foreign and nuclear policy
iconoclasm fade away into a quick acceptance of the treaty?
This chapter shows that Romanian desires for autonomy in the arms
control domain were not possible due to its subordinate position in the patron–
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client relationship with the Soviet Union. The chapter draws on historical accounts,
ENDC and Warsaw Pact meeting records, and declassified diplomatic
communications. For all its leaders’ rhetoric, Romania was a subordinate, as noted
in Table 3 of Chapter 2. Despite Bucharest’s rhetorical objections to the NPT, my
theoretical prediction is that Romania would lack the relative power to resist Soviet
demands to sign the treaty. As predicted, I demonstrate that Romania assented to
pressure from Moscow, signaling its type as a subordinate in a sequence of events
that past studies do not adequately explain.
The Kremlin viewed Romania as less critical to the strategic balance
with NATO than other satellite states like Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and
Hungary. Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev was more willing to tolerate dissent from
Bucharest than from other Soviet clients. But ultimately, refusal to participate in the
NPT was a line Brezhnev would not allow Romania to cross. This position would
have disrupted Warsaw Pact unanimity and threatened to expand the size of the
club of nuclear-armed states. Consequently, Brezhnev reminded Ceaușescu that
Romania’s security and state survival depended on the USSR while also taking
steps to diplomatically isolate Bucharest from its communist allies. In the end,
Ceaușescu signed the NPT without delay, type signaling as a subordinate state
within the Eastern Bloc. Deeper commitment signaling through ratification would
follow shortly after it became clear that Moscow would respect RSR sovereignty
and also ratify. Romania has since then been an active member in multilateral
nuclear arms control agreements, for example, signing the CTBT in 1996 and
ratifying it in 1999.
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This chapter proceeds in five sections as it investigates Romania’s
complicated history with nuclear diplomacy and legally forswearing nuclear
weapons. First, I discuss the early Cold War Romanian alliance with the USSR
and interest in nuclear energy. Second, I unpack Bucharest’s participation in—and
objections to—the ENDC negotiations on the NPT. Third, I evaluate internal
Warsaw Pact discussions that influenced Ceaușescu’s decision-making on signing
and ratifying the NPT. Fourth, I highlight post-NPT nuclear activities in Romania
and show how my theory of type and commitment signaling applies to Bucharest
joining the CTBT. Lastly, I briefly analyze the evidence on-balance and conclude
the chapter.
Frayed Romanian–Soviet Relations and Nuclear Energy Politics
Romania’s patron–client relationship with the USSR is central to understanding its
nuclear history. Before the negotiations on the NPT, Bucharest frequently
attempted to increase its autonomy from the Soviet Union with some success. Yet,
the evidence demonstrates that Romania remained firmly in the Soviet sphere of
influence in the lead-up to the negotiations. The early tensions in dyadic relations
foreshadow decision-making in Bucharest related to the NPT. That is, Romania
tried to express its independence by dissenting to the NPT but was unable to
overcome its subordinate ties with the Kremlin, whose leaders demanded that its
clients join the treaty.
Soviet plans to dominate Romania date to as early as 1939, when
Moscow laid claim to Romanian border regions in secret protocols to the Molotov–
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Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany.103 The inability of Romanian
King Carol II’s neutralist government to manage territorial disputes during the
Second World War led to a coup d’état and fascist dictatorship under Field Marshal
Ion Antonescu. As the war’s tide turned, Antonescu’s alliance with Adolf Hitler
could not prevent a Soviet invasion in 1944 followed by military occupation
(Deletant 2006). Romanian subordination had begun.
The subsequent turn in politics saw a full Romanian transition to a
unitary communist state by 1947. And in 1948, President Constantin Ion Parhon
signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with Joseph
Stalin’s USSR. The accord allowed for the stationing of as many as 35,000 Red
Army troops in Romania (Lanoszka 2014). Bucharest’s incorporation into the
Kremlin’s sphere of influence was now complete. The communist government
began a campaign to nationalize industry in the country, providing limited or no
compensation to the—predominantly Western European—former owners of such
enterprises. Diplomatic and cultural ties with the West were also reduced. In the
summer of 1948, Foreign Minister Ana Pauker directed “the closing of French and
Italian institutes in Bucharest, as well as the closing of the Italian government’s
consulate and the American Library (Stanciu 2013a, p. 257).”
Stalin’s death five years later in 1953 opened the door for a more
autonomous Romanian foreign policy, which would become a feature of the Cold
War. Gheorghiu-Dej, who had consolidated power by 1952 and purged his rivals,
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See: “Secret Supplementary Protocols of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 1939,”
September, 1939, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Doc. 110994, in Raymond
James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, eds., Nazi-–Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents
from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.
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immediately demanded less Soviet interference and the removal of officials sent
from Moscow who served in the state’s economic institutions (Retegan 2000;
Watts 2013). He was aided in this drive for independence by the early rhetorical
embrace of détente by Stalin’s short-reigning successor Georgy Malenkov. In
March 1953, Malenkov stated that “no issue existed in Soviet–American relations
that could not be resolved peacefully (Stanciu 2013a, p. 259).” Three months later,
the Soviet leader called for the “peaceful coexistence of the two systems (Ulam
1976, p. 151).” Gheorghiu-Dej took the initiative during this time and first
approached Washington about the topic of rapprochement in late 1953 (Watts
2013). He was rebuffed, as the Americans simply did not find Romanian autonomy
from Moscow credible. They viewed the Romanian approach as a ploy for Soviet
influence and espionage.
The U.S. suspicions seemed to be confirmed when Romania was
incorporated into Nikita Khrushchev’s Warsaw Pact in May 1955 despite early
efforts to resist Soviet domination. However, the Warsaw Pact was little more than
a symbolic institution before the 1960s (Crump-Gabreëls 2017). Gheorghiu-Dej’s
quest for autonomy continued unabated, as he and Prime Minister Chivu Stoica
again approached U.S. officials in late 1955.
In a formal meeting with Robert Thayer, the U.S. Ambassador to
Bucharest, Stoica urged that “relations should be reviewed as whole and close
relationships developed on definite reciprocal basis [sic].”104 Gheorghiu-Dej would
express a desire for “close personal, cultural and economic relations” in
104

See: “Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State,” Bucharest,
November 20, 1955, in FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXV, Eastern Europe, Doc. 38.
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conversation with Thayer at a Yugoslavian National Day party in Bucharest.105
Thayer also reported that Gheorghiu-Dej and his advisors ignored persistent
attempts by the Soviet ambassador to interrupt the conversation. Still, the U.S.
ambassador discounted all Romanian approaches during his tenure as part of an
attempted Soviet intelligence coup.106 He maintained this disbelief as GheorghiuDej pushed for the withdrawal of Red Army troops from the RSR (Watts 2013).
Although evidence suggests no such plot to deceive Washington,
Thayer had good reason to believe Romania was firmly under Khrushchev’s
thumb. Soviet troops remained in the country and used the northwestern city of
Oradea as their entry point to suppress the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Verona
1992). Thayer likewise assessed that the PCR government “never swerved in the
slightest degree from their adherence to the Soviet line” but kept “the door open
for such economic and cultural advantages as it may glean at an appropriate
moment.”107 The Romanian balance of trade with the Soviet Union also remained
deeply unfavorable, with a deficit in 1956 of approximately 400 million roubles
(Gheorghe 2014a). Romanian autonomy appeared to be mostly aspirational.
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Romanian dependence on the USSR also had a nuclear dimension.
Though Romanian officials tried without success in 1948 to obtain medical
radioisotopes from the United States (Gheorghe 2014a), nearly all of Bucharest’s
early nuclear procurement efforts involved the Soviets. In the wake of
Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace speech, the Soviet Union began its own
program for peaceful nuclear assistance in 1955.108 Gheorghiu-Dej thus created
the State Committee for Nuclear Energy (CSEN) that year and quickly signed an
agreement for technical cooperation with Moscow (Gheorghe 2014a). Under the
agreement, a 2,000-kilowatt Soviet research reactor came online at Măgurele in
1957, followed a year later by a cyclotron for medical isotope production
(Gheorghe 2012, 2013b). But due to ideological differences between GheorghiuDej and Khrushchev, the Soviets declined to provide nuclear power reactors to
Romania while pledging to do so for other satellite states (Gheorghe 2014a, 2019).
This occurred even as Romania’s uranium deposits continued to serve as source
material for the USSR’s nuclear program (Gheorghe 2012).
The subordinate status of Romania on nuclear issues was diplomatic
as well as technical. From 1957–1960, Bucharest advocated for the so-called
“Stoica Plan” between Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. The
proposal called for the Balkans to be a conflict-free region and the world’s first
NWFZ. On the one hand, the Stoica Plan appeared to show an increasingly
independent Romanian foreign policy. On the other hand, it was, in actuality, a
Kremlin-supported initiative that offered Romania “an ideal opportunity to prove
108

See: “National Security Council Report,” Washington, DC, December 13, 1957, in FRUS, 1955–
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sustained allegiance to the Soviet Union (Mavrodin 2020, p. 188).” Indeed, the
Soviets encouraged the Romanians to call for a Balkan NWFZ to divide NATO and
domestically weaken the Greek and Turkish governments by showing them as
disinterested in lasting regional peace. NATO governments eventually saw the
plan for what it was and duly rejected it (Kourkouvelas 2012). The NATO decision
came despite pronounced U.S. interest in avoiding Soviet nuclear deployments in
the satellite states of Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania.109
Constant pressure on Bucharest from Moscow and perceived
discrimination in the nuclear realm would take their toll on Romanian–Soviet
relations. In May 1958, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (PCC)
called a rare special meeting to withdraw Soviet troops from Romania (Crump
2015). In Khrushchev’s eyes, Bucharest was less strategically important than other
client states and less worthy of limited Soviet military resources. Gheorghiu-Dej
welcomed the newfound autonomy, but the move also weakened the credibility of
Soviet nuclear umbrella assurances (Lanoszka 2018b) while maintaining air force
and navy bases on RSR territory (Deletant and Ionescu 2004).
In addition to Romania’s newly ambiguous status within the Warsaw
Pact, a 1961 Kremlin-sponsored economic plan within the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (COMECON) further infuriated Bucharest. The plan
dismissed Gheorghiu-Dej’s visions of RSR industrialization and called for Romania
to become a mere agricultural provider to the Eastern Bloc (Crump 2015; Crump109

See: “Draft Paper Prepared by N. Spencer Barnes of the Policy Planning Staff,” Washington,
DC, June 15, 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. X, Part II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey,
Doc. 35.
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Gabreëls 2017; Lanoszka 2018a). The Romanian leader rejected the plan as an
unequal initiative, exploiting ongoing Sino–Soviet tensions to receive support from
Peking in doing so (Deletant 2007).110 The COMECON episode likely emboldened
the Romanians, as it showed that it was possible to push back against Soviet
schemes in some policy areas.
The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 only exacerbated the
fractured ties between Bucharest and Moscow. As had also occurred in the 1961
Berlin Wall Crisis, the Kremlin did not consult the Romanian government as
nuclear tensions with the United States escalated. Further, one of the Soviet
tankers used in an attempt to break the American blockade of Cuba was named
Bucharest, seen by Gheorghiu-Dej as “clearly meant to imply Romanian
involvement (Watts 2013).”111
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Even so, declassified Chinese documents reveal a 1961 assessment that the Kremlin had “an
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The Romanians were shocked. Stoica’s successor as Prime
Minister, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, criticized Moscow for its lack of consultation both
over the placement of nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba and the potential for East–
West conflict involving Romania.112 Gheorghe Maurer—who with Gheorghiu-Dej
only learned about the crisis from the press (Opris 2012)—would later remark that
Romanian officials would have learned of a war “from newspapers (Deletant and
Ionescu 2004, p. 264).” Further, the Cuban Missile Crisis placed additional strain
on the credibility of the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Moscow had previously promised
forward-deployed nuclear missiles in Romania but rescinded this pledge in the
aftermath of the crisis (Opris 2012; Gheorghe 2013b). Weakened Soviet extended
deterrent pledges only compounded the problems with Romania’s national
defense. Warsaw Pact joint military exercises in the early 1960s had “revealed that
Romania could not repel an enemy attack on its own (Lanoszka 2018b, p. 224).”113
Mănescu” [“Unfinished Conversations with Corneliu Mănescu”] in Lavinia Betea, Partea lor de
Adevăr [Their Side of the Truth], Bucharest: Compania, 2008, pp. 499–501. Trans. Larry L. Watts.
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197. Trans. Larry L. Watts.
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Persistent doubts about the USSR as a reliable patron and fear of
entrapment in a U.S.–Soviet conflict prompted new directions in Romanian foreign
policy. Less than a year after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Gheorghiu-Dej wrote a
letter to U.S. President John F. Kennedy. The letter, delivered by Foreign Minister
Corneliu Mănescu to Secretary of State Dean Rusk in October 1963, discussed
Romanian security policy vis-à-vis Washington and Moscow:
There were four principal points to the message: (1) that
Romania had not been informed and did not approve of the
Soviet missile deployments; (2) that Romania would not
participate in an offensive war against the US provoked by the
Soviet Union, and that it would appreciate this fact being taken
into account in US targeting policy; (3) that Romanian Armed
Forces were fully under national control and should not be
considered an adjunct of Soviet military power; and (4) that
Romania did not host Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory
and that the US was welcome to conduct on-sight [sic]
inspections to satisfy itself of the same (Watts 2013).114
U.S. diplomat Raymond Garthoff (1995), who discussed the letter
with Rusk, has even gone so far as to label it as a Romanian declaration of
neutrality in the event of a conflict. One month later, Gheorghe Maurer further
distanced Romania from the politics of East–West confrontation. He declared that
the country would pursue a foreign policy of peaceful coexistence, disarmament,
and nuclear nonproliferation.115 These changes in Romania’s traditional alignment
FRUS, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic
Policy, Microfiche Supplement, Doc. 240].
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with the USSR produced a new “special relationship” with Washington and the
beginning of an era of rapprochement with the West. There were now reasons to
believe that Romania was becoming less subordinate to the Kremlin.
Romanian openness to dealings with NATO states also took place in
the nuclear domain. Officials in Bucharest viewed atomic energy as a technology
that would bring about economic growth and national development (Gheorghe
2012, 2013b). As the early Romanian interest was civilian in nature, political
science datasets list no weapons ambitions during this period (Singh and Way
2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Bleek 2017). But when the Romanians again asked
the Soviets to sell them nuclear power reactors in 1960, the Kremlin dismissed the
idea (Gheorghe 2014a). Branching out from the influence of the USSR enabled
Bucharest to pursue atomic energy deals—without much success—with NATO
members Britain, Canada, France, Italy, the United States, and West Germany, as
well as with neutral Sweden (Gheorghe 2019). Such assistance was seen as
necessary if Romania was to have a nuclear energy program given Soviet
reluctance and delays in providing technology.116
The RSR attempt to distance the country from Soviet influence also
involved considerable warming of diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). Romania was a constant proponent of greater inclusion of
Archive, Doc. 116565, Doc 6 in Ambassador Romulus Ioan Budura, Politica Independenţă (2008),
pp. 104–118; Ion Gheorghe Maurer, “Temelia de neclintit a unitatii miscarii comunist international.”
Problemy Mira i Sotsializma [Problems of Peace and Socialism], 4(11): 11–22. Trans. Larry L.
Watts.
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communist China in UN activities during the 1950s and 1960s.117 And as I
discussed above, Gheorghiu-Dej used the Sino–Soviet split in the early 1960s to
win Chinese support against COMECON economic plans he disliked (Deletant
2007). RSR officials also complained to their Chinese counterparts about their
treatment by Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis.118 The enhanced
relationship with Peking would eventually allow Romania to become a mediator
between the Chinese and the Soviets (Selvage 2001). The PRC also gained
influence over Romanian foreign policy, pushing Bucharest to oppose many
Warsaw Pact positions on the NPT both within the PCC and the ENDC (Crump
2015; Crump-Gabreëls 2017).
When international discussions arose over a treaty for nuclear
nonproliferation in the early 1960s, the Romanian geostrategic position was
complex, to say the least. Bucharest was a member of the Warsaw Pact and
integrated into its security and policy-making organs. Chinese and U.S. officials
assessed with good cause that Romania was highly subordinate to the whims of
its Soviet patron.119 However, Gheorghiu-Dej had made strides to carve out an
117

See, e.g.: “Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions,”
Washington, DC, August 3, 1957, in FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XI, United Nations and General
International Matters, Doc. 78.

118

See: “Conversations between Delegations of the Romanian Workers Party and the Chinese
Communist Party in Beijing, 3–10 March 1964 (excerpts).” “Conversations between Romanian
Leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Chinese Ambassador Liu Fang, Referring to Bilateral
Relations and the Soviet–Chinese Ideological Conflict Snagov, 5 June 1964 (excerpts),” History
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Doc. 116568, ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R. – Secţia Relaţii
Externe – China, dosar 5/1964, f. 28-53, Doc. 219 in Ambassador Romulus Ioan Budura, Relaţiile
Româno-Chineze (2005), pp. 463–483. Trans. Larry L. Watts.

119

See: “Letter From the Minister in Romania (Thayer) to the Secretary of State”; “Despatch From
the Legation in Romania to the Department of State”; “Cable from the Party Committee of the

126

independent line of foreign policy from Moscow, including improved relations with
the United States, NATO, and China. Meanwhile, the Romanian quest for peaceful
civilian nuclear energy continued with, at best, limited success. The nature of the
Romanian response to the NPT seemed far from predictable.
Negotiating the NPT in Geneva
Understanding the Romanian position on the NPT requires an examination of
external posturing in the ENDC negotiations as well as internal Warsaw Pact
discussions. Romania was an active participant in multilateral nuclear arms control
from the very beginning. Under Gheorghiu-Dej, Bucharest was a member of the
UN’s Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee formed in 1959 to consider such
issues.120 Romania was also a member of the ENDC at its inception in 1961, with
Ceaușescu—after Gheorghiu-Dej’s death—overseeing participation in formal
negotiations on the NPT from 1965–1968.121 The historical record shows Romania
taking an independent stance at the ENDC talks, objecting to the treaty in the
manner of a status dissenter. Table 3 in Chapter 2 identifies such states as those
that seek enhanced global recognition and object to the balance of power reified
by an agreement. My theory predicts that status dissenters will not sign the NPT.
Chinese Embassy in Romania, ‘Summary Bulletin of Romania’s Domestic and International Policy
and Sino–Romanian Relations since the Moscow Conference.’”
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Consequently, reviewing Bucharest’s positions only in the forum of
the ENDC would not accurately explain why Romania quickly signed and ratified
the NPT. It is still essential to understand this posturing, which was overwhelmed
by behind-the-scenes allied pressures in the Warsaw Pact. Ultimately, Romania
type signaled as a subordinate despite defiance of its Soviet patron in the
multilateral ENDC context.
There were early signs that Romania would be a troublesome actor
in the formal NPT negotiations in Geneva. In November 1965, Ceaușescu’s
representatives abstained in two cases on votes that would allow the ENDC to
move forward on the NPT. First, Romania did not support the UN First Committee
on Disarmament and International Security adopting Egyptian representative
Ismail Fahmy’s Eight-Party Draft from the non-aligned states on fundamental treaty
principles (Shaker 1980a).122 Second, when the UNGA then voted to adopt the
draft as part of UNSC Resolution 2028, Bucharest again abstained.123 However, it
is worth emphasizing that Romania abstained rather than dissented in these votes
that the Kremlin strongly supported. One month after the votes, U.S. officials
assessed that Romanian autonomy was “unpleasant” for the Soviets but had not
“exceeded proportions that Moscow can accept.”124
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When the treaty negotiations moved forward without Romanian
support, Ceaușescu’s strategy turned to delay and distraction while extracting
concessions from the superpowers. NPT historian Ambassador Mohamed Shaker
(1980a, p. 78) recalls: “It was the only Eastern European delegation to submit
proposals and amendments concerning treaty drafts.”125 For example, at one point
in late-stage negotiations in 1968, “the Romanian envoy advanced a proposal for
eleven burdensome amendments in an attempt to throw a wrench in the whole
negotiating works (Hunt 2013, p. 387).” Ironically, PCR delegates would even
criticize the draft NPT preamble for not referencing Resolution 2028 language,
which they had not supported in the UNGA vote.126
The Romanians had many doubts about, and objections to, the
treaty. They pertained to:
● Its discriminatory separation of nuclear “haves” (the NWS) and “have-nots”
(the NNWS);
● Its efficacy in promoting disarmament;
● Its ability to protect the security of the NNWS;
● Its guarantees of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
● Its treaty amendment process.
Romanian disagreements with the discriminatory nature of the NPT
were characteristic of the positions of a status dissenter, as they pointed to a
rejection of the treaty’s distribution of power. These points were also unsurprising
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given the state’s tepid relationship with Washington and fraying ties with Moscow.
The treaty’s origins lie in U.S. and Soviet initiatives to limit the club of nucleararmed states (Coe and Vaynman 2015; Popp 2017). Even though the ENDC met
for much of the 1960s, the superpowers only really considered treaty input from
the NNWS in 1967 and 1968 (Popp 2017). This type of collusion was central to
Romanian fears about being a small state in an inherently unfair bipolar world.
Because Taiwan maintained the Chinese seat in the UN until 1971,
Romanian officials were similarly unhappy with a perceived attempt to disarm
communist China. Peking was not a member of the ENDC. Pressure from China
shaped this RSR position, as the PRC presented the NPT to its Romanian
comrades “as an action directed against the Chinese.”127 Bucharest would also
urge the French, who opposed the U.S.–Soviet collusion and declined to
participate in the ENDC as a result, to use the discrimination argument to resist
the agreement (Hunt 2013).
While attempts to dispute anti-PRC language in the NPT were
successful, the treaty still discriminated against Bucharest. The final text of Article
IX set detonation of a nuclear test explosion by January 1, 1968, as the benchmark
for distinguishing between the five permitted NWS and the remaining NNWS.128
Ceaușescu’s Romania would be among the nuclear “have-nots” if it were to abide
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by the parameters of the accord. The treaty language thus represented the
consolidation of an unequal status quo and distribution of power that was
disadvantageous to Romania.
Since the treaty would forbid Romania from acquiring nuclear arms,
its representatives in Geneva set out to ensure disarmament by the NWS.
Romania’s attempts to oppose Articles I and II of the NPT preventing horizontal
nuclear proliferation were deeply unsuccessful (Gheorghe 2013a).129 These were,
after all, the core purpose of a treaty designed to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Now, Bucharest sought to promote the treaty’s “grand bargain” between NNWS
nonproliferation and NWS disarmament. If the NPT’s drive to stop horizontal
proliferation would leave Romania disarmed, PCR officials sought for it to also
counter and reverse vertical proliferation by the NWS and improve the balance of
power in Bucharest’s favor.
The Romanian delegation to the ENDC consequently expressed its
disapproval over the lack of adequate disarmament provisions in the August 1967
treaty drafts from the superpowers.130 In a forceful October 1967 working paper,
Romania called for preambular language stipulating, “The Treaty should be a step
towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more
particularly, nuclear disarmament.” Moreover, Bucharest desired no ambiguity
over disarmament, proposing a new paragraph in the preamble:
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Recognizing that the danger of a nuclear war can be
eliminated only by the cessation of the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the use of nuclear
weapons, and the destruction of all existing stockpiles
of such weapons and of the means of their delivery.131
The United States and the Soviet Union predictably rejected such
language, but that did not prevent Romanian diplomats from introducing similar
provisions—to no avail—in March 1968. In doing so, Romania also called for
concrete “nuclear-disarmament measures” within the treaty.132 Still, the Romanian
working paper did influence the writing of the NPT’s preamble and Article VI on
nuclear disarmament. When the treaty opened for signature, its wording on
disarmament was more extensive than representatives from Washington and
Moscow had hoped (Harries 2014).133
Romania would incur an ex-ante status cost by being a NNWS and
could also face future nuclear security threats. While Bucharest confronted no
immediate attempt at nuclear blackmail, the Romanians advanced proposals at
the ENDC for negative security assurances from the NWS (Gheorghe 2013a).
Since Romania had no forward-deployed nuclear weapons on its sovereign
territory, the country was a supporter of the Soviet “Kosygin formula.”134 The 1966
proposal called for negative security assurances for such states. Kosygin’s plan
failed because the United States and NATO saw it as an attempt to pressure West
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Germany to remove U.S. weapons from its territory (Shaker 1980b; Bunn and
Timerbaev 1992).135 The October 1967 Romanian working paper was also explicit
in its call for negative security assurances. In it, the Romanians requested new
language indicating:
Nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty solemnly
undertake never in any circumstances to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclearweapon States which undertake not to manufacture or
acquire nuclear weapons.136
The United States rejected the Romanian amendment, as it did with
all other proposals on negative security assurances—predominantly from the
ENDC’s eight non-aligned members. Romania would re-introduce the proposal in
January 1968, only for it to be vetoed again (Shaker 1980b). Washington’s counter
of positive security assurances to the NNWS drew support from the RSR, but it
also was not adopted.137 In the end, the superpowers did endorse the concept of
positive security assurances at the UNSC to gain signatories to the treaty.138 Few
states were satisfied by Resolution 255, however, as it was vague in describing
the actual details of such assurances (Adeniji 1995).
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There were also Romanian concerns that the NPT would be a tool to
prevent the NNWS from obtaining civilian nuclear energy programs. This possibility
of commercial barriers was particularly troubling to PCR officials, given their lack
of success in obtaining power reactors from both the Soviets and the West. Indeed,
recalling the NPT negotiations, one Romanian official stated: “The right of every
State to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was inherent in its sovereign
right to independent economic development, and was an essential attribute of
national sovereignty and independence (Shaker 1980a, p. 294).” The official’s
language epitomizes the rhetoric of a status dissenter in my typology.
The October 1967 Romanian working paper took issue with the lack
of credible civilian energy guarantees in the U.S. and Soviet draft treaties. The
Ceaușescu regime viewed as insufficient the draft treaties’ Article IV promise of
“the inalienable right [...] to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination.”139 Thus, the working paper called for the inclusion of the clause
“on the basis of equality” as well as language noting that the article applied to all
states, “whether they possess nuclear weapons or not.”140 After all, the existence
of the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program and its Soviet analog had done little to
advance Romanian nuclear power aspirations. Instead, other states with closer
patron–client relationships had become the beneficiaries of technical assistance
and access to the civilian nuclear marketplace.
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Like Italy, Romania also sought guaranteed access to special
fissionable materials for use in the production of medical radioisotopes or reactor
fuel (Swango 2014). None of the RSR amendments to Article IV were accepted by
the United States and the Soviet Union, though the Romanians did have mixed
success when supporting proposals from non-aligned countries (Timerbaev 1999).
Based on nuclear energy assurances alone, it seemed as if Bucharest would likely
decline to sign the treaty by type signaling as a status dissenter.
The IAEA’s system of safeguards further challenged notions of
Romanian autonomy. Nuclear energy deals Bucharest pursued with Britain and
the United States had previously stalled because of objections to safeguards
(Gheorghe 2013b, 2014a). For the Romanians, safeguards presented a
considerable sovereignty cost. The logic behind this thinking was two-fold. First,
Romanian officials saw the potential presence of international inspectors on their
territory as tantamount to sovereign interference. And second, there was an
overarching concern that safeguards would be a tool to prevent the NNWS from
having readily available access to civilian nuclear energy technologies (Gheorghe
2014a). Again, the Romanian focus on autonomy and status was apparent.
Throughout the ENDC negotiations, Romania repeatedly advocated
for the NPT’s Article III on safeguards to apply only to fissile materials (Shaker
1980b). The intent was to limit sovereign interference and protect the NNWS
Article IV right to peaceful nuclear energy. In one representative example, the
Romanian delegate, Ambassador Nicolae Ecobesco, gave a speech to the ENDC
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in March 1968 as negotiations were drawing toward their eventual end. Ecobesco
covered the full scope of the Romanian objection to overreaching safeguards:
In its present form, [A]rticle III provides for an extension
of the safeguards system of the International Atomic
Energy Agency to fields which, by their nature, involve
no danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In
order to ensure complete agreement between the
scope of the safeguards and the purpose laid down by
the treaty, the area of control must be defined in such
a way as to cover only those activities of States which
might enable nuclear energy to be diverted from its
peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons,
Otherwise, control may put a brake on the activities of
States devoted to the peaceful use of nuclear. Those
are the considerations underlying our proposal to
include in [A]rticle III, before the present paragraph 1,
a new paragraph worded as follows: “The control
established by this Article shall have the exclusive
purpose of preventing the use of special fissionable
materials for the production of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty. Control shall be
applied to such peaceful nuclear activities of nonnuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty as, by their
nature and the quantities of source and special
fissionable materials which they produce, process or
use, may lead to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.”141
Here again, however, the Romanians failed to gain any traction in relaxing the
IAEA safeguards system. Article III of the NPT, as agreed, restricts the provision
of special fissionable materials to NNWS “for peaceful purposes, unless the source
or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards.”142
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Lastly, Bucharest voiced dissent to how the superpowers had laid
out the process of amending the NPT in their August 1967 draft treaties. Given the
significant number of Romanian amendments to the draft treaties that were
considered but rejected, Ceaușescu and his advisors endeavored to preserve
national autonomy. There was little interest in having to adhere to treaty provisions
the regime did not support. Unfortunately for the Romanians, Article VII of the draft
treaties stipulated that amendments would be adopted if they received a simple
majority vote from the States Parties, including, of course, all of the NWS.143
Ecobesco stood with the delegation of Nigeria in insisting that such a procedure
would be “undemocratic.” He further warned, “Amendments made in that way,
whatever the nature of the intention underlying them, could entail injustices to one
or several parties to the treaty.”144 Like so many other Romanian proposals, this
one, too, was rejected by the ENDC. The voting rules on Article VII remained in
the final version of the treaty for signature.145 Still, it is important to note that states
must ratify such amendments in order to be legally bound by them. For this reason,
the Romanian objection to the NPT on these grounds seemed to be driven by
principles related to status.
The historical evidence from the multilateral negotiations over the
NPT appears to present a straightforward narrative. Romania assumes the role of
a status dissenter—a state whose leaders fear that the balance of power enshrined
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by a multilateral arms control treaty will minimize their role on the international
stage. Consequently, Ceaușescu’s diplomats objected to the NPT at every turn in
Geneva. They insisted that it divided the world into unequal camps of the nucleararmed and the disarmed. They claimed that it might prevent Romania from
obtaining civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They cautioned that its
system of IAEA safeguards would enable unnecessary sovereign interference.
And they chastised its amendment process as an undemocratic attempt to
suppress the voices of smaller states. As Gheorghe (2013a, p. 12) notes, this line
of autonomy from the Soviets “brought [Romania] considerable image benefits”
and was often seen “as proof that Romania was pursuing its own national interests
through its independent foreign policy.”
But if these objections to the NPT offered the full story, why did
Ceaușescu sign the treaty on the day it opened for signature? After all, the
superpowers rejected almost all of the proposed Romanian amendments to the
treaty. I argue that the Romanian leadership had many substantive reasons to
criticize the treaty, so Bucharest often appeared as a status dissenter within the
ENDC. Declassified U.S. documents from the time assess that the Romanian
rhetoric was independence posturing that would not prevent Bucharest from joining
the NPT.146 The reason for this was obvious: While talks were occurring in Geneva,
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a more important deliberation process for the RSR was happening within the
Warsaw Pact. Romania was, in fact, a subordinate state, not a status dissenter.
Negotiating the NPT with Moscow
Foreign policy rhetoric at the ENDC aside, Romania was a subordinate state that
depended on the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc for military protection and
economic prosperity. Brezhnev was willing to tolerate some level of independence
from Bucharest in multilateral fora, but declining to sign the NPT would have
carried stark consequences for Romania. As the historical record shows, Romania
simply lacked the relative strength to resist coercive pressure from its Soviet
patron. My analysis of Romania as a subordinate stands in contrast to what a close
reading of the ENDC negotiation records alone would reveal—Bucharest as a
status dissenter. I find that when the Kremlin pressured Romania, its type and
commitment signaling on the treaty followed. There was, however, a brief delay
between signature and ratification when RSR officials feared an invasion in the
aftermath of Soviet interference in Czechoslovakia. The commitment signaling of
ratification only became possible when Bucharest and Moscow rekindled their
security relationship, eliminating the risk of conflict.
Early Romanian objections to the treaty in a Warsaw Pact context
date back to 1963. It was during this time that Kennedy was again seriously
considering his predecessor’s—Dwight D. Eisenhower—MLF proposal. The MLF
would involve multinational NATO crews on submarines armed with U.S. nuclear
weapons to increase shared nuclear decision-making in the Atlantic Alliance (Kohl
1965; Bunn 1992). In October 1963, Khrushchev indicated his willingness to
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cooperate with Washington and allow the MLF to be permissible under the NPT.
The move shocked the USSR’s Warsaw Pact allies, including the RSR under
Gheorghiu-Dej, who had already felt abandoned in the Berlin Wall and Cuban
Missile Crises (Brands 2007). By presenting the possibility of the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG, West Germany) obtaining nuclear weapons, it showed further
weakness to Khrushchev’s internal Soviet critics. Khrushchev, who faced constant
pressure on the homefront, was eventually ousted by his protégé Brezhnev in
October 1964 (Taubman 2003).
Brezhnev’s rise to power that month coincided with the first Chinese
nuclear explosive test. Now, the USSR had to take the criticism of the MLF by its
Eastern European clients seriously, lest it lose them to a new nuclear protector in
the Sino–Soviet split (Selvage 2001; Crump-Gabreëls 2017). Some of the most
vociferous opposition to the NPT in the Eastern Bloc had come from the GDR and
Poland regarding the MLF. But when the Kremlin did an about-face and rejected
the idea of the MLF’s acceptability under the NPT, East German leader Walter
Ulbricht and Polish leader Władysław Gomułka closed ranks with Moscow (CrumpGabreëls 2017). Romania took a different position, with its leaders viewing Peking
as another potential nuclear patron in the communist world (Alexiev 1981). Unlike
the Soviets, the Chinese did not support the NPT.
The Soviets convened their allies for a PCC meeting in Warsaw in
January 1965. They intended to achieve unanimous endorsement of the NPT
within the Warsaw Pact to present a unified front at the ENDC. Two important sets
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of meetings involving Romanian officials had occurred before the PCC met.147
First, the Chinese Ambassador to Romania, Liu Fan, had secured support from
Bucharest through Politburo representative Emil Bodnaras for blocking consensus
in the Warsaw Pact on the NPT (Crump 2015; Crump-Gabreëls 2017). As noted
in the previous section, the Chinese viewed the treaty as a joint U.S.–Soviet
attempt to disarm them. Second, Gheorghiu-Dej and Mănescu had met with
Gomułka and Ulbricht in meetings to discuss a GDR draft NPT (Crump-Gabreëls
2017).148 The Romanians argued that the MLF and the larger global
nonproliferation issue were unsuitable for the UN setting because they risked
unfairly targeting the PRC nuclear program. In the meeting with Gomułka,
Romanian officials urged an international communist conference so that no country
would be unduly subjected to the will of others.149
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In Warsaw, Brezhnev, Gomułka, and Ulbricht all condemned the
MLF as a means for West German proliferation.150 They maintained that the only
way to prevent such an emergent security threat was Warsaw Pact unanimity on
a robust NPT. Gheorghiu-Dej and Maurer saw the matter differently.151 For
example, the Romanian president warned that the treaty was “having as its goal
the condemnation of China for the tests it conducted with an atomic weapon.”152
The RSR effectively used the consensus-based intergovernmental nature of the
Warsaw Pact to veto the alliance’s endorsement of the NPT. The communiqué
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from the meeting in Warsaw drew attention to concerns about the FRG and the
MLF while also calling for a nonaggression treaty with NATO. One thing the
communiqué did not discuss, however, was anything related to an accord on
nuclear nonproliferation.153
The veto of the NPT surprised the Soviets, who mounted a campaign
to convince Romania to change its position. Brezhnev dispatched Lev Tolkunov,
of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, to Bucharest for February 1965 discussions with
Bodnaras and Ceaușescu (Crump 2015). Ceaușescu would become the
Romanian leader in March that year after Gheorghiu-Dej succumbed to lung
cancer. Tolkunov appealed to his interlocutors to accept the NPT on the basis of
international communist solidarity. By all accounts, the Romanians listened to
Tolkunov without shifting their views. Bondaras even “duly reported his entire
conversation with Tolkunov a day later to the Chinese diplomat Van Tung (Crump
2015, p. 181).” The Soviets would propose the creation of an NPT to the UNGA in
October 1965, but the Romanian dissent prevented the draft treaty from being
introduced as a Warsaw Pact initiative (Crump-Gabreëls 2017).154
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To try to achieve Eastern Bloc unity on the treaty, the Soviets
adopted a new strategy. In January 1966, Brezhnev began pushing for the Warsaw
Pact to become a supranational entity. He sent Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid
Il’ichev to Bucharest to discuss the NPT and win Ceaușescu’s support for the new
configuration. Ceaușescu rebuffed the Soviet official by insisting that China must
be consulted over the treaty and that adopting it would hinder communist attempts
to engage France, which opposed the NPT under President Charles De Gaulle
(Gheorghe 2014a). Il’ichev offered a bold rejoinder, reminding the Romanian
leader of his country’s reliance on the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Romania depended
on the USSR as a security sponsor, making it unnecessary for Bucharest to pursue
the bomb from the Soviet perspective. The Kremlin also expected loyalty from the
Romanians on the NPT, given the nuclear protection they provided to their client.
Brezhnev himself would visit Romania in May to reassure Ceaușescu
of the credibility of Soviet nuclear assurances. This pledge was seen as essential
for Romania to embrace a treaty on nuclear nonproliferation. Brezhnev forcefully
stated, “If a bomb is dropped in Romania, then in thirty seconds a retaliatory bomb
drops on the country in which the first bomb originated (Gheorghe 2014a, pp. 123–
124).” There was a catch, of course, as the Soviet Premier noted that nuclear
protection was conditional upon Bucharest accepting the proposed institutional
arrangements of the Warsaw Pact. Since the supranationalism was intended to
create unanimity on the NPT, Brezhnev implied that the provision of the nuclear
umbrella depended on Romania accepting Moscow’s position on the treaty.
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Though Ceaușescu did not accept supranationalism at the PCC’s
July 1966 meeting in Bucharest, the Kremlin had become more aggressive in its
advocacy for the NPT.155 If Romania were to keep resisting Soviet proposals—
particularly in an NPT context—it could no longer count on Moscow for its security.
Such coercive threats almost certainly resonated in Bucharest. Romania was, after
all, a relatively weak state with little ability to independently defend itself from any
potential NATO attack (Lanoszka 2018b). For all the Romanian rhetoric about
autonomy and status, rejecting the NPT would bear risks for state survival if the
Soviets abandoned Bucharest. Romania legally forswearing nuclear weapons was
a higher priority for the Kremlin than its previous agricultural arrangements.
Still, Romanian reluctance to support the NPT forced the other states
of the Warsaw Pact to find alternative means to endorse the negotiation of the
treaty. For instance, Ceaușescu opted not to send representatives to the European
Communist and Workers’ Parties Conference in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in
April 1967 (Shaker 1980a). The other Warsaw Pact members seized the
opportunity to condemn China and the United States. Their official conference
statement also called for, “The conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty as an
important step towards the stopping of the arms race.”156 Such a position was at
odds with the Romanian efforts in both PCC and ENDC proceedings.
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Beyond reasons of status and protecting Chinese interests, Romania
may have opposed the NPT due to its own indigenous proliferation aspirations.
This possibility is slightly perplexing, as no major dataset of nuclear proliferation
codes Bucharest as exploring or pursuing the bomb during this time (Singh and
Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Bleek 2017). It is true that no such evidence of
military nuclear activities from the 1960s has surfaced. Gheorghe (2013a, p. 1)
does note that by 1964 “intelligence analysts in the United States pointed out that
Romania had the capacity to go nuclear in a relatively short period of time.”
Capacity, however, does not equate to proliferation intent or technical efforts. It is
also unclear whether the U.S. assessment was correct given Romania’s lack of
ENR capabilities. There is, at best, some evidence that CSEN officials were
intrigued by plutonium production plants during a trip to France in March 1965 to
discuss technical cooperation on nuclear energy (Gheorghe 2014a, 2014b).
But if Ceaușescu was genuinely interested in nuclear weapons, the
common understanding on PNEs reached by the United States and the USSR in
September 1966 presented a new barrier (Gheorghe 2013a). The Romanians had
sought access to PNEs, purportedly for civil development purposes. Under the
agreement between Washington and Moscow, Articles I and II of the NPT prohibit
NNWS development or acquisition of devices for PNEs alongside nuclear
weapons. Article V allows for the NNWS to benefit from PNEs, but they are
https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/statement_by_the_european_communist_and_workers_parties_on_s
ecurity_in_europe_karlovy_vary_26_april_1967-en-e8fe5ae4-27cc-4e0f-a48ac8c82cb548e6.html.
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services to be provided and performed by the NWS.157 Tellingly, Ceaușescu would
lament that month about Soviet secrecy over missiles and nuclear weapons
technology (Gheorghe 2013b).
In March 1967, both Maurer and Ceaușescu indicated to Brezhnev
that Romanian opposition to the NPT stemmed from a desire not to tie the state’s
hands regarding future development of the bomb (Gheorghe 2013a, 2013b).
Romania remained in nuclear forbearance, but in line with my theory, taking steps
to legally renounce the nuclear option was a more complicated matter. Maurer and
Ceaușescu also sought assurances from both the Soviets and the Americans that
the NPT would not prevent Romania from obtaining a civilian nuclear energy
program (Gheorghe 2013a, Swango 2014).
As the ENDC negotiations headed toward their conclusion,
Ceaușescu called for a meeting of the PCC. The Warsaw Pact met in Sofia from
March 6–7, 1968, to discuss the many concerns Bucharest had voiced to the NPT
in Geneva.158 In Sofia, Ceaușescu elaborated on the RSR critiques of the treaty.
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For example, he argued that the NWS would need to actually agree to concrete
steps toward nuclear disarmament within five years of the NPT entering into force
(Timerbaev 1999). The proposal would have significant ramifications for the Soviet
nuclear arsenal were it adopted.
The response was harsh, with swift and dismissive criticism from the
Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, East German, Hungarian, Polish, and Soviet
delegations. Mainly, the other Warsaw Pact states sharply accused Romania of
making unreasonable demands and attempting to delay and derail the NPT.159 The
summit produced an odd outcome: a statement in the Soviet newspaper Pravda
supporting the draft NPT that stressed the “complete unanimity” of the treaty’s
other PCC proponents but failed to mention Romania.160 While the Warsaw Pact
seemingly ignored the internal opposition from Romania, Bucharest moved
forward by proposing its amendments in the ENDC setting (Hunt 2013).
“Memorandum by the Hungarian Foreign Minister (János Péter) on the Romanian Proposal to
Convene the PCC,” February 5, 1968, PHP, Warsaw Pact Records Collection,
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/18010/ipublicationdocumen
t_singledocument/dec73e7c-af57-4cfb-9b44-2751a4dc2cc4/en/Memo_Peter_1968_Eng.pdf;
“Letter by the General Secretary of the PCR (Nicolae Ceauşescu) to the First Secretary of PZPR
(Władysław Gomułka) Proposing to Summon the PCC,” January 31, 1968, PHP, Warsaw Pact
Records Collection,
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/18012/ipublicationdocumen
t_singledocument/ff70d906-ed7f-4059-91eb-10cfafc49a9a/en/680131_Letter_Eng.pdf.
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The moves came with substantial diplomatic repercussions for
Romania. To this point, the Soviets had tolerated the autonomous Romanian
streak. But in Sofia, Brezhnev moved quickly to isolate Romania, noting that its
attempt “at sabotaging the conclusion of the treaty [...] could not be allowed.”161
The Soviets thus put together the joint statement with the intent to show the
exclusion of Romania. Brezhnev would further chastise Romania—as would
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko—in his speech to the April 1968 Plenum
of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.162 Brezhnev even went
so far as to say:
If the Romanian amendment were accepted, the nonproliferation treaty would not be concluded in the
foreseeable future. Who will win from this? First and
foremost, the West German revanchists and the neoNazis. The nuclear arms race will intensify, and there
will be new capitalist states in possession of atomic and
hydrogen bombs.163
The relative Soviet tolerance of Romanian independence on
nonproliferation had come to an end. Brezhnev had already made clear to
Ceaușescu that Romanian security and the nuclear umbrella depended upon
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compliance with the Soviet agenda on the NPT. Now, criticism from all of the
state’s closest allies threatened to isolate Bucharest, which was economically,
politically, and militarily locked into the Eastern Bloc. Diplomats from Warsaw Pact
countries also began to strongly object to Romanian proposals at the ENDC,
publicly battling their PCR comrades in front of NATO and non-aligned states.
Ceaușescu caved under pressure, signing the NPT on July 1, 1968,
the day it opened for signature. In line with U.S. and Chinese assessments of intraalliance dynamics in the Warsaw Pact, Romania remained squarely in the Eastern
Bloc. It is true that Romanian officials believed that the treaty would unfairly freeze
the balance of power to the benefit of the NWS over the NNWS.164 Bucharest had
used its relative autonomy to extract concessions from the treaty, but, as my theory
would predict, Ceaușescu had little choice except to type signal as a subordinate
by quickly signing the NPT when his Soviet patrons insisted. In doing so, he joined
every other Warsaw Pact state leader under the Soviet nuclear umbrella.
Crump-Gabreëls (2017, p. 109) contends that “Bucharest radically
changed its course in June 1968, when it became clear that an overwhelming
majority of UN members supported the treaty.” Yet, such a turn of events entailed
Ceaușescu opposing China, constraining Romania’s future ability to pursue
nuclear weapons, and recanting years of principled opposition to the treaty.
Additionally, many other UN members—including Brazil, India, and South Africa—
continued to oppose the NPT when it opened for signature. Romania may have
wanted to share in the treaty’s success, but a more likely pathway to signing
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See: “Memorandum of Conversation,” Washington, DC, April 11, 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968,
Vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Doc. 159.

150

pertains to patron coercion. The aftermath of the Sofia PCC meeting revealed that
being an NPT dissenter could cost Romania all of its military allies and its main
trading partners. Predictably, such pressure forced the hand of the regime.
Even though type signaling occurred in July 1968, Ceaușescu did
not order commitment signaling through his parliament ratifying the NPT until
February 1970. This is a relatively short period of time between signature and
ratification, although Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland did so in 1969.
What might account for the slightly lengthier signature–ratification time-lag in the
Romanian case? I find that RSR officials had a protracted ratification discussion
related to security threats rather than a pro forma one based on procedural issues.
Gheorghe (2013a) points to Romanian success in opening
opportunities for obtaining nuclear energy technologies between 1968–1970 as
the determinative factor in the ratification. During these years, Romania had
productive conversations about technical collaboration with the Americans, the
Soviets, and other European countries. Washington had signed a Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement with Bucharest in 1967. And that year, Brezhnev agreed
to finally sell Romania the long-desired power plants after receiving assurances
that numerous technical obstacles would prevent a drive toward the bomb
(Gheorghe 2013a, 2013b, 2018).
However, it remains unclear whether continued progress towards
civilian nuclear energy was sufficient to prompt Romania to recant its autonomous
streak. Furthermore, the state’s first nuclear power reactor only came online
decades later in 1996, raising doubts about the overall influence of nuclear energy
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on its NPT decision-making. This is not to say that nuclear power was not one
incentive for ratifying the NPT, but Bucharest had already been assured by the
Soviets in 1967 and the Americans in 1968 that the treaty would not result in civilian
energy denial (Gheorghe 2013a, Swango 2014).
Why then did it take longer for Romania to ratify the NPT than it did
for the Soviets’ other clients? The evidence points to deterioration of Romania’s
security environment that made commitment signaling about nuclear weapons
significantly more costly between 1968–1970. It was not until a serious security
threat to Romanian sovereignty was resolved that Bucharest could ratify the treaty.
Ceaușescu ordered its ratification only then and when it became clear that both
the USSR and the United States would also do so.
In August 1968, the Soviets and all of their Warsaw Pact allies—
except Romania—invaded Czechoslovakia to put down reformist ambitions by the
new government. The move inspired “true paranoia [...] concerning a possible
Soviet invasion” just one month after Ceaușescu had signed the NPT (Deletant
and Ionescu 2004, p. 99).165 Ceaușescu immediately mobilized an armed militia of
nearly 100,000 workers to defend the country called the Patriotic Guard (Mason
1982; Deletant 2007). He also condemned the invasion: “There is no justification
whatsoever, and there can be no excuse for accepting even for a moment the idea
of military intervention in the affairs of a fraternal socialist state (Pechlivanis 2017,
p. 242).” The RSR had struggled over adopting the NPT, signaling its intent to
eventually legally forswear nuclear weapons because of Soviet pressure and
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protection provided by Warsaw Pact membership. Yet, any role for the Soviet
Union as the defender of Romanian sovereignty now appeared to ring hollow.
The threat to Romania from the Kremlin was more than mere
paranoia. A heavy Soviet troop presence remained in Czechoslovakia into 1969.
U.S. intelligence reports indicate that—at one point—Czech officials cautioned
Brezhnev that violence in their country could prompt anti-Soviet resistance in
Romania. Brezhnev reportedly replied, “We’ll wipe Romania off the map when it
suits us.”166 Taking the final step to commitment signal to being a NNWS was
becoming increasingly difficult, as nuclear weapons would help to secure survival
of the Romanian state. Still, Ceaușescu continued to assure U.S. President
Richard Nixon, “With regard to physics, we donʼt want nuclear weapons, but would
wish to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”167
The growing pressure on Romania from Soviet military adventurism
in the Eastern Bloc prompted a series of diplomatic maneuvers. Ceaușescu, upon
the advice of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, aimed to find ways to appease
Brezhnev and rebuild relations with Romania’s Soviet patron (Stanciu 2013b). The
Romanians also voiced their concerns to the Americans, who demanded Soviet
pledges not to invade.168 In fact, the Nixon administration went so far as to tell
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Moscow’s envoy in Washington that an invasion of Romania would spell the end
of the NPT and other near-term prospects for détente.169 Mănescu met Brezhnev
in Moscow in April 1969 to discuss the overall trajectory of their states’ bilateral
diplomatic relationship. The meeting ended with the Soviet leader dismissing the
prospect of an invasion and noting the importance of Romania within the Eastern
Bloc. For their part, the Romanians reaffirmed their allegiance to Moscow. This
attempt to patch up fraying relations would lead to preparations for signing a new
treaty of friendship by July 1970 (Stanciu 2013b). Perceptions of a pressing Soviet
threat and invasion had changed.
Without a Soviet threat to Romanian sovereignty, Ceaușescu could
move forward on the NPT. He ordered ratification of the treaty, which the
parliament voted for on January 30, 1970. Romania would then deposit its
instruments of ratification in Moscow, London, and Washington on February 4. It
is essential to note that Bucharest did wait until ratification by the superpowers—
on March 5, 1970—was imminent. The delay represented one final act of defiance
from a state that had long sought to ensure that the nuclear-armed states would
commit themselves to disarmament via the treaty.170 Ratification simply would not
have been possible, however, so long as officials in Bucharest had believed in the
constant specter of Soviet invasion. The gap between Romania’s type and
commitment signaling on the treaty emphasizes the increased level of
consideration given to ratification decisions.
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The Romanian fear of a Soviet invasion raises a question: If the level
of threat to state sovereignty was so high, why did Bucharest not begin to pursue
the bomb during this period? There are two likely, related answers. First,
nuclearization is a long process that takes many years, and Romania was quite far
away from having the capability to rapidly nuclearize. Second, trying to proliferate
is not the only tool states use to address emerging threats. During the short period
when the Romanians feared a Soviet invasion, Ceaușescu opted for diplomatic
solutions. And he was successful in repairing the relationship with the USSR,
avoiding a sense of urgency to pursue the nuclear option. With the threat resolved,
Romania leaders felt secure in issuing the commitment signal of ratification.
The Aftermath, Cheating, and the CTBT
Legally forswearing nuclear weapons through NPT ratification was not the end of
the Romanian nuclear story. In line with Sagan’s (2011) observation that
autocracies are more likely than democracies to cheat by violating their NPT
commitments, Ceaușescu would order exploratory nuclear weapons research
during the 1980s. However, these activities would never have the resources to
allow the serious pursuit of nuclear weapons. The democratic government that
emerged after his overthrow, trial, and subsequent execution in 1989 would
terminate the program and champion the CTBT as an advocate in the 1990s. The
Romanian ratification came three years after signature due to other priorities. But
having legally forsworn nuclear weapons through the NPT, the ratification debate
in Bucharest was of a pro forma, rather than protracted, nature, with little emphasis
on substantive issues.
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For Ceaușescu, the 1970s were a period of dissatisfaction with the
superpowers’ progress toward disarmament per NPT Article VI. He sharply
criticized the Interim Agreement of 1972 emerging from the SALT I talks because
it did “not take account of third state interests and offered no Soviet or U.S.
commitment not to use nuclear weapons.”171 Ceaușescu warned that this
attachment to nuclear arms would do little to dissuade proliferation by countries
such as India. SALT I not only failed to take disarmament steps desired by
Bucharest, but it also contained no negative security assurances for the NNWS.172
The Romanian President would accordingly continue to push for nuclear abolition
throughout the early and mid-1970s, most notably in 1973 and 1975.173 He
consistently informed his interlocutors from Washington and Moscow that their lack
of progress toward this end could spur global proliferation cascades.
Alongside 1970s disarmament advocacy, Ceaușescu continued the
Romanian drive to develop a civilian nuclear energy program. In 1972, Bucharest
would sign an agreement for nuclear safeguards with the IAEA despite objecting
to them in principle during the ENDC negotiations.174 The safeguards agreement
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was instrumental in convincing the Nixon administration to approve the sale of a
14-megawatt TRIGA II (Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics) research
reactor to Romania. This reactor allowed experimental research into nuclear fuel
that might one day be used in a nuclear power program (Gheorghe 2013a). Work
also began in 1978 on a nuclear power station at Cernavodă using CANDU
(Canada deuterium uranium) reactor technology (Gheorghe 2014a).
There were signs that the Romanians may have been interested in
military nuclear applications as well. When India carried out its “Smiling Buddha”
PNE in 1974, Ceaușescu quickly sent a delegation of scientists for an exchange
of expertise with New Delhi (Gheorghe 2014a). Ceaușescu also told officials from
Atomic Energy Canada in 1976 that he intended for Romania to have an
autonomous nuclear weapon program by 2000. Still, the Canadians nevertheless
agreed to sell him CANDU reactors. Romania had become adept at playing
nuclear suppliers off one another and had numerous supply-side options
(Gheorghe 2019). In 1976, U.S. intelligence concluded that “if Romania were to
opt to produce nuclear weapons, it can acquire the necessary knowhow and
material over a reasonably short span of years (Gheorghe 2013a, p. 15).”
Such activities and statements by Ceaușescu did, however, lead to
some complications in the nuclear marketplace. Romania came under pressure
during the presidency of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who had a more intense
focus on nonproliferation than his predecessors. The Carter administration’s
emphasis on the 1978 NNPA and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NGS) Guidelines
created bottlenecks in the supply chain. Romania gave up on purchasing hot cells
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from the United States and instead bought them from France’s Ateliers et
Chantiers de Bretagne (Gheorghe 2019). The French—non-signatories to the
NPT—had far less intrusive safeguards demands than the Americans. Of course,
procuring hot cells for nuclear materials research by itself does not imply
nuclearization intentions. Hot cells may also be used in the production of medical
radioisotopes or for examining how fuel has held up in a reactor, which can be
important for developing independent fuel fabrication capabilities. Romania’s
research, however, does not appear to have been for either of these purposes.
In 1983, Ceaușescu ordered his scientists at the Nuclear
Technologies Institute in Pitești to engage in experimental research to extract
plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel (Gheorghe 2019). They succeeded by 1985
in reprocessing “a small quantity” of fissile isotope Plutonium-239 (Pu-239), which
may be used as material for a bomb (Gheorghe 2013a, p. 4). The manner of the
experiments was similarly suspect, as they were not declared to the IAEA and
intentionally scheduled around safeguards inspections to avoid detection (Dunn
2009; Gheorghe 2014a; Findlay 2015). Gheorghe (2013a, 2014a) further points to
an interest in HWRs that would produce plutonium byproducts with natural uranium
fuel to indicate nuclearization intent. Yet, the experiments involved reprocessing
only 100 milligrams of plutonium, a far cry from the kilogram quantities required to
build a bomb (Findlay 2015, p. 37).
Bleek (2017, p. 43) argues convincingly that such evidence hardly
constitutes “pursuit” of nuclear weapons. The plutonium separation experiments
were only small-scale laboratory exercises. HWRs and reprocessing were also
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attractive because they would make dependence on foreign-supplied enriched
nuclear fuel unnecessary. Still, given the nature of these activities, three political
science studies code Romania as “exploring” the nuclear option. Since only limited
material has been published on these experiments, dates for nuclear exploration
are varied. Bleek (2017) codes it as taking place from 1979–1989, longer than Jo
and Gartzke (2007) who say 1981–1989, and Singh and Way’s (2004) coding of
1985–1989. In all cases, there is agreement that the activities ceased in 1989. That
year, Ceaușescu was overthrown in a revolution that gave rise to a new democratic
government under Ion Iliescu.
The fact of Romanian violation of the NPT is not in itself surprising.
As the theory explains, cheating may occur in multilateral nuclear arms control
regimes, consistent with Sagan’s (2010) observation that autocracies are more
likely to cheat than democracies. This does not mean that the NPT is ineffective.
The statistical literature shows that the treaty has a causal effect in preventing
proliferation (Fuhrmann and Lupu 2016). A total of 24 of 58 economically-capable
states engaged in nuclear weapons activities prior to the NPT opening for
signature, but only 13 of 83 did so after its introduction (Müller and Schmidt 2010).
Instead, the theory predicts that treaty withdrawal is highly unlikely.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation explained how withdrawing from nuclear treaties
invites severe punishment from the international community by signaling that a
state may seek the bomb. In line with the theory, Ceaușescu did not attempt to
withdraw. It is also telling that Romanian officials planned the plutonium separation
experiments to avoid apprehension by the IAEA and the wider international
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community. The consequences of being caught in non-compliance with its NPT
obligations could have been severe, including economic sanctions and possible—
but unlikely, given the extremely limited scale of violations—Soviet military
intervention. Even if non-compliance did not rise to the level of intervention from
Moscow, previous Warsaw Pact unanimity on the NPT indicates that disclosed
violations would have at least resulted in increased Romanian isolation from its
communist allies.
Ceaușescu’s brief flirtation with nuclear proliferation during the
1980s remains surprising, nonetheless, given the alliance with Moscow and
general lack of tensions with NATO. As Debs and Monteiro (2017, p. 76) argue,
“We know of no security motivation behind Romania’s nuclear exploration.”
Alternative possibilities for Romanian hedging behavior are more likely. They
include domestic pressure from scientists eager to experiment with new
technologies (Sagan 1996/1997) and international status incentives (Hymans
2005). Though this dissertation does not seek to definitively explain proliferation
decision-making, some combination of the two seems most plausible. Romania
had, after all, engaged in a broad technology procurement program, and its leaders
had doubts about the treaty’s viability to prevent horizontal proliferation and the
emergence of new nuclear powers. Low-level nuclear exploration would help to
move Romania closer to the bomb should it ever become necessary.175 This
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should not be confused with a proximate security threat motivation, as it more
closely resembles Narang’s (2016/2017, p. 118) concept of insurance hedging “to
further reduce the time required to build a bomb should a state need to weaponize.”
Narang (2016/2017, p. 118) notes that insurance hedging does not
involve “developing organizational routines for the management of nuclear
weapons or any physical work on weaponization.” In all likelihood, the Romanian
experiments involved laboratory proof-of-concept reprocessing, very far from
anything resembling a concerted drive for the bomb. There is also no evidence
that Romania amassed the necessary combination of nuclear capability indicators
for weaponization identified by Meyer (1984) and Stoll (1996). These human
capital

resources

include:

engineers/physicists/chemists,
production

capacity,

and

metallurgists,

chemical

electronic/explosive
electricity

production

engineers,

specialists,
capability.

nuclear

nitric

acid

Furthermore,

Ceaușescu’s 1976 statement that Romania would have its own nuclear weapon
by the year 2000 attests to the lack of organized effort and resources associated
with the Romanian military nuclear option.
The 2000 plan never materialized, and Ceaușescu was overthrown
and executed in 1989. The democratic Iliescu government was more supportive of
multilateral nuclear agreements than its predecessor. It pursued a pro-western
course of policy as it attempted to move toward NATO membership—achieved in
2004. Iliescu embraced the NPT, as Romania invited the IAEA into the country for
L. Watts. No evidence has surfaced suggesting that the Euromissile crisis spurred the RSR to
consider nuclear experimentation for hedging purposes in the 1980s, though the possibility cannot
be excluded.
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special inspections in 1992 to investigate the plutonium separation legacy (Dunn
2009). His government would also support the indefinite extension of the NPT in
1995 and the negotiation of the CTBT in Geneva as a member of the CD.
Had the communist government remained in power during the test
ban negotiations, there might have been cause for concern among CTBT
proponents. Romania tried to establish technical exchanges with China and India
following their first nuclear tests in 1964 and 1974, respectively. The RSR had also
been interested in PNEs during the 1960s and 1970s, leveraging IAEA technical
cooperation to connect with subject matter experts on the topic. Romania made
contact with PNE specialists from France, India, the United States, and the USSR
(Gheorghe 2013a). But as the credibility of PNEs for civil-scientific projects waned
in the international community in the 1980s, so too did Romanian interest.
Still, even Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceaușescu would likely have
supported the CTBT. Gheorghiu-Dej advocated for the Stoica Plan’s Balkan NWFZ
in 1958, when Khrushchev “began calling for disarmament and a nuclear test ban
(Mavrodin 2020, p. 198).” In July of that year, the Romanian leader sent
seismoacoustic experts to a joint NATO–Warsaw Pact meeting in Geneva to
design a test ban verification regime (Johnson 2009).176 The LTBT of 1963 did not
incorporate their proposed monitoring system of 160–170 stations due to
perceived difficulties in monitoring underground nuclear explosions.177 It did,
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however, help to form the basis of the eventual IMS of the CTBT (Ramaker et al.
2003). The RSR had followed the lead of its Soviet patron and adopted the LTBT
irrespective of verification concerns. Gheorghiu-Dej signed on August 8, 1963, and
ratification came shortly thereafter on December 12, 1963. Under Ceaușescu,
Romania would join with seven other communist countries, including the Soviet
Union, to propose a verifiable CTBT in 1987.178 Their joint CD working paper also
suggested possible OSI as part of the test ban regime.
Support for the idea of a CTBT in principle was one of the few nuclear
legacies of the Ceaușescu regime followed by Iliescu. This strategy was logical,
as Romania had already legally forsworn nuclear weapons through the NPT and
given up on the hopes of conducting PNEs. Bucharest had little to gain by holding
out on the test ban and faced no serious security threats, so my theory predicts an
advocate’s type signal followed by ratification. Romania was one of 61 states to
participate in the treaty negotiations at the CD in Geneva from 1993–1996 (Mackby
2016). Its officials, led by Ambassador Romulus Neagu, were early supporters of
the treaty.179
In Geneva, Romanian negotiators frequently agreed with the
positions of the United States and other NATO countries. Their intent appears to
have been creating a verifiable CTBT that would ensure fairness for the NNWS
high degree of probability (Ramaker et al. 2003, p. 5).” However, seismologists Richards and
Zavales (1996) have since determined that such analysis was overly conservative and may have
prevented the realization of an early, viable nuclear detection system.
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and make impossible evasive nuclear testing. Bucharest joined with Washington
and several of its allies to propose an IMS with global coverage enabling detection
of nuclear tests at yields of one kiloton or lower (Ramaker et al. 2003). The
proposal was eventually adopted and offered the lowest detection threshold of the
various options considered. The delegations had agreed that a 0.1 kiloton
threshold or dedicated CTBT satellite monitoring network would be prohibitively
expensive. Such options were not viewed as necessary for the detection of
militarily significant evasive testing. Romania also supported some of the most
intrusive OSI provisions, which were at times concerning to Moscow. They
included the use of “data from national technical means [...] collected in conformity
with international law (Ramaker et al. 2003, p. 159).” Today, the authentication of
such data and intelligence remains an area of debate in the CTBTO’s Working
Group B on verification issues.
Additionally, Ambassador Neagu and the Romanian delegation in
Geneva stood with the United States on the matter of computer simulations and
laboratory experiments.180 The nuclear-armed countries battled against states like
Brazil that sought to prohibit most scientific activities intended to replicate nuclear
tests without producing a nuclear explosive yield. Neagu criticized this type of
language as unverifiable and a risk to derail the negotiations. He was probably
right, as the nuclear-armed states were highly unlikely to accept such provisions.
Romania also advocated for three general treaty principles to
prevent any state from impeding the enforcement of the CTBT. First, it was the
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See: CD/PV.706.
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Romanian hope that the CTBTO’s Executive Council—which would receive data
from OSI—would report treaty violations to the UNGA instead of the UNSC. This
was proposed to subvert the veto power of Russia and the other permanent
members of the Security Council, but it was unsuccessful.181 Second, Romania
opposed the idea of having treaty review conferences to amend CTBT provisions
“unless new scientific and technological developments provided a reason to do so
(Ramaker et al. 2003, p. 212).”182 The majority of states rejected the Romanian
proposal, and CTBT Article VIII thus calls for the convening of review conferences
every ten years after entry-into-force.183 Third, Romania stood with the United
States in objecting to an Indian proposal to link the treaty to specific time-sensitive
disarmament commitments (Ramaker et al. 2003).184 The exclusion of such
provisions from the agreement resulted in India remaining outside the treaty. At
the same time, the United States could continue to provide the nuclear umbrella
that would eventually protect Romania.
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Here, it is important to recall that the veto-wielding P5 are nuclear-armed and are thus among
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For example, treaty Article IV (Part B) explains that the IMS shall consist of internationallycertified seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and noble gas stations as well as
radionuclide processing laboratories. Yet, Article IV (para. 11) calls for “the examination of the
verification potential of additional monitoring technologies such as electromagnetic pulse
monitoring or satellite monitoring, with a view to developing, when appropriate, specific measures
to enhance the efficient and cost-effective verification of this Treaty.” It is these types of
breakthroughs that might have been worthy of convening a review conference from the Romanian
viewpoint.
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Lastly, Romania sought the early entry-into-force of the CTBT. It
initially objected to stringent treaty language to this end, proposing that 40–50
states, including the five NPT-designated NWS, would be sufficient (Ramaker et
al. 2003). However, numerous states viewed this provision as overly permissive. It
did not account for India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, or advanced civilian
nuclear powers with short breakout timelines to the bomb. Instead, the CD agreed
to the CTBT Annex 2 language requiring the 44 “nuclear-capable states” with
nuclear weapons programs, civilian nuclear power plants, and research reactors
to ratify the treaty before entry-into-force.185 This language, which included
Romania among the Annex 2 states, has proven problematic as far as CTBT entryinto-force. Twenty-five years after the negotiations concluded, eight states must
still ratify the treaty before it can take effect.
Despite having some remaining concerns about parts of the eventual
treaty, Bucharest opted to support the CTBT. Romania joined several other nonnuclear members of the CD in supporting the submission of the draft treaty of June
28, 1996, to the UNGA. After additional amendments to satisfy China on OSI and
efforts to bypass Indian objections on nuclear disarmament, the General Assembly
received the CTBT for its consideration. The body widely approved the final text
on September 9, 1996 (Johnson 2009).
The Romanian government acted quickly to join the test ban regime.
Iliescu signed the treaty on September 24, 1996, the day it opened for signature.
In doing so, Romania type signaled as an advocate of the treaty. Romania’s
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commitment to being a NNWS was no longer contested as it was during the
Ceaușescu years. The voluntary IAEA inspections of 1992 and quick signing of the
CTBT helped put the contentious PCR nuclear legacy to rest. There was little for
Bucharest to lose in accepting a distribution of power that limited the vertical and
horizontal proliferation of capabilities Romania had forsworn. Iliescu’s successor,
Emil Constantinescu, had the parliament pursue ratification. On October 5, 1999,
the representatives did so after a pro forma debate—there were no strong
substantive objections to the treaty.
The three-year time-lag between type and commitment signaling
may be attributed to policy priorities. Constantinescu (2005) details in his
autobiography how his presidency dealt with pressing issues ranging from
economic liberalization, to preparing for NATO and European Union candidacy, to
constitutional crises provoked by his firing of prime ministers. CTBT ratification was
important, but it was hardly among the top parliamentary priorities of the time.
Having given up any nuclear weapon aspirations, there were few external
pressures on Romania to hastily ratify the treaty. Its commitment signal was
expected. Romania would soon install and receive CTBTO certification of its IMS
seismic station at Muntele Rosu, as stipulated in Annex 1 to the treaty’s protocol.186
The country has since been an active participant in discussions of treaty monitoring
and verification prior to the CTBT’s entry-into-force.
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Conclusion
The prevailing narrative in the literature surrounding Romanian behavior on
multilateral nuclear arms control is that of the maverick. Such characterizations
seem to make sense at first glance. After all, Bucharest behaved independently
from the Warsaw Pact at the ENDC negotiations on the NPT and frequently
challenged the Soviets in internal PCC nuclear deliberations during the 1960s. The
RSR also had a wide-ranging nuclear procurement program in the 1960s and
1970s, striking technology transfer deals with communist and non-communist
states alike. Then, Ceaușescu briefly ordered exploratory nuclear activities in the
1980s. The literature’s explanations for why Romania overcame its longstanding
resistance to the NPT fall short, however. Obtaining a civilian nuclear program and
wanting to take partial credit for the treaty’s successful negotiation are unlikely
drivers. The first power plant did not come online until 1996, and the PCR had
fought hard to sabotage the NPT.
A careful reading of the transcripts of the ENDC negotiation records
seems to deceptively support the maverick characterization. The records show
Romania as a status dissenter: opposing the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact
allies by chastising the NPT as discriminatory and codifying an unacceptable
balance of power. Bucharest appeared to agree with non-aligned state critics of
the accord more than it did with its closest allies. Yet, the fact that Romania signed
and ratified the NPT on a similar timeline to the other Soviet client states suggests
that there is more than meets the eye in this case. For all its criticism of the treaty,
Romania legally forswore nuclear weapons in an expeditious manner.
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In actuality, Bucharest neatly fits into the template of my processbased theory of entry into multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. GheorghiuDej, Ceaușescu, and other Romanian officials surely cared about peaceful civilian
nuclear energy and pursuing an autonomous foreign policy. Their position at the
ENDC made clear that Bucharest had every incentive to join states like Brazil and
India—that offered similar objections—in resisting the NPT after its opening for
signature. However, this chapter’s examination of historical accounts, meeting
records, and diplomatic correspondence reveals that Romania was a subordinate
in the NPT context. The Kremlin allowed limited autonomy from Bucharest on
agricultural trade issues, but refusing to join the NPT was a bridge too far. The
Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies made it plain to Ceaușescu and his advisors
that being a status dissenter would result in isolation and abandonment.
The evidence indicates that pressure from the Warsaw Pact,
particularly the Soviet Union, compelled Ceaușescu to sign the treaty. Bucharest
could not risk the consequent diplomatic and economic punishment promised by
Brezhnev. Romania type signaled its subordinate state allegiance to Moscow in
1968, but the deteriorating relationship with the Soviets briefly delayed its more
intense commitment signaling. Ratification became possible only in 1970 once
Brezhnev had provided assurances that the USSR presented no threat to
Romanian sovereignty and would likewise ratify the treaty. The CTBT was
significantly less complicated for Romania as the post-Cold War democratic
government harbored no secret nuclear proliferation or hedging aspirations. Iliescu
endorsed the balance of power enshrined by the CTBT and signed the test ban in
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1996 as an advocate. Ratification followed in 1999 under Constantinescu after a
pro forma debate containing little substantive content.
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Chapter 5 – Brazil: Status Aspiration Barriers to Arms Control
From start to finish, Brazil was one of the principal antagonists of the NPT during
the treaty negotiations of 1965–1968. The Brazilians castigated the agreement as
a tool of the nuclear-armed states to freeze world power and deny advanced
technology to developing states. It was thus anything but surprising when military
dictator Artur da Costa e Silva refused to sign the accord in 1968. While U.S.
leaders hoped Brasília would reverse its decision, every move Washington made
to limit the state’s access to civilian nuclear capabilities only hardened its drive to
obtain them. This course continued unabated under each successive Brazilian
administration—whether autocratic or democratic—until 1998, when Brazil
acceded to the NPT under popular President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Until
that point, Brazil had epitomized a status dissenter to multilateral nuclear arms
control per the typology shown in Table 3 of Chapter 2. Such states decline to sign
treaties they believe reify a balance of power that limits their international status.
The

interaction

of

Brazil’s

status

aspirations

and

U.S.

nonproliferation pressure is a fascinating story of more than three decades of
defiance to the superpower-led nuclear order (see Figure 6 for a timeline). It
involves secret deals with former Nazi nuclear scientists, regional competition with
Argentina, and confrontation between military and civilian leaders over clandestine
activities and an alleged nuclear test site. One of the most important questions
regarding the contentious history of Brazilian nuclear politics remains
underexplored in the scholarly literature. This chapter seeks to answer that
question: Why did Brazil finally accept multilateral nuclear arms control after so
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many years of refusing to accept a treaty its leaders viewed as unequal and
harmful to its international status?
Figure 6: Timeline of Brazilian NPT and CTBT Diplomacy

Existing literature generally provides three potential explanations for
the decision to legally forswear nuclear weapons via the NPT during the Cardoso
era. First, Brazilian mastery of uranium enrichment enabled the accession (Patti
2012; Debs and Monteiro 2017). Second, democratization was the key factor
leading to the embrace of the treaty (Graham 2002; Goldemberg, Alvim, and Mafra
2018). Third, non-nuclear norms associated with the NPT were pivotal in prompting
the diplomatic reversal (Rublee 2010).
This chapter brings new analysis of historical documents and original
interviews of key actors—including President Cardoso—to bear on the debate. My
extensive research based on fieldwork interviews and archival documents
challenges these existing explanations by providing new evidence on Brazil’s
nuclear decision-making and research programs. I find that, with some adaptation,
the first and third explanations above are more persuasive than the second.
However, neither fuel cycle mastery nor norms were independently sufficient to
trigger NPT accession. Looking at treaty accession through the lens of my processbased theory highlights the underlying signaling context. I argue that Brazilian
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participation in the NPT required a joint signal based on both status (type signal)
and security (commitment signal) considerations. I show that the evolving nature
and universalization of the treaty grew to pose status liabilities for advanced
nuclear holdout states like Brazil. Additionally, the evidence demonstrates that
Brazil faced no serious security threats and stood to gain from nuclear hedging as
a member of the NPT. It took 30 years after the treaty opened for signature for an
environment conducive to joint signaling to emerge. But emerge it did, and Brazil
joined the NPT on September 18, 1998.
The chapter proceeds in five sections as it dissects Brazil’s
complicated history with nuclear power and nuclear weapons. First, I chronicle the
beginnings of Brazilian interest in the atom and the start of the national nuclear
program. Second, I examine the sources of Brazilian type signaling of
dissatisfaction with the NPT during the ENDC negotiations on the treaty. Third, I
analyze the nuclear history of Brazil’s dictatorship after it refused to sign the NPT,
including nuclear procurement efforts, struggles against U.S. nonproliferation
pressure, and the “parallel program” of nuclear development under military
auspices. Fourth, I focus on domestic and international changes after the transition
to democracy that eventually led Brazil to accept the NPT, the CTBT, and other
multilateral security institutions. Finally, I summarize the evidence and conclude
the chapter.
Early Atomic History and Development Goals
The nuclear politics of Brazil were about international status aspirations from the
very beginning. Brazilian interest in the atom began soon after the end of the
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Second World War. In January 1946, the UNGA established the United Nations
Atomic Energy Agency Commission (UNAEC) to oversee nuclear matters. Brazil
appointed Admiral Álvaro Alberto—now known as the father of the Brazilian
nuclear program—as its representative to the UNAEC (Patti 2012). Alberto took a
keen interest in nuclear energy, and in April 1946, proposed widespread
international cooperation and domestic development of civilian atomic power to the
Brazilian National Security Council (CSN). To Alberto, nuclear power offered Brazil
a path to rapid development alongside membership in an exclusive club of
technologically advanced states. The administration of President Gaspar Eurico
Dutra marked the issue as a policy priority for a future National Research Council.
Alberto did not at that point obtain the infrastructure support he sought for the
initiative (Patti 2015).
Despite only limited support from the Dutra administration, the
UNAEC role presented Alberto with opportunities to shape Brazilian nuclear policy.
The United States proposed the Baruch Plan in New York to the UNAEC during
the summer of 1946. It called for an International Atomic Development Authority to
control nuclear technology and the atom. Bernard Baruch, the U.S. representative
to the UNAEC, initially reported to President Harry Truman that Brazil supported
the plan.187 But as the negotiations on nuclear controls dragged on, Alberto and
his team argued that “no restrictions shall be imposed on the nations that hold raw
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See: “Memorandum by The United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission
(Baruch) to President Truman,” New York, September 17, 1946, in FRUS, 1946, Vol. I, General;
The United Nations, Doc. 482.
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materials relative to the use of material for pacific ends.”188 Washington objected
to the Brazilian proposal as a loophole that might allow for the proliferation of
nuclear weapons by the Soviets and others.189
Alberto’s position was foundational, however, as it foreshadowed the
status-driven nature of the next several decades of Brazilian nuclear history. The
admiral would win approval from Dutra in November 1947 to reject the Baruch Plan
as an infringement on national sovereignty (Patti 2012). Because the plan was also
unclear on whether the United States would give up its nuclear monopoly,
opposition from Moscow would eventually prevent its realization.
At home, Alberto continued to seek support for nuclear energy. He
led a group of scientists who introduced a bill in April 1949 to establish the National
Research Council previously supported by Dutra. In January 1951, the bill passed.
Alberto became the head of the new National Council for Scientific and
Technological Development (CNPq), which included a Nuclear Energy
Commission (Patti 2015; Goldemberg, Alvim, and Mafra 2018). Alberto then
spearheaded efforts to develop human capital and raw inputs for the nuclear
energy project. He quickly established nuclear physics programs at universities
with the help of foreign scientists and sent Brazilian students to study at top
universities abroad. Meanwhile, the government stood up “public companies for
mining Brazilian uranium reserves while banning foreign exploitation (Spektor
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2016, p. 637).” Still, CNPq was not an organized and well-funded nuclear
development effort like the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).
But Alberto made the most of his limited resources, also beginning
nuclear technology procurement efforts through the CNPq. While Alberto was
unsuccessful in a 1951 attempt to purchase a cyclotron from the United States for
use in nuclear medicine, leadership changes provided him with a new base of
support.190 Getúlio Vargas had succeeded Dutra as president on an ambitious
center-left platform of national development and protectionism that matched
Alberto’s plans to enhance Brazilian status (Levine 1998). In October 1952, Vargas
signed off on a classified CNPq plan to aggressively seek foreign nuclear
technologies to pursue higher levels of domestic development (Patti 2012).
Alberto acted on the president’s approval, first attempting to obtain a
Norwegian HWR. Because HWRs operate on natural uranium fuel, the reactor
would have prevented dependency on foreign fuel suppliers. For Brazil, the
perception of independent technical capabilities was central to enhanced global
status. Alberto changed his mind due to costs, however, turning to West German
technologies in 1953 on the advice of prominent nuclear scientists: American
Robert Oppenheimer and West German Paul Harteck (Patti 2015). The FRG
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The Harry Truman administration opted not to sell Brazil the cyclotron particle accelerator out
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technologies would involve uranium enrichment that could be used as part of
reactor fuel fabrication for LWRs. While this option would also prevent
dependence, it posed a dual-use risk for nuclear weapons proliferation by
accumulating highly-enriched uranium (HEU).191 Likewise, HWRs would have
created significant plutonium byproducts that could be separated through
reprocessing, again raising the inevitable dual-use dilemma. There is no evidence,
however, that the overarching objective of these Brazilian nuclear procurement
efforts was to produce a bomb. Instead, Alberto’s longstanding goal of using
nuclear energy to increase Brazilian status and development had strong support
from Getúlio Vargas and his administration.
Alberto had contracted Harteck, who had played a role in the failed
Nazi attempt to build the bomb, to forge ties between Brazilian and FRG scientists
(Patti 2015). The admiral traveled to West Germany in 1953 and met with Harteck
and his collaborators Konrad Beyerle, Wilhelm Groth, and Otto Hahn. These
former Nazi scientists agreed to produce three prototype gas centrifuges and train
Brazilian counterparts in uranium enrichment techniques (Gall 1976). The U.S.
Embassy in Rio de Janeiro warned the CSN that this “German adventure in Brazil
[...] could be considered as a potential threat to the security of the United States
and the Western Hemisphere” (Gall 1976, p. 44). Further, the U.S. government
191

Uranium in nature is approximately 99.3 percent non-fissile isotope Uranium-238 (U-238) and
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applications. Still, the dual-use dilemma may loom in the minds of a state’s interlocutors.
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informed Alberto that—irrespective of the stated intent to create enriched nuclear
fuel for reactors—the export could not be approved by the AEC. The FRG was,
after all, barred from this type of atomic research per the conditions of the Allied
post-war occupation (Patti 2015). When the centrifuges were completed, the
British military blocked their shipment from the Port of Hamburg (Sá 2015).
The centrifuges were released to Brazil in 1956, as they turned out
to be useless for uranium enrichment (Dalaqua 2019). One Brazilian physicist even
referred to them as “expensive chocolate makers (qtd. in Sá 2015, p. 5).” The
centrifuges were an embarrassment and placed in storage for years to come at
São Paulo State’s Institute for Technological Research (Goldemberg, Alvim, and
Mafra 2018). Yet, the episode only increased the Brazilian drive to obtain nuclear
energy and civilian nuclear power status through whatever means necessary.
As the centrifuge story was unfolding, domestic political scandals
rocked Brazil and led to the suicide of Getúlio Vargas in August 1954. His more
pro-American successor, João Café Filho, was decidedly less enthusiastic about
Alberto’s quest for an autonomous nuclear program and protection of Brazilian
uranium reserves. Café Filho quickly signed a Wheat Agreement with Washington
in 1954 that provided uranium exports in exchange for wheat, not conditional upon
any technology transfer (Pecequilo and Bertolucci 2019). And in 1955, he walked
back cooperation with the FRG and signed an agreement under the Atoms for
Peace Program after being pressured by the administration of Dwight D.
Eisenhower (Debs and Monteiro 2017). The Americans had recognized and
leveraged Brazil’s inability to produce its own nuclear technology while eyeing its
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vast and unexplored uranium and thorium reserves (Kassenova 2016). The deal
contained both fuel supply guarantees and safeguards provisions regarding the
transfer of reactors and materials.192 Yet, total reliance on the United States in the
nuclear domain was objectionable to proponents of enhanced Brazilian status.
The deal produced mixed reactions. In the National Congress, an
inquiry found that it created unnecessarily high Brazilian dependence on the United
States for its nuclear needs (Debs and Monteiro 2017).193 Among some members
of the public, the reaction was quite the opposite. The Atoms for Peace program
provided a glimpse into ideas of modernity and being a great power. More than
500,000 people visited an exhibit set up by the U.S. government in São Paulo to
highlight the benefits of nuclear energy. The U.S. National Security Council (NSC)
assessed it as the “most inspirational expression of U.S. leadership that has been
formulated in many years.”194 Status was the key consideration for both reactions.
However, the fears of the congressional inquiry prevailed as
Washington began restricting exports to Brazil and limiting the scope of technical
exchanges. In an interview, former nuclear official Ambassador Marcos Azambuja
described Atoms for Peace as creating a status deficit among Brazilian leaders by
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almost immediately failing to offer nuclear energy on equitable terms.195 Or, as
Ambassador Sérgio Duarte—perhaps Brazil’s most noted arms control expert—
recounts: “This was a freezing of the world power, and Atoms for Peace did not
make technology available for peace on our terms.”196
The next elected president, Juscelino Kubitschek, returned the
country to an ambitious nationalist development agenda.197 For Kubitschek and
his advisors, relying on the United States alone for nuclear development was
inadequate, even as Brazil received Latin America’s first research reactor under
Atoms for Peace in 1956 (Goldemberg, Alvim, and Mafra 2018). This “swimming
pool” reactor (IEA-R-1) came online in 1957 at the University of São Paulo Nuclear
and Energy Research Institute (IPEN). Alongside this gain in nuclear research
capacity, Kubitschek revitalized several of Alberto’s initiatives, including the
funding of nuclear cooperation with France and West Germany. The president
“considered nuclear energy to be a main priority of his ambitious economicdevelopment plan, the so-called Plano das Metas, which sought to industrialise
Brazil in a short period (Patti 2015, p. 370).” Along these lines, he ordered the
creation of the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) in October 1956 to
finally coordinate broad nuclear energy development efforts.198
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The early historical evidence shows that nuclear energy for status
and development purposes was the Brazilian objective, but the dual-use dilemma
remained in the shadows. Following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945, future CNPq military representative Colonel Orlando Rangel would note “that
it was necessary for Brazil to acquire all the information for the development of an
atomic device (Patti 2015, p. 363).” Rangel was later intimately involved in
Alberto’s efforts to court former Nazi scientists. Alberto also oversaw the highly
classified development and successful testing of Bomba Marambaia in 1953. This
was an implosion device designed to hold fissile materials—which Brasília
lacked—should Brazil ever decide to pursue nuclear proliferation (Patti 2015).
Yet, there is no documentation that political leaders actually sought
the bomb at this point. U.S. intelligence noted in 1957 that Brazil could develop
nuclear weapons within a decade “with substantial and continuing outside
assistance,” which it lacked.199 Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev told the Americans
in 1959 that Moscow believed Brazil could proliferate “very much later” than ten to
fifteen years.200 Brazil was also one of the ENDC members negotiating on nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament in Geneva.201
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From October 16–28, 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred as the
ENDC stood in a stalemate without U.S.–Soviet agreement on the parameters for
NPT negotiations. The new Brazilian President João Goulart had his diplomats
consult with the United States during the crisis both bilaterally and in the forum of
the Organization of American States (OAS).202 Nuclear dangers presented to
Brasília and other South American states became abundantly clear during these
consultations. During the crisis, Brazilian officials at the OAS began discussing a
proposal to create a Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ. Documents indicate
that U.S. diplomats initially responded positively due to the prospect of
permanently banning Soviet nuclear weapons from the Western Hemisphere.203
Indeed, the Brazilians introduced the proposal at the UN General Assembly on
October 29, the very day after the Cuban Missile Crisis ended (Musto 2018).
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Cuban and Soviet opposition to the plan prevented it from being adopted at the
UN (Debs and Monteiro 2017).
Regardless, Goulart was undeterred by this predictable obstacle and
again raised the NWFZ issue with the Five Presidents’ Declaration of April 1963.
He joined the leaders of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico to call for an
agreement “whereby their countries would undertake not to manufacture, receive,
store, or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices.”204 The statement
paved the way for the negotiation of the Tlatelolco Treaty in Mexico City in a series
of sessions between 1965–1967 (Sotomayor 2013). Goulart had overseen
nationalization of Brazil’s uranium stockpile, negotiations with France on a natural
uranium-fueled HWR, and partial construction of an experimental reactor in
collaboration with the United States (Debs and Monteiro 2017). He remained firmly
committed to the civilian nuclear energy course while aiming to eliminate the
dangers of nuclear weapons from the region.
But Goulart was overthrown in a U.S.-backed coup d’état in 1964,
leading to a military junta under Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco and his
successor Marshal Costa e Silva. A military regime would also rise to power in
neighboring Argentina two years later, as General Juan Carlos Onganía toppled
President Arturo Illia (Potash 1996). The countries would begin a dispute over the
resources of the Paraná River Basin (Spektor 2016). A joint Brazil–Paraguay
hydroelectric project to build the Itaipú Dam was believed by the Argentines to
have downstream risks for their own planned Corpus Dam with the Paraguayans.
204

See: A/5415/Rev.1.

183

And while Brazil pursued ENR technologies during the dictatorship, Argentina was
also interested in nuclear energy without constraints (Kutchesfahani 2013). Its
nuclear development efforts began in 1950 with the founding of the National
Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA).
The two hawkish military dictatorships might not have seen eye-toeye on hydropower issues in the mid-1960s, but they were able to find agreement
on arms control matters. Both sides seemed to have an unwavering belief that
PNEs for the excavation of canals and ports, as well as energy exploration, were
the path toward becoming advanced, technologically developed states. This
perception likely stemmed from an abundance of ongoing U.S. and Soviet PNE
activities. Under Costa e Silva, in particular, PNEs “became almost an article of
faith in Brazilian domestic politics (Redick 1995b, p. 17).” It is important to note
that the near-obsession with PNEs aimed at status-driven civil and scientific
projects, not nuclear weapons testing. Goulart had signed the LTBT banning
atmospheric nuclear tests in 1963. Castelo Branco had his newly purged National
Congress ratify it in 1964. Brazil–Argentine coordination in the PNE domain led to
complications in negotiating the Tlatelolco Treaty NWFZ regime.205
The military regimes modified the Tlatelolco Treaty along two critical
lines. First, Article XVIII of the treaty permits States Parties to “carry out explosions
of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve
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devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons.”206 Second, Article XXVIII
restricts entry-into-force until States Parties have waived an obligation for all
countries in the region to ratify, or until such ratifications occur. In both cases, the
juntas preserved their perceived national interests by having the treaty allow PNEs
and require regional universality. If Brasília and Buenos Aires were going to be
non-nuclear, all other players in the region would have to adhere to the same rules.
Neither state was willing to accept an unfavorable balance of power. And most
importantly, there would be no restrictions on scientific projects that might
contribute to the advancement of these states in the global order.
A further complication arose in Additional Protocols I and II to the
treaty (Dawood and Herz 2013; Duarte 2016). Protocol I calls for states with
territorial possessions or military bases in Latin America and the Caribbean to
apply the agreement’s denuclearization standards to these areas. Protocol II calls
for the NWS not to take actions in the region that violate the obligations entailed in
the treaty. But there were several holdouts, most notably the United States with
respect to Protocol I, and the USSR with respect to Protocol II.207 The U.S.
concerns dealt primarily with limitations on its bases—albeit non-nuclear facilities
in Panama, Puerto Rico, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba—alongside distrust of the
PNE language. For the Soviets, the PNEs loophole presented a proliferation risk
that might decrease their status by expanding the nuclear club. According to retired
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Brazilian nuclear official Ambassador Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves, these
holdouts triggered a fear that the superpowers could ignore the treaty and
“circulate and deposit [nuclear] weapons” in the region.208
When the Tlatelolco Treaty opened for signature in February 1967,
Brazil was quick to join, but the gesture was symbolic at best. Costa e Silva signed
the accord on May 9, 1967, with ratification by his subservient National Congress
to follow in January 1968. Carasales (1999, p. 55) describes the act as
“meaningless” since Brasília did not waive the conditions for entry-into-force in
Article XXVIII. The government was type signaling to the international community
its status dissenting role by declining to do so. Because there was no interest in
nuclear weapons and the treaty preserved the right to PNEs, the objections did not
pertain to security considerations. Future CSN director General Danilo Venturini
explained that Tlatelolco allowed a “recognition of castes among countries (qtd. in
Debs and Monteiro 2017, p. 92).” Brazil could thus not be a party to the treaty until
the NWS accepted that there were to be no military nuclear powers in the region
pursuant to Tlatelolco Additional Protocols I and II. In practice, the Brazilian
government frequently used Tlatelolco as a tool to stigmatize the NPT and its
unequal division of the world between the five NWS and the remaining NNWS.
The NPT: “Disarming the Disarmed”
While the Tlatelolco discussions were occurring, the NPT negotiations were also
underway in Geneva amongst the ENDC. Brazil was one of the 18 non-aligned
members after it was added to the body in 1961 upon a request from the United
208

Author interview with Castro Neves, 2017.

186

States (Shaker 1980a).209 The Brazilians were not subordinate to Washington and
had no plans to side with the Americans during the formal talks on the treaty from
1965–1968. Instead, Brasília coordinated its positions with Argentina, a nonmember of the ENDC.210 Brazil thus acted as one of the foremost critics of the
agreement, but not for reasons predominantly related to security—like the MLF,
which Brasília ignored with “complete silence (Shaker 1980a, p. 167).” Rather, the
Brazilian concerns were those of a status dissenter to the treaty. Delegates from
Brazil identified a range of issues with the NPT they believed would limit Brazil’s
development, presence on the international stage, and sovereign equality. Such
matters dealt with the difficulties of legally forswearing nuclear weapons through a
treaty that disarmed some states but not others. This dissertation’s theory predicts
that status dissenters cannot join treaties until national ambitions evolve.
The threat posed by the NPT to Brazil’s status required top
negotiators from Itamaraty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At times, the Brazilian
contingent was led by either Ambassador João Augusto de Araújo Castro or
Ambassador Antonio Azeredo da Silveira. The former had previously served as
Goulart’s Foreign Minister, and the latter would later become Foreign Minister. One
member of the four-person Brazilian mission to the ENDC recalls the mindset at
the time regarding superpower collusion: “The NPT was not negotiated there, and
209
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everyone knows it.”211 According to another former official, the perception was that
“the main purpose of the NPT was to disarm the already disarmed.”212
In the early stages of negotiations, Araújo Castro and the team were
vocal supporters of Egyptian representative Ismail Fahmy’s statement of principles
for the NPT.213 Fahmy had written the Eight-Party Draft statement in 1965 on
behalf of the non-aligned members in response to the initial U.S. and Soviet draft
treaties. All the non-aligned states in the group endorsed these ideas of
permanence, universality, freedom from loopholes, protection of the NNWS, and
eventual nuclear disarmament. Brazilian backing stemmed from the idea that it
would ensure equality of obligations between all states, with no country legally
permitted to stand above Brazil. This support continued with the introduction of the
statement into the UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security
before its adoption by the General Assembly.214
Brazil’s rhetoric exemplified that of a status dissenter to the NPT.
When the United States and the USSR tabled revised identical draft treaties in May
1967, Brazilian opposition was strong.215 The delegation levied numerous critiques
against the NPT intended to protect access to the nuclear fuel cycle and secure
opportunities for development (Spektor 2016). Protecting Brazil’s status and
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combating the creation of nuclear hierarchies were at the heart of these critiques.
Azeredo da Silveira openly criticized the treaty for being “designed to maintain the
status quo, without taking into account the interests of all the members of the
international community (qtd. in Patti 2012, p. 66).” A declassified letter shows that
in later years he further noted, “The NPT seeks to legitimize a distribution of power
which is unacceptable, because it results from the stage at which states found
themselves at the date of its signature.”216 The division of the world into the nuclear
“haves” and “have nots” was a non-starter at Itamaraty. Accepting the NPT meant
locking Brazil out of an exclusive club of states or a “passport to greatness.”217
Ambassador Duarte, who took part in the negotiations as the junior
member of the Brazilian delegation, further reflected on the procedural unfairness
of the talks:
For the NPT, in my view, there were no negotiations at
the ENDC. First, the Americans came with the draft [in
1965]. Then the Soviets came with a draft. And then
they came with a joint proposal [in 1967], and it was
clear that they wanted to push it through. They each
had the other five states, from NATO and the Warsaw
Pact, to make it happen.218
The Brazilian objections did not just focus on the distribution of power reflected in
the language of the treaty itself. The process by which the United States and the
Soviet Union attempted to limit the nuclear club was deeply troubling. To the
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Brazilian delegation, the ENDC talks were a façade: superpower coercion
masquerading as negotiations between equals.
Intrusive IAEA safeguards also struck a nerve in Brazil. Inspectors
on Brazilian territory were, after all, an ex-ante sovereignty cost to the nation. This
concern was consistent with the longstanding national position that pacific
activities by the NNWS did not require inspections.219 At one point in the Geneva
talks, the Brazilians even briefly rejected the IAEA as the safeguards organization
for the NPT, seeing it as “unrepresentative in terms of its membership of the
governing board (Shaker 1980b, pp. 459–460).”
In August 1967, Brazil joined with India to advocate for safeguards
to be applied to the military and civilian activities of the NWS to ensure they were
fulfilling their disarmament commitments. As Azeredo da Silveira explained to the
ENDC, “The manifest imbalance of obligations as set out in the two drafts can
hardly enhance the prospect of universal acceptance and final adherence by the
great majority of nations.”220 The message was clear: Brazil was not going to sign
such an unequal treaty. But in each case, the U.S. and Soviet representatives
dismissed the Brazilian safeguards concerns anyway. In their view, a lack of
safeguards on dual-use nuclear technologies in the NNWS would risk proliferation
by diversion to military programs. And safeguards at military sites in the NWS could
lead to leaks of nuclear secrets and undermine some of the opacity inherent in
219
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nuclear deterrence. Article III of the final NPT did—as Brazil warned—entail
safeguards obligations for the NNWS, but not the NWS.221
Brazilian representatives in Geneva also squared off with their NATO
and Warsaw Pact counterparts on the treaty’s disarmament clause. In August
1967, Azeredo da Silveira indicated that Brazil understood disarmament would not
happen immediately, but he demanded concrete steps toward this end to be a part
of Article VI.222 For the Brazilians, this was imperative given the status costs
associated with being a treaty-designated NNWS. Brazil followed Azeredo da
Silveira’s remarks by introducing a working paper in October 1967 that suggested
amendments to the treaty.223 The paper called for Article VI to include an obligation
to negotiate a treaty specifying interim steps to eliminate both nuclear arms and
their delivery systems. But perhaps the most interesting Brazilian disarmament
proposal dealt with using the peace dividend:
Each nuclear-weapon State party to this Treaty
undertakes the obligation to channel, through a special
United Nations fund for the benefit of the economic
development of developing countries, in particular for
their scientific and technological progress, a
substantial part of the resources freed by the measures
of nuclear disarmament.224
The NWS again rejected the Brazilian proposals, intensifying views at Itamaraty
that the NPT was a ploy to constrain developing states’ prospects. However, the
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ENDC did accept more moderate language from Mexico on “negotiations in good
faith” on nuclear disarmament (Shaker 1980b; Harries 2014).
And while the NWS were still nuclear-armed, the Brazilian delegation
supported the non-aligned initiative to obtain negative security assurances.225
Restrictions on the use of nuclear arms were in line with Brazil’s foreign policy.
When Washington rejected negative security assurances in favor of positive ones,
Brazilian support faded. The Costa e Silva regime abstained from a vote on UNSC
Resolution 255, which offered such assurances to the NNWS on behalf of London,
Moscow, and Washington (Hunt 2013).226 The reason was simple: Positive
security assurances created a hierarchy by mandating the defense of the disarmed
by the NWS. Furthermore, Resolution 255 was relatively vague and intended to
win NNWS backing for the NPT, which Brazil did not support (Adeniji 1995).
Brasília also attempted to use other elements of the NPT to limit the
space of the NWS to avoid their Article VI disarmament commitments. For
example, the Brazilian representatives sought for the treaty to be of unlimited
duration rather than the 25-year term proposed in the U.S. and Soviet draft
treaties.227 They further tried to link the prospects for treaty review conferences to
the adoption of their amendments on nuclear disarmament (Harries 2014). Finally,
the Brazilian working paper of October 1967 requested modification of Article X—
pertaining to withdrawal—so that States Parties would report this intention only to
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each other.228 This marked a change from reporting withdrawal to the UNSC, which
the Brazilians saw as an undemocratic institution dominated by veto-wielding
nuclear powers. In each case, the superpowers refused to budge and did not
incorporate the amendments.
However, safeguards and disarmament concerns did not produce as
heated a reaction from Brasília as the PNE issue. This corresponds with the
theory’s expectation that status dissenters will object to any attempt to limit their
national technology. Although the Tlatelolco Treaty allowed PNEs, Washington
and Moscow reached an agreement in September 1966 to prohibit the NPT’s
NNWS from carrying out such activities (Gheorghe 2013a). The draft treaties of
May 1967 thus banned the NNWS from acquiring “nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices” in Articles I and II. Moreover, Article III safeguards
provisions now aimed to prevent the diversion of fissile materials to support nonweaponized devices intended for PNEs.229 The NWS would therefore commit
under Article V to providing PNE services to NNWS as a nonproliferation measure.
Costa e Silva and his advisors were outraged by superpower
collusion on PNEs, which they believed was intended to constrain the development
of Brazil and other states. In March 1967, the leader had criticized any effort to
limit nuclear knowledge, stating that “nuclear energy [...] constitutes undoubtedly
the most powerful means to be put within the reach of developing countries in order
228
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to reduce the gap between them and the industrialised nations.”230 Costa e Silva
and his Foreign Minister José Magalhães Pinto would again tell the CSN in
October 1967 that the NPT was objectionable due to it giving complete control of
PNEs to the NWS. The president further praised the instrumental value of the
Tlatelolco Treaty because it “allowed us to go to [the ENDC in] Geneva and also
defend our sovereign right as a country to deal with this subject as an international
power without any restriction.”231
The president’s marching orders on PNEs were clear in 1967, and
Brazilian diplomats launched an unrelenting assault on the NPT on this basis.232
Brazil proposed amending the treaty so that Articles I, II, and III only covered
nuclear weapons, not devices for PNEs. The unfortunate difficulty was the near
impossibility of distinguishing between such capabilities. Additionally, the new
Brazilian language would have Article IV guarantees to NNWS of peaceful uses of
nuclear technology amended to include a new clause preserving the right to PNEs:
Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting
the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to
develop, alone or in cooperation with other States,
research, production, and use of nuclear energy for
230
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peaceful purposes, including nuclear explosive
devices for civil uses, without discrimination.233
In support of these failed proposals at the ENDC, Azeredo da Silveira
introduced PNEs into the discussions repeatedly. The Brazil delegation was
usually only joined by India in its steadfast dedication to autonomously conducting
PNEs. The variety of arguments raised by Azeredo da Silveira in making a case
for these activities is perhaps best observed in his remarks on March 14, 1967:
There is no difference at the present time between
nuclear weapon technology and technology for
peaceful purposes;
The development of research in the field of nuclear
energy inevitably includes, at a certain stage, the use
of explosions; to bar access to explosions would
amount to hindering the development of the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy;
Banning nuclear explosions would not be an absolute
means of checking the spread of nuclear weapons for,
at the present level of technology, nuclear weapons
can be manufactured without resort to nuclear
explosions;
Even after attaining capability to carry out explosions
for peaceful purposes, non-nuclear weapon States
would still have to take several additional steps to
embark on the manufacture of nuclear weapons;
To contend that non-nuclear weapon countries ought
to relinquish the possibility of developing by national
means nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is,
grosso modo, tantamount to requiring that peaceful
countries refrain from producing conventional
explosives for industrial purposes;
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Peaceful nuclear explosions may provide a solution to
many of the serious problems which confront Latin
American countries and developing countries in
general in the economic field, such as the digging of
canals, the connexion of hydrographic basins, the
recovery of oil fields, the release of natural gas, etc.234
The Brazilian delegation would further clarify its interest in remaining free of
nuclear weapons while maintaining the right to conduct PNEs.235 Efforts by the
United States and the Soviet Union to provide firmer Article IV guarantees in their
later treaty drafts did not alleviate the PNE concern.236 To Brazil, NNWS
dependence on the NWS for PNEs risked a “widening of the technological gap
(Shaker 1980a, pp. 208–209).” Autonomous PNEs were not negotiable.
Fearing that the PNE issue would cause Brazil to stonewall the
treaty’s negotiations and ultimately not sign the NPT, the U.S. administration of
Lyndon B. Johnson attempted to resolve the question bilaterally.237 Secretary of
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Azeredo da Silveira had unambiguously warned as early as August 1967 that a prohibition on
NNWS conducting PNEs would prevent Brazil from joining the NPT: “[W]e have made it clear that
the renunciation of nuclear armament does not entail the abandonment of our inalienable right to
economic and social development through the preservation of our freedom of scientific research
and technological advancement. There can certainly be no reason, in a broader context, to adhere
to a treaty the NPT imposing greater restrictions and restrictions which, in our view are both unjust
and unnecessary.’” [See: “Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense (Packard),” Washington, DC, June 10, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-2,
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a July visit of AEC chairman Glenn Seaborg to Brazil. Seaborg told the Brazilians that the United
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State Dean Rusk met with Magalhães Pinto in New York in May 1968. There, he
urged the Brazilian Foreign Minister not to further stall the treaty’s negotiation over
PNEs. Rusk also assured his counterpart that “the purpose of the treaty was not
to inhibit these [peaceful nuclear] activities (qtd. in Patti 2012, p. 78).” Araújo
Castro, who also participated in the meeting, was emphatic that the CSN would
disapprove of being “put under a technological freeze for 25 years (qtd. in Hunt
2013, p. 400).” Shortly after the meeting, Rusk informed Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Vasily Kuznetsov that Brazil was unlikely to sign the treaty.238
The treaty moved from the ENDC to the UNGA, where national
delegations considered a draft resolution in May 1968. It was adopted on June 12,
1968, as Resolution 2373.239 The vote was 95 states approving, 4 dissenting, and
21 abstaining—Brazil among the abstentions (Shaker 1980a, p. 117). On July 1,
1968, it opened for signature.
As expected, Costa e Silva did not sign the NPT on behalf of Brazil.
Both the declassified evidence and the ENDC negotiating records unequivocally
point to the central importance of international status in this decision.240 Brasília
had no nuclear weapons program or active ambitions to obtain the bomb. In this
respect, legally forswearing nuclear weapons should not have been difficult.
central to Brazilian objections to the NPT. See also: “Notes of Meeting,” Washington, DC,
November 28, 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Doc. 217.
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However, the Brazilians desired to be treated equally to the NWS and to face no
constraints on obtaining technologies believed to be pivotal for national
development. Type signaling as a status dissenter by opposing the NPT showed
that Brazil would accept neither a subordinate international role nor the denial of
scientific knowledge and technology. A U.S. intelligence community document
assessing Brazil’s opposition to the treaty arrived at similar conclusions: “These
attitudes reflect the traditional national sentiment that Brazil is destined for ‘Great
Power’ status and the government will probably not alter its view that the NPT is
an obstacle to this national goal.”241
Rather than seeking the bomb, the Brazilians sought status. And the
NPT represented a barrier to access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In an
interview I conducted, Ambassador Azambuja summarized Brazilian opposition to
the NPT as a central component of national identity:
Brazil was looking at nuclear energy as a symbol of
prestige. The idea of mastering nuclear energy was
present in the Brazilian identity from the very
beginning. This was seen as the single most important
element of great power status. The fact that all five
permanent members of the United National Security
Council had it showed that that nuclear energy was the
key to being part of the directorate—a club we think we
should belong to. [...] Brazil has dreams for the future.
Greece looks to a golden age, but Brazil looks forward
to a golden age. In the Brazilian psyche, there is a
desire not to accept anything that will compromise this
future.242
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The NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970. The conditions for this
event required ratification by Britain, the United States, the USSR, and 40 other
countries.243 Since Brazil had not signed by entry-into-force, its only possibility to
join the treaty would be through accession—a joint signal requiring both the type
signal of signature and the commitment signal of ratification simultaneously. Such
a decision would not occur until the late 1990s. In the interim, Brazil’s refusal to
sign the NPT or embrace comprehensive IAEA safeguards would lead to
contentious nuclear politics (Nascimento Plum and Resende 2016).
Status-Driven Nuclear Procurement
The NPT’s entry-into-force in 1970 marked the beginning of a new period in
Brazilian nuclear history. Costa e Silva had also fallen ill in the summer of 1969,
making way for the succeeding authoritarian presidencies of Generals Emílio
Garrastazu Médici, Ernesto Geisel, and João Figueiredo. Yet, the trajectory set by
Costa e Silva remained intact. From 1970–1985, these leaders would maintain
Brazil’s status dissenter opposition to the NPT and attachment to PNEs. And they
would, of course, continue the endeavor to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle for
Brazil. These status ambitions led to conflict between Brazil and the United States,
which had wide-ranging nonproliferation objectives. U.S. pressure backfired,
leading Brazil to pursue a secret parallel military nuclear program to obtain
technology autonomy alongside its official civilian nuclear program.
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Costa e Silva’s successors inherited a somewhat precarious state of
nuclear politics. Brasília’s opposition to the NPT and unsafeguarded nuclear
energy pursuits drew heavy skepticism from the international community
(Nascimento Plum and Resende 2016). Statements by Brazilian generals during
the late 1960s had further legitimated these fears about nuclear proliferation. For
example, the July 6, 1967, headline of the Folha de São Paulo newspaper read:
“Since 1960, Brazil has had the means to build a nuclear weapon and now military
officials are promising that the NUCLEAR DELAY WILL BE REMEDIED (qtd. in
Goldemberg, Alvim, and Mafra 2018, p. 390).” In truth, a 1967 CNEN study had
concluded that it would take fifteen years to build an atomic bomb, subject to a
political order (Gall 1976). Behind the scenes, the U.S. intelligence community was
convinced Brazil did not have weaponization intentions in 1968 (Spektor 2016).
Though doubts remained about Brazil’s intentions, the change in
U.S. administrations from Lyndon B. Johnson to Richard Nixon did bring some
relaxation in tensions. Nixon, a Republican, seemed more interested in nuclear
exports to Brazil to support U.S. industry than his Democratic predecessor. In
1969, his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, assessed that exerting
diplomatic pressure on Brazil to join the NPT could be counterproductive for the
bilateral relationship.244
The more permissive environment enabled the Médici government
to sign an agreement with Westinghouse and the AEC in 1972. Under the terms
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of the agreement, Brazil would receive a LWR and enriched uranium fuel for its
planned Angra Nuclear Power Plant. The deal received sharp criticism from the
Brazilian scientific community and military. While the Angra I reactor was 624megawatts and could generate nuclear power, it was a turnkey system. No
significant technical knowledge was transferred to Brazil, and the LWR’s fuel
requirements created supply dependence on Washington (Goldemberg, Alvim,
and Mafra 2018). It was hardly the bold move to enhance global perceptions of
Brazil as a technologically advanced country that many elites sought. But the deal
moved forward anyway, with the LWR coming online in 1985. The chorus of voices
calling for autonomous civilian nuclear energy remained dissatisfied.
In March 1974, Médici’s hand-selected successor, Geisel, was
approved by the military to become president. Just two months later, India carried
out its Smiling Buddha PNE at the Pokhran site in the Thar Desert. As the U.S.
NSC worried that Brazil would follow suit by developing its own PNE capability,
Azeredo da Silveira—now the Foreign Minister—warned Geisel that Argentina
might do so.245 Polls at the time also showed that an overwhelming majority of
Brazilians supported their government’s position of refusing to disavow PNEs
(Shaker 1980b). Just three weeks after the Indian test, Geisel told his generals the
country should “develop the technology necessary for a peaceful nuclear
explosion, which will even allow us, if necessary, to possess our own weapon (qtd.
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1974, in FRUS, Vol. E-14, Part II, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976,
Doc. 57; “Report from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to President Ernesto Geisel, ‘Subject: The
Indian nuclear test,’” May 21, 1974, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Doc.
121350, Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasília.

201

in Debs and Monteiro 2017, p. 93).” This stunning remark revealed another trend
in Brazilian foreign policy: nuclear hedging and the pursuit of latency.
The Indian PNE exacerbated global fears of nuclear proliferation. It
led to the formation of the NSG, a multilateral export control regime restricting
transfers of materials, equipment, and technology related to nuclear arms. The
NSG was founded in 1974 and would make it more challenging to acquire dualuse nuclear items, even for ostensibly civilian end-users. Geisel’s advisors saw the
formation of the NSG and the 1973 oil crisis as significant barriers to prosperity in
Brazil.246 The president decided in 1974 to pursue an advanced indigenous
uranium enrichment capability for producing fuel for nuclear reactors (Spektor
2016). More specifically, the August 1974 plan required close collaboration with an
old nuclear partner to obtain a complete uranium fuel cycle.
That partner was none other than West Germany, though Brazil also
considered France. This time the Brazilians dealt with Bonn directly instead of
through backdoor deals with the laboratories of former Nazi scientists.247 While
negotiators laid the groundwork for a deal prior to India’s PNE, the global reaction
to the event created imperatives to quickly finalize the agreement.248 The two
Brazilian entities involved were CNEN on the research side and the newly formed
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(January 1974) Nuclébras, charged with constructing nuclear power plants. The
FRG, barred from activities such as uranium enrichment on its territory, would
commit to “public-private joint ventures to mine and enrich uranium, train hundreds
of Brazilian nuclear-sector personnel and scientists, and transfer heavy materials,
turbo-generators, and reactor technology (Patti and Spektor 2020, p. 67).”
The U.S. reaction to the proposed deal was three-fold. First, the
Americans punished Brazil. In June 1974, the AEC withdrew from a nuclear energy
conference in Rio de Janeiro (Patti 2012). A harsher consequence followed two
months later when the AEC announced it would no longer be able to supply fuel
for future Brazilian power reactors, confirming fears of dependence (Patti and
Spektor 2020). Second, Washington vetoed alternative proposals to the FRG deal
from U.S. firms Westinghouse and Bechtel (Patti 2012, Patti and Spektor 2012).
Third, the AEC and the State Department pressured West Germany to exclude
centrifuges from the deal.249 Instead, the Germans offered the experimental
Becker method, an unproven and inefficient jet nozzle technology for uranium
enrichment. The Brazilian scientific community was skeptical of the jet nozzle, but
CNEN President Paulo Nogueira Batista and Nuclebrás President Hervásio de
Carvalho were convinced of its utility (Dalaqua 2019).
The U.S. Congress took a strict line on the deal in the fall of 1974. In
October, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act and the Export Administration
Act to make it more difficult for Brazil to acquire nuclear technology (Patti 2012).
And in November, new President Gerald Ford’s Secretary of State—Kissinger—
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sent a team to Brazil to discuss the state’s nuclear intentions. The Brazilians were
incensed, viewing this as an attempt by the nuclear-armed states of the NPT to
coerce the disarmed. As Patti and Spektor (2020, p. 71) explain, “Brazil could not
possibly relinquish its quest to acquire nuclear fuel-cycle technologies when the
United States thought it legitimate to suspend future nuclear fuel supplies.”
Cameron (2018) provides further context, noting that Geisel faced domestic
political challenges and could not risk the reputational costs of backing down from
the FRG deal.
Despite resistance on Capitol Hill and public attention spurred by
leaks to the press, the Ford administration approved the deal in June 1975.250 “We
are not a nonproliferation agency,” Kissinger had concluded (qtd. in Patti and
Spektor 2020, p. 77). The Ford administration would consequently not sanction
Brasília and Bonn for their transactions. In a June 20 telegram to his counterpart,
Azeredo da Silveira, Kissinger wrote:
We did not invite, and in fact regret, the public debate.
We would have much preferred that the matter remain
in diplomatic channels. [...] We understand and support
Brazil’s desire to expand its use of nuclear energy as a
tool for development. Count on our cooperation and
assistance in your endeavor where Brazil considers it
useful, to the limit permitted by our overall nuclear
policy. And let us continue to exchange views on our
250
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common aim of avoiding the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in the hemisphere.251
The Brazil–FRG deal was signed a week later, on June 27, 1975.252 It aimed for
the installation of up to eight 1,300-megawatt power reactors by 1990 alongside
technology and knowledge transfer related to ENR (Goldemberg, Alvim, and Mafra
2018). Spektor (2016, p. 641) sheds light on the significance of the agreement: “At
an estimated cost of around $4 billion, it was, at the time, the single largest
technology transfer in history.”
Ironically, the nuclear energy deal appeared to be more about
increasing Brazil’s status than actually producing energy—recall the defiant
reaction to U.S. reactor fuel supply threats. Noted Brazilian physicist José
Goldemberg (2006, p. 41) argues:
The government claimed the nuclear program was a
response to the 1973 oil crisis, which threatened the
country’s trade balance. This was clearly not true as
electricity in Brazil was and still is produced mainly in
hydroelectric plants and not from petroleum. Building
nuclear reactors would not reduce oil imports, which
are used for transportation and industry.
Further, immediately after signing the agreement, Azeredo da Silveira remarked,
“Brazil has gained new technological and political status on the world scene with
the nuclear agreement (qtd. in Gall 1976, p. 45).” The U.S. Embassy in Brazil also
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assessed that, aside from energy purposes, a major rationale for the deal was for
Brasília “to fulfill its ‘destiny’ as a great power.”253
Brazil had also agreed to accept stringent IAEA safeguards as part
of the deal. Itamaraty used this fact as a talking point to show that it was possible
to be a responsible non-signatory to the NPT (Sotomayor 2013).254 The prevailing
status-based reasons to avoid the treaty remained. Indeed, the Brazilian foreign
policy elite believed that pressure and restrictions from Washington and other
nuclear “haves” would continue even if Brazil acceded to the NPT.255
This belief became even more entrenched in 1976. In June, U.S.
diplomats attempted to pressure the FRG to become more restrictive in their
nuclear exports. They did so in the forum of the London Nuclear Suppliers’ Meeting
and bilaterally.256 Then, in July, Congress passed the Symington Amendment to
the Arms Export Control Act.257 It aimed to punish any state supplying or receiving
ENR technologies if the recipient’s entire fuel cycle was not safeguarded (Patti and
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Spektor 2020). Brazil had accepted IAEA safeguards in the West German deal,
but in Brasília, the new demand translated to unacceptable sovereign interference.
Ford’s tightening of restrictions on Brazil was driven in large part by
a desire to match Jimmy Carter’s rhetoric and win the 1976 U.S. presidential
election. Carter even went so far as to make the case against nuclear sales to
Brazil (and Pakistan) in a televised debate (Spektor 2016). Shortly after Carter’s
election, one Geisel regime official reflected on the current and future state of U.S.
nuclear supply coercion to the media: “Despite all the threats and reprisals [...] [o]ur
nuclear program will continue, at least to the extent it depends on us, against all
internal and external pressures.”258 Just a few days into the Carter Presidency,
Azeredo da Silveira also expressed deep pessimism to Geisel about U.S.
permissiveness over nuclear exports.259 This view seemed justified, as Carter had
dispatched Vice President Walter Mondale to Bonn, warning “Chancellor [Helmut]
Schmidt that provision of nuclear fuel reprocessing technology to Brazil will create
a major crisis in US–German relations.”260
Brazil and the United States were at an impasse. Geisel and his
advisors remained anchored to their view that the complete nuclear fuel cycle was
critical to Brazilian status aspirations and national development. Yet, Carter told
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Secretary of State Warren Christopher that fuel supply restrictions on states
seeking reprocessing technology, like Brazil, might force them to embrace the NPT
(Debs and Monteiro 2017). The U.S. intelligence community, however, assessed
that Brazil was seeking civilian nuclear capabilities for reasons of prestige.261
Carter’s technology denial policy—intensified by the regulations of the NNPA of
1978—was bound to have counterproductive consequences. In fact, nuclear fuel
cycle technologies were now intimately tied to Brazil’s desires to enhance its
international status and resistance to the NPT. For this reason, Debs and Monteiro
(2017) attribute the delay in Brazilian accession to U.S. nonproliferation policies.
Such policies had certainly made nuclear technology acquisition
difficult. Brazil was unable to obtain ultracentrifuges and reprocessing technology
and also confronted an uncertain fuel supply for its nuclear energy pursuits. It
would receive FRG reactor technology for the Angra power plant, but the
capabilities to autonomously carry out civilian nuclear activities were unobtainable.
In an interview, Goldemberg recalled Brazilian scientific views on what U.S.
pressure had meant for the final FRG deal:
When we looked at the deal with Germany, it was full
of holes. It included minimal technology transfer, was
all written in German, and it did not include centrifuges
or uranium enrichment. I went to Germany with two
other physicists [José Israel Vargas and Oscar Sala]
and looked at the lab. It was clear the jet nozzle was
not viable. We learned much later that the Israelis and
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South Africans used it [for the bomb]. But for industrial
purposes, it was not possible.262
U.S. pressure had denied Brazil from achieving the technological breakthrough
and independence that its leaders had craved for decades.
Facing an uncertain nuclear future and unrelenting supply-side
restrictions, Figueiredo ordered a clandestine nuclear program shortly after
becoming president in 1979. The Autonomous Program of Nuclear Technology
(PATN), or parallel program, aimed for mastery of the fuel cycle. This would, if
successful, relieve Brazilian dependence on foreign suppliers. Three separate
military programs coordinated by CNEN formed the PATN. The air force
experimented with laser isotope separation for uranium enrichment. The army
attempted to build a graphite-moderated HWR using natural uranium fuel. And the
navy partnered with IPEN to pursue an indigenous centrifuge (Goldemberg, Alvin,
and Mafra 2018; Dalaqua 2019). The programs were competitive within the
military, but the navy had the most resources due to its stated purpose of pursuing
a submarine powered by a nuclear propulsion reactor (Sá 2015; Silva and Moura
2016). Under the PATN, Brazil would engage in gray or black market nuclear
transactions with China and Iraq while rejecting approaches from Pakistan and
South Africa (Patti 2012, 2018; Spektor 2016).
As
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nuclear

technologies,

U.S.

nonproliferation pressure helped to spur the beginnings of rapprochement with
rival Argentina. Buenos Aires also sought fuel cycle mastery, but its attempts to
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acquire reprocessing technology in the global market met stiff resistance from
Washington (Carasales 1999; Hymans 2001).263 U.S. pressure helped the states
identify a common status-driven goal of resisting superpower coercion in the
nuclear domain that emerged during the negotiation of Tlatelolco (Redick 1995c).
However, dyadic distrust remained strong, particularly surrounding Argentina’s
1978 announcement of the construction of its Ezeiza plutonium reprocessing plant
(Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler 2015). Yet, any nuclear rivalry that may have
existed in a competition for prestige at the national level did not trickle down to the
scientists. Government and university nuclear physicists from the two states had
long maintained cordial ties and interacted at international conferences.264
The Paraná River controversy initially stood as an obstacle to
cooperation, and previous attempts to forge official nuclear ties in the late 1960s
and early 1970s had failed.265 Geisel and Azeredo da Silveira had been unwilling
to sign a hydroelectricity agreement and were deeply skeptical of Argentina in the
263
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nuclear realm. But Figueiredo had lived in Argentina as a child, was received better
by his neighbors, and was much more receptive to resolving the issue of
hydroelectric dams and improving the bilateral relationship (Mallea, Spektor, and
Wheeler 2015). In October 1979, his Foreign Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro
signed the Argentina–Brazil–Paraguay Tripartite Accord setting height and water
capacity restrictions related to the Itaipú and Corpus Dam.266 Nuclear cooperation
was now much more feasible.
On May 14, 1980, Figueiredo made the first visit of a Brazilian head
of state to Argentina in over four decades (Coutto 2014). His meetings with
Argentine President Jorge Rafael Videla spurred follow-up bilateral dialogue at
various levels of government. Three days later, the two states signed the
Agreement on Cooperation for the Development and Application of the Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy.267 It contained provisions to formalize scientific
exchanges (Nascimento Plum and Resende 2016) as well as limited technical
266
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sharing like “heavy metallurgy parts from the Brazilian side and the loan of zircaloy
pipes on the part of Argentina (Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler 2015).”
But overall, the agreement was not about any specific collaboration
so much as it symbolized status-dissenting opposition to the NPT and the
nonproliferation regime. Redick, Carasales, and Wrobel (1995, p. 112) explain:
“The underlying motivation for this agreement was a shared view that modern
technology, a powerful symbol of an advanced economy and prosperity, was
unjustly dominated by a few highly developed nations.” Hymans (2001, p. 182)
further notes that such solidarity “was seen as a way of fending off pressure to join
the international nonproliferation regime.” Ambassador Castro Neves, who was
intimately involved in the discussions at the time as the Deputy Chief of the Energy
and Mineral Resources Division of Itamaraty, indicated the accuracy of these
interpretations.268 It is important to note that during this period, the United States
ratified Additional Protocol I to the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1981, following Soviet
ratification of Protocol II in 1979.269 U.S. supply-side restrictions, however, made
Figueiredo unwilling to drop objections to allowing the treaty to enter into force.
Alongside the bilateral agreement of 1980, the Falklands War of
1982 sowed the seeds of further nuclear cooperation. Brazil supported Argentina
in the forum of the UNSC and recognized its sovereignty over the disputed island.
There were incidents at sea between British and Brazilian naval vessels. And the
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Brazilian Air Force intercepted and temporarily held the crew of a British Vulcan
bomber at Galeão Air Base (Chant 2013). Regardless, Argentina lost the war in a
crushing defeat.
The conflict sparked new concerns about a nuclear arms race in the
Southern Cone. U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s NSC had warned that a British
victory would lead to the rise of a hardline Peronist regime in Argentina. Then, a
memo concluded, “A nuclear weapons capability would be virtually guaranteed, as
both Brazil and Argentina would seek ultimate security in nuclear arsenals.”270 This
is not what happened, of course. Economic crisis followed the war as the Argentine
regime failed to control spiraling inflation. The junta collapsed, and Raúl Alfonsín
won a democratic election in 1983. Alfonsín was predictably more open to
cooperation than his authoritarian military predecessors, and Brasília’s conduct
during the conflict had generated goodwill in Argentina. Brazil even represented
Argentine interests in London from July 1982–February 1990 after diplomatic
relations were severed (Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler 2015, p. 179n31). Still,
authors like Myers (1984) continued to predict arms racing.
Such predictions were inaccurate. Though the actual cooperation
under the bilateral agreement was limited, its real value came in the form of
confidence-building measures. Brazilian officials were still concerned about
Argentine nuclear intentions, while the Argentines were less worried about Brazil.
The latter viewed intelligence reports about the PATN as a Brazilian response to
270
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growing nonproliferation pressures (Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler 2015). The U.S.
intelligence community had concluded that neither Brazil nor Argentina was
seeking the bomb, but attempts to reassure Brazilian officials about the Argentines
were not always persuasive.271 However, a 1983 visit to Argentina by Nuclébras
and CNEN heads Darío Gomes and Rex Nazaré Alves helped to create greater
transparency.272
Shortly before the transition to democracy under Alfonsín, the last
military president, Reynaldo Bignone, wrote a letter to Figueiredo. The November
18, 1983, letter informed his counterpart that Argentina’s mastery of uranium
enrichment at the Pilcaniyeu facility was “achieved by my country without any
external assistance.”273 His announcement surprised Figueiredo, as Brazilian
officials and intelligence services were apparently unaware of the laboratory-scale
gaseous diffusion efforts.274 Still, Figueiredo congratulated Bignone on the
achievement in peaceful nuclear energy for Latin America.275 The Argentine
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president-elect, Alfonsín, indicated that he would place uranium enrichment and
other nuclear endeavors under civilian control in his government (Mallea, Spektor,
and Wheeler 2015).
Brazil had its own enrichment program and nuclear aspirations
through the PATN. While the air force laser enrichment project floundered, the
navy and IPEN began seeing progress on the centrifuge method. They had even
studied the failed prototype centrifuges obtained by Alberto in the 1950s (Dalaqua
2019). According to Barletta (1984, p. 6), the first mini-cascade of centrifuges came
online in 1984. And while the scientific consensus had turned against PNEs by the
late 1970s, Brazil kept up the rhetoric in support of these explosions as a matter
of principle.276 In 1995, Folha de São Paulo received a leaked document from the
Figueiredo era. The November 1984 document justified the PATN on the basis of
a need to autonomously master the fuel cycle and potentially conduct PNEs
(Goldemberg, Alvim, and Mafra 2018). Similarly, a February 1985 document laying
out “guidelines” for the program refers to ENR and PNE technologies as “essential
to the autonomy desired by any country.”277 Whether the PNE rhetoric was internal
posturing or part of an actual plan remains unclear. That said, the PATN had very
little funding, and no evidence has ever surfaced showing Brazilian scientific work
on the physics package for a nuclear device.
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In January 1985, Brazil entered into a new era both in the nuclear
domain and for the country as a whole. The opposition in the National Congress
had fought hard for a constitutional amendment allowing for a direct election of
Figueiredo’s successor. While the amendment did not pass, it garnered
considerable popular support, as millions of Brazilians took to the streets
(Skidmore 1990). In the ensuing indirect election that month, Congress voted for
opposition candidate Tancredo Neves of the Brazilian Democratic Movement to
become president. Alfonsín followed the election by proposing without success to
Figueiredo a joint statement disavowing PNEs.278 Barletta (1997, p. 19) also notes
that Figueiredo rejected an opposing suggestion by the air force to conduct a PNE
to celebrate the accomplishments of the regime because a CSN review concluded
that “Brazil’s interests were to master the enrichment cycle and to avoid any activity
that would be perceived as a bomb.”
Tancredo Neves fell ill the day before his inauguration and died a
month later, on April 21, 1985. His Vice President, José Sarney, would become
president in this new era. Sarney faced an increasingly cooperative Argentina
under Alfonsín, but pressure from the military to preserve the PATN would be a
constant element of his presidency. These difficulties aside, the coming era would
finally see Brazil’s embrace of multilateral nuclear arms control after years of
playing the role of a status dissenter.
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The Path to Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control
The transition to democracy marked the beginning of a process that saw Brasília
join many multilateral peace and security institutions, including the NPT and the
CTBT. The evidence reveals, however, that democratic regime type itself was not
the causal factor leading to this dramatic change in decades-old posture.
Democracy did create a climate that facilitated greater nuclear transparency and
cooperation between Brazil and Argentina. This climate was one of several factors
that enabled acceptance of arms control treaties and legally forswearing nuclear
weapons. But ultimately, mastery of uranium enrichment and the nonproliferation
regime’s evolving character were the predominant factors that satisfied the statusand security-based criteria needed for Brazil to embrace such agreements.
Progress toward a new nuclear role for Brazil occurred soon after
Sarney’s inauguration in April 1985, with the first direct elections slated for 1989.
The president cut funding for the PATN, but he did not terminate the program or
stop the military’s efforts (Spektor 2016). Maintaining good relations with the armed
services was essential for Brazil’s first post-dictatorship president’s political
survival. And like his authoritarian predecessors, Sarney supported the quest for
technological autonomy that ruled out the NPT as an option. Following the visit of
Brazilian Foreign Minister Olavo Setúbal to Buenos Aires in November 1985,
Sarney and Alfonsín would sign a Joint Declaration on Regional Nuclear Policy
(Patti 2012; Nascimento Plum and Resende 2016). The document recommitted
the sides to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and established a bilateral working
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group (Monteiro de Matos 2020). Yet, it stopped short of support for the NPT, as
the two countries continued to reject the accord as status dissenters.
Sarney’s rhetoric supported only peaceful nuclear use, but the
president confronted military pushback and statements to the press. Despite
internal documents indicating that the government did not believe Argentina would
develop a bomb (Patti 2012), Army Minister General Leônidas Pires Gonçalves
made just such an accusation in September 1985. The general said that he would
support Brazil pursuing nuclearization as a result. His statement prompted a
demand for clarification from Argentina and assurances from CNEN head Nazaré
that Brazil’s program was solely peaceful in nature (Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler
2015).279 A year later, former Navy Minister Admiral Maximiano da Fonseca would
argue that Brazil should build the bomb since the NWS continued to improve their
arsenals (Krasno 1994). Notably, the military also supported the status-driven
civilian fuel cycle project, with Leonídas saying, “Countries that do not complete
the nuclear fuel cycle by the 21st century, will not be considered a world power
(Krasno 1994, p. 431).”
As Nazaré and President Sarney himself clarified Brazilian nuclear
intentions, questionable leaks continued to emerge. Folha de São Paulo reported
in August 1986 that the air force was building an underground nuclear test site at
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Serra do Cachimbo in the state of Pará.280 The Sarney administration denied the
allegations, claiming that the deep hole in the ground was a repository for industrial
nuclear waste storage. The public and the international community remained
dubious that the air force was not constructing a vertical shaft for testing.
Sarney did, however, stick to the course of the 1985 Joint
Declaration. In July 1987, Alfonsín invited Sarney for a confidence-building visit to
the Pilcaniyeu enrichment facility in Argentina. He was accompanied by Nazaré of
CNEN, José Henrique Buchmann of IPEN, and CSN nuclear affairs advisor Marco
Marzo. According to Marzo, in an interview I conducted, the delegation was
pessimistic and believed the Argentines would answer no questions. Instead,
CNEA representatives answered every question from the Brazilians. The Brazilian
delegation noted that the gaseous diffusion plant was incapable of enrichment due
to nonfunctional compressors. Uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) could not move
through the gaseous diffusion cascades as a result. They left with confidence that
Argentina was not pursuing the uranium route to the bomb.281 Argentina simply
lacked the technical competence to do so.
In September 1987, Sarney informed Alfonsín that Brazil had now
mastered enrichment via the gas centrifuge. Alfonsín replied that he was “proud
as a Latin American” and happy to be informed before a public announcement.282
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For the Brazilians, this was a moment of national pride after so much pressure to
abandon the centrifuge; Brazil would be able to produce its own LWR fuel. The
Sarney administration had an event that year in Brasília where officials displayed
a kilogram of LEU.283 Sarney stated that there were two types of states in the world:
“countries that master technologies and countries that are sentenced to be
technologically enslaved (Dalaqua 2019, p. 236).” The development marked the
end of the official Nuclébras program in cooperation with the FRG, as Brazil had
succeeded autonomously with the PATN (Dalaqua 2019).
Sarney then invited Alfonsín to tour CNEN and the navy’s new
industrial-scale Aramar enrichment facility at its inauguration in April 1988. Alfonsín
reciprocated with an invitation for Sarney to inspect the Ezeiza reprocessing plant
in November 1988. Unlike Pilcaniyeu, Ezeiza impressed the Brazilians with its
facilities.284 Each state had done the seemingly unthinkable by mastering the fuel
cycle with only limited external technical assistance.
The 1987–1988 confidence-building visits set the stage for further
peaceful nuclear measures. The National Congress approved a new democratic
constitution for Brazil on October 5, 1988, in advance of the 1989 election. Part of
Article XXI read: “all nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be
admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the National
Congress.”285 It did, however, stop short of outlawing PNEs or embracing the NPT.
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In November 1988, Brazil and Argentina signed the “sweeping” Bilateral Treaty on
Integration, Cooperation, and Development (Carasales 1995, p. 41). The treaty
called, in part, for increased commercial nuclear relations and created the first joint
technical program—designing a fast breeder reactor (Monteiro de Matos 2020).
Fernando Collor de Mello won the presidency in March 1989 on a
reformist agenda. He quickly replaced Nazaré and appointed José Luiz Santana
Carvalho—a PATN critic—to the helm of CNEN (Patti 2012). The Collor
administration then approved a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) to
investigate whether the military had secretly pursued construction of an atomic
bomb. The CPI concluded that the navy had the ability to produce HEU at Aramar
but was focused on developing naval nuclear propulsion and was uninvolved in
nuclear proliferation schemes (Barletta 1997). Another result of the CPI was to
show just how competitive and compartmentalized the three different branches of
the services had been in their nuclear programs.286 Figueiredo attested that: “The
Cachimbo air base could have been used for nuclear tests, but the government at
the time [1984–1985] did not think about building a nuclear weapon (qtd. in Debs
and Monteiro 2017, p. 102).” Collor soon began bringing civilian control to the
nuclear program and halting any uncoordinated—and now constitutionallybarred—military activities that may have had non-peaceful intentions.
During the CPI investigations and afterward, Collor ordered the
military to give his Secretary of State for Science and Technology, Goldemberg,
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full access to all elements of the parallel program. I spoke at length to Goldemberg
in an interview, and he was less than complimentary of the expertise he observed:
●

On the air force: “It was nothing. It was
equivalent to a master’s thesis on laser isotope
separation.”

●

On the navy: “They were the most proficient, but
they were very far away. You’d need thousands
of centrifuges [to produce a significant quantity
of uranium for a bomb], like Iran.”

●

On the army: “The point is the [graphite reactor]
technology and the [knowledge] level of the
people was miserable. I said, it will take them
100 years to do this.”287

Goldemberg concluded that, while some military officers may have dreamed of the
bomb, there was no coordinated government plan, human capital resources, or
funding that would have led to one.
Collor also visited the Cachimbo site with Goldemberg in 1990, when
the president dumped dirt into the shaft with a shovel in front of the media. The
president said, “These guys are crazy. They were really going to explode the
bomb. This is absolutely true (qtd. in Barletta 1997, p. 27).” Goldemberg’s
interpretation is different, seeing it as Collor exerting power over the military:
I went there. They were exaggerating what they were
doing in order to extract money from the [authoritarian]
government. And President Collor is a master of
rhetoric. He dumped the shovel. It was a symbol. There
were no [diagnostic] cables, nothing you should have
287
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at a test site. It was a rumor spread by the military to
get more money for what they were doing.288
Ambassador Castro Neves also visited Cachimbo as an Itamaraty official in 1984
under Figueiredo and 1985 under Sarney (Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler 2015).
He described the shaft as “not fit for the purpose of studying nuclear explosions.”
It was “too small” for nuclear tests at one meter in diameter, and “the subterranean
water was very corrosive.”289 Indeed, there is to date no evidence to support the
contention that Cachimbo was truly meant to be a nuclear test site (Spektor 2016).
The Brazilian case leads to an interesting discrepancy in the nuclear
proliferation literature. Brazilian officials and scholars who have qualitatively
studied the history (Patti 2012; Spektor 2016; Debs and Monteiro 2017) argue that
there was never really a nuclear weapons program. At best, it was uncoordinated
exploration. Yet, quantitative scholars have questionably coded Brazil as
“pursuing” nuclear weapons in dates ranging from 1975–1991 (Singh and Way
2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Bleek 2017). Goldemberg himself tried to get to the
bottom of the mystery by asking Nazaré, who coordinated the PATN as the CNEN
chief, directly in 2016:
I asked Rex point-blank. I said, Rex, we are getting old,
we are going to die soon, most of our colleagues are
dead. Was a [presidential] decision made to build a
weapon or not? He said yes, it was. But President
Figueiredo told me [whether the decision was yes or
no] must always remain a secret.290
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Until new information surfaces about the content of that decision, the balance of
evidence and the president’s personal statements are the best scholars can do.
Both elements of the equation suggest that Brazil hedged by developing a latent
nuclear capability, but there was no decision to pursue the bomb.
After dismantling the secret military programs, Collor set his sights
on PNEs. Brazilian officials corroborate that no one was scientifically taking PNEs
seriously, and it was known that Washington and Moscow would soon exchange
instruments of ratification on the PNET. There was no longer a need for a country
that had mastered enrichment to draw international ire by defending a discredited
practice.291 Collor renounced Brazil’s right to PNEs at the UNGA in September
1990 (Spektor 2016). Then, he met Alfonsín’s successor, Carlos Menem, at Iguaçu
Falls two months later and agreed to prohibit PNEs as well as to develop a system
of bilateral safeguards and nuclear materials accounting. Their meeting produced
the July 1991 Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy. It
barred PNEs for the foreseeable future until there was a way to technically
distinguish them from nuclear weapon tests (Stanley 1992). They also agreed that
accession to Tlatelolco was an important near-term goal (Owens 1995).
Brazil and Argentina took steps to implement the provisions of the
July 1991 agreement. The two sides created the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) for safeguards inspections,
which began in September 1992 (Goldemberg and Feiveson 1994). And in
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December 1991, Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and the IAEA drafted the Quadripartite
Agreement. It combined ABACC and IAEA safeguards under one umbrella, and
IAEA Director General Hans Blix praised its comprehensiveness (Redick,
Carasales, and Wrobel 1995). The Quadripartite Agreement entered into force in
March 1994 while Itamar Franco was the Brazilian president—Collor faced
impeachment charges for corruption and resigned in December 1992. Tlatelolco
also entered into force, as Argentina waived its objections in January 1994, and
Brazil did so in May 1994. No longer seeking to conduct PNEs, the two parties led
an effort to outlaw PNEs so long as they were indistinguishable from weapons
tests (Nascimento Plum and Resende 2016).
Despite all of these developments, there is one agreement that
neither Collor nor Franco touched: the NPT. This observation affirms the idea that
simply having a democratic regime is causally insufficient to spur entry into
multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. Former Deputy Foreign Minister
Sebastião Rego Barros recalls, “President Collor had many revolutionary ideas but
in a short while his political situation became so unstable that there was no way to
take his ideas forward (qtd. in Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler, p. 159).” It is also
worth noting that even Collor remained skeptical of the discriminatory nature of the
NPT and the fact that Brazil did not have a seat at the table in shaping global
nuclear export standards. Franco, on the other hand, let Itamaraty take the lead
on nuclear issues and “exerted little personal effort in the difficult congressional
debates over ratification of the Quadripartite Agreement and the Tlatelolco Treaty
amendments (Redick 1995b, p. 40).”
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Franco’s former Foreign Minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, won
the 1994 election in a landslide and took office on January 1, 1995. Cardoso would
ultimately be the president who saw Brazil’s joining of the NPT. He had a broad
electoral mandate and faced a rapidly changing climate in nuclear politics. ABACC
inspections were ongoing, and Tlatelolco was in force. China and France acceded
to the NPT in 1992, marking the treaty’s growing universalization and the legal
commitment of all five NWS to disarmament per its Article VI. Meanwhile, illicit
nuclear activities by Iraq and North Korea were changing global perceptions of socalled “rogue states” (Lake 1994). Cardoso thus committed to considering the
issue of Brazil’s NPT status prior to his inauguration (Redick 1995b).
Before any serious study of the treaty by the Cardoso administration,
the Americans approached Brazil about the issue. John Holum, director of the U.S.
ACDA, came to Brasília in March 1995 to invite his counterparts to take part in the
Review Conference on the Indefinite Extension of the NPT. Cardoso’s Foreign
Minister, Felipe Lampreia, attended the May conference as an observer, but he
could not participate since Brazil was not a party to the treaty. President Cardoso
did, however, visit Washington, where he agreed to regularly consult with U.S.
President Bill Clinton on arms control and nonproliferation topics (Redick 1995b).
In an interview with me, Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., Clinton’s Special
Representative for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament, credits this
line of diplomacy with helping to change Brazilian perceptions of the NPT.292 It
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became increasingly important in the Brazilian mindset to have a seat at the table
to shape global nuclear policy.
Cardoso did seek such seats. He renounced ongoing ballistic missile
projects and led Brazil to membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) in 1995 (Spektor 2016). Now, Brazil could help set the “rules of the game”
as far as global regulations on the export of military and dual-use space and missile
technologies. More importantly, the NSG accepted Brazil as a member in 1996. It
marked a stunning turn of events, as Brazil was now recognized as a legitimate
civilian exporter of nuclear technology by the same regime that had targeted it for
decades with supply-side restrictions. Ambassador Santiago Mourão, who would
later be Itamaraty’s Director for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, told me
that NSG membership was “fundamental” for working-level Brazilian diplomats’
views on the NPT.293 The institutions of the nonproliferation regime were now
enhancing, rather than constraining, Brazil’s status. As my theory indicates, such
a shift foreshadowed movement toward becoming an arms control advocate.
Cardoso also inherited from Franco the ongoing (1993–1996) CTBT
negotiations at the CD in Geneva. Since Brazil had abandoned its attachment to
PNEs under Collor, supporting the CTBT came naturally. Diplomats serving under
Lampreia attempted to make the test ban regime as strict as possible while also
protecting Brazilian sovereignty.294 First, Brazil advocated for a range of policies
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rejected by the P5: prohibiting computer simulations of tests, dismantling all former
test sites, and opening such sites to international inspectors.295 Second, Brazil
initially fought against proposals for the eventual zero-yield standard of the treaty
in favor of a 300-ton limit to avoid potential OSI that would disrupt its mining
industry. Third, Brazil was an early supporter of entry-into-force language requiring
ratification by 95-percent of states with nuclear reactors or research programs. The
view was that this clause would prevent a single nuclear-armed state from having
a veto over the treaty coming into effect (Ramaker et al. 2003; Johnson 2009).296
In the end, the CD accepted none of these proposals. Brazil is also
one of the 44 “nuclear-capable” states in the CTBT’s Annex 2 that must ratify
before the agreement may enter into force.297 Annex 1 to the treaty’s protocol also
lists five IMS stations in Brazil—three seismic and two radionuclide—that are all
operational today and collecting data on nuclear explosions around the clock.298
They continue to do so even though the treaty has not entered into force.
Cardoso signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996, the day it opened
for signature. By doing so, he type signaled as a treaty advocate to the international
community that Brazil did not seek to conduct nuclear weapon tests or the PNEs
that his country’s officials had defended for decades. In an interview I conducted
with the former president, Cardoso explained that it was only natural for him to sign
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the treaty because Collor had already made Brazil’s decision to forgo PNEs, and
“the military never said that they were against this.” To Cardoso, whatever
reservations diplomats may have had about the specific parameters of the treaty,
there was simply no point in raising eyebrows in the international community by
not signing.299 The National Congress would consider the commitment signaling
of ratification as a corollary to the NPT.
In March 1997, Cardoso called a meeting with Lampreia and his top
diplomats to consider the NPT (Patti 2012). Acceding to the treaty was not without
its opponents. Most notable was Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg,
Cardoso’s Secretary for Strategic Affairs. Cardoso’s (2015) diaries from the
presidency describe conversations with Sardenberg, who continued to view the
NPT as a discriminatory institution that would diminish Brazilian status.300
Regardless, the president decided that it was time to join the regime and leave
behind Brazil’s standing as a status dissenter.
Since the NPT had entered into force in 1970, Cardoso could no
longer sign this multilateral arms control treaty per the provisions of its Article IX.301
Participating in the NPT would have to occur through the joint signaling process of
accession, where the motivations for both type and commitment signaling would
need to be addressed. Cardoso pushed back against opponents of the treaty in
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his administration and the National Congress, paving the way for accession
(Cardoso 2016; Burges and Bastos 2017). On July 2, 1998, Congress linked its
approval of the NPT to a statement reaffirming the imperative of nuclear
disarmament per its Article VI (Duarte 2016). There were some objectors in
Congress, but with a popular president’s support, the remaining steps were a
formality. Three weeks later, Brazil ratified the CTBT on July 24 as part of its
broader nuclear discussions. Accession to the NPT, the joint signal changing
course after more than 30 years of opposition to the accord, followed on
September 18. Brazil had already legally forsworn nuclear weapons through the
Tlatelolco Treaty in 1994, but the NPT accession came with a greater degree of
global recognition.
But much like the debate over exploration versus pursuit of nuclear
weapons, there is some disagreement in the literature over the reasons for Brazil
finally joining the NPT. Patti (2012) and Debs and Monteiro (2017) point to the
mastery of the fuel cycle as the catalyzing event. The fuel cycle was, however,
mastered more than a decade before the NPT decision. Graham (2002) and
Goldemberg, Alvim, and Mafra (2018) attribute the event to democratization. Nonauthoritarian leaders like Sarney, Collor, and Franco were skeptical of the NPT,
though. Rublee (2010) gives some credit to the norms of the nonproliferation
regime. Yet, Brazil fought against such norms for over three decades.
In my interview with the former president, Cardoso explained his NPT
decision-making. He quickly dismissed ideas that he was a visionary leader,
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distilling his thoughts down to two main lines of reasoning that conform to the logic
of this dissertation’s process-based theory of multilateral nuclear arms control.
First, Cardoso addressed how his government overcame Brazil’s
status dissenter objections to the treaty. He immediately pointed to the changing
nature of the NPT in the face of Iraq and North Korea. That is, the treaty the
Brazilians fought against in the 1960s had evolved and was now more universal.
The former president explained:
In supporting the [NPT], my motivation, I will preserve
the national interest by not producing the bomb. [...] In
my conception, our international influence will be better
and we will be capable of being the leaders in South
America. Being a leader in South America has some
power in the world.302
The world had evolved. While opposing the treaty might have brought about status
benefits during the Cold War, it had morphed into a liability for Brazil. Cardoso’s
(2015) diaries even indicate that at one point he believed that acceding to the NPT
might position Brazil to eventually obtain a permanent seat on the UNSC. Such
explanations seem in line with Rublee’s (2010) normative argument, but the
motivations were self-serving for Brazil rather than moral. It seems likely that fuel
cycle mastery also contributed to status-based reasons to join the NPT, as Brazil
would face greater scrutiny as an advanced nuclear state outside of the treaty than
would a country with limited or no capability.
Second, Cardoso discussed regional security, which relates to
commitment signaling, the other component of joint signaling in the theory.
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Cardoso indicated that fuel cycle mastery, as argued by Patti (2012) and Debs and
Monteiro (2017), was essential to his decision-making. However, he offered a
surprising connection to nuclear latency and hedging:
There are no Brazilian enemies in the area with an
atomic bomb, so why should we have one? It would
just provoke competition. At the same time, it is
necessary to have the competency. In my mind, in the
balance between loss and gains, we will have more
losses than gains if we are outside the nuclear treaty,
assuming we had the competence. [...] I have from time
to time heard some people saying it was a mistake to
sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. Of course, it is always
possible for us to go nuclear—we have the
knowledge.303
As the theory predicts, countries will not provide a commitment signal to legally
forswear nuclear weapons if they lack credible protection against a serious security
threat. Cardoso is clear in pointing out that Brazil faced no such threats in 1998.
His discussion of nuclear hedging is interesting because it implies that accession
offered another security benefit. That is, Cardoso explained that being one of the
NPT States Parties in good standing means that a country does not face a harsh
spotlight and nonproliferation pressure. Essentially, being a member of the NPT
may make it easier to hedge toward the bomb in the event of a political decision to
do so. Spektor (2016) confirms that Cardoso tried to revive the civilian nuclear
program, although financial constraints prevented him from doing so at a
meaningful level. Cardoso also noted that Argentina joining the regime in 1995
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during this same period was important, as it signaled peaceful nuclear intentions
from a former rival state.304
The reasons why countries join treaties are rarely monocausal. This
dissertation has shown that by frequently pointing to differential motivations
underlying treaty signature and ratification. In the case of Brazil, the joint signaling
of accession required simultaneous satisfaction of both sets of conditions.
Democratic regime type may have eased the process of transparency between
Brazil and Argentina, but it does not appear to be a prerequisite for NPT accession.
Likewise, with some slight adaptations, both the fuel cycle mastery and norms
arguments map onto parts of the Brazilian story. Neither is independently sufficient
to explain the joint signaling that occurred in 1998. Instead, it is useful to think of
treaty decision-making within the dissertation’s theoretical process-based
signaling framework, which incorporates both variables.
Conclusion
Brazil’s journey in nuclear diplomacy did not end in 1998. Since then, Brasília has
become an active participant and sometimes leader at NPT Review Conferences.
The state is a member of the pro-disarmament New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and
has even attempted to mediate between Iran and the United States on nuclear
issues. Still, statements and actions by Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Dilma
Rousseff, and Jair Bolsonaro have raised occasional suspicions about Brazil’s
nuclear intentions (Herz, Dawood, and Lage 2016; Spektor, Kassenova, and
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Florentino 2019). Brazil has refused to sign an Additional Protocol with the IAEA
since the late 1990s, chastising the arrangement as an infringement on national
sovereignty. The navy continues to develop a nuclear-powered submarine, which
poses unique safeguards challenges since Brazil is an NNWS. These concerns
aside, Brazil remains solidly on its peaceful nuclear course and is a significant
player in the multilateral nuclear arms control arena, given its historical experience.
Extant literature has either labeled Brazil as an attempted proliferator
without compelling evidence or inadvertently oversimplified its nuclear history.
Common explanations of the Brazil case contend that the state sought nuclear
weapons under a military dictatorship before abandoning such aspirations due to
democratization. The evidence presented here suggests that neither of these
statements is accurate. More nuanced narratives rightly reject these points,
offering more persuasive but incomplete accounts. Accordingly, this chapter
provided analysis of historical documents and original elite interviews to shed new
light on Brazilian decision-making in the nuclear domain. It showed that mastery
of uranium enrichment and the evolution of the NPT were both necessary
conditions to prompt joint signaling reversing decades of opposition to the treaty.
They did so by eliminating any status or security concerns that might have
prevented Brazil from acceding. While scholars have indeed discussed each of
these arguments, the dissertation offers a process-based theoretical framework
inclusive of both. In doing so, it attempts to capture the historical richness of the
case as well as a basis for broader generalizability.
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Brazil was a status dissenter during the NPT negotiations and in the
decades following its refusal to sign the treaty in 1968. Its leaders viewed the treaty
as discriminatory and aimed at keeping technologies for modernization out of the
hands of developing states. International and U.S. nonproliferation pressure only
intensified motivations for acquiring such capabilities. Those counterproductive
supply-side measures were a part of a long journey that did not see Brazil accede
to the treaty until 1998 in close proximity to related developments. These events
included Brazil joining the Tlatelolco Treaty, CTBT, NSG, and MTCR alongside its
regional rival Argentina. When Brazil finally entered the NPT, the treaty had
evolved. Type signaling as a status dissenter had become a liability to Brazil’s role
on the global stage rather than an asset. Further, Brazil had no serious regional
security threats to prevent commitment signaling and would benefit from the NPT
legitimizing its nuclear latency. The joint signaling of accession was now possible,
as Brazil finally turned the page on its troubled history with the treaty.

235

Chapter 6 – Japan: Nuclear Futures, Taboos, and Alliance Politics
Much of the nuclear history of Japan focuses on the attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and their consequences for Japanese strategic culture and society. The
resultant narrative is frequently that of transformation into a peace state and vocal
proponent of international nuclear disarmament (Tanaka 1970; Akimoto 2020).
However, nuclear politics in Japan are more complex than any single narrative
would suggest. Since the end of the Second World War, Japan has also repeatedly
requested—and obtained—robust U.S. nuclear security assurances and studied
the possibility of developing its own nuclear arsenal (Kase 2001; Debs and
Monteiro 2017; Akiyama 2018). Tokyo’s reliance on the nuclear umbrella and
efforts to promote disarmament at home and abroad have produced a dynamic
Masakatsu Ota (2018, p. 94) refers to as the “Nuclear Kabuki Play.”
Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in the case of the
NPT. Prime Minister Eisaku Satō, leader of the only state to suffer an atomic
bombing, refused to sign the treaty when it opened for signature on July 1, 1968.
Japan was thus not an early advocate of legally forswearing nuclear weapons. As
discussed in my typology in Table 3 of Chapter 2, advocates endorse the balance
of power codified by a treaty and view the agreement as a long-term benefit to the
state. Satō would wait until February 3, 1970, to sign the NPT and signal Japan’s
state type as an advocate. Yet, he was not immediately supportive of ratification
by the Japanese Diet and did not submit the treaty for consideration by the body.
The firmer commitment signal of ratification would finally occur on June 8, 1976,
under the Prime Ministership of Takeo Miki. This lengthy delay in renouncing
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nuclear weapons transpired even as Washington urged its protégé to embrace the
accord. But why did Japan take so long to accept the NPT?
The extant literature is somewhat divided over how to explain
Japanese behavior in the NPT context. While there is little scholarly analysis of
Tokyo’s decision to sign the treaty, there are several existing explanations for its
slow ratification. Quester (1970) and, later, Paul (2000) contend that such delays
were caused by Japan’s commercial imperative to negotiate a favorable nuclear
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Solingen (2007) primarily attributes the
delays to domestic politics in Japan. Akiyama (2018) and Abe (2020) argue that
the Japanese inability to decide whether to foreclose the nuclear option was
pivotal. After all, championing the NPT would be tantamount to Japan legally
forswearing nuclear weapons when China was carrying out thermonuclear tests
and developing ballistic missiles.
This chapter introduces declassified internal Japanese documents
and diplomatic correspondence that show the determinative impact of security in
Tokyo’s NPT decision-making. I find that Satō’s delay in signing was due to Japan
initially being a weapons dissenter in my typology, as opposed to an advocate.
Weapons dissenters have difficulty embracing the treaty’s balance of power and
view independent nuclear weapons programs as a realistic means of security. It
took time for the Japanese government to accept in principle its non-nuclear status.
Only when national ambitions had evolved concerning the treaty could Tokyo type
signal as an advocate. Meanwhile, Japan conducted several studies to assess the
viability of an autonomous nuclear weapons program. It also mastered the civilian
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nuclear fuel cycle in a way that would enable it to develop a plutonium-based bomb
quickly should emergency circumstances ever arise.
The evidence supports my theory that ratification decisions revolve
around security. Existing explanations pertaining to safeguards and domestic
politics issues mattered in the Japanese context, but the security narrative is
significantly more persuasive. As my theory of multilateral nuclear arms control
spells out, signature and ratification are actions of different magnitude. The existing
literature’s focus on ratification in the Japanese case overlooks much of the
complexity of Tokyo’s signaling. While Japan had said “No” to nuclear weapons by
eventually signaling its type as an advocate in 1970, its leaders needed until 1976
to say “Never” with a firmer commitment signal. Ratification did not occur until
Japan had received robust U.S. security assurances and thoroughly studied and
ruled out building the bomb.
Figure 7: Timeline of Japanese NPT and CTBT Diplomacy

The timeline shown in Figure 7 offers further support for my argument
by comparing Japan’s signaling on the NPT to the CTBT. Japan had already legally
forsworn nuclear weapons and obtained iron-clad U.S. nuclear umbrella
guarantees. Its participation in the CTBT of 1996 was nearly a foregone
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conclusion. Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto signed the CTBT on September 24,
1996, the day it opened for signature. Ratification by the Diet took place relatively
quickly afterward on July 8, 1997.
This chapter explores Japan’s complicated multilateral nuclear arms
control journey in five sections. First, I analyze Japanese interest in the atom and
alliance politics after Hiroshima and Nagasaki to provide context for the NPT
discussions. Second, I provide evidence showing deep Japanese skepticism of the
treaty during its negotiation. Third, I assess reasons why Japan delayed its signing
and ratification of the NPT. Fourth, I discuss Japan’s post-NPT nuclear politics,
including the negotiation, signing, and ratification of the CTBT. Finally, I briefly
review the evidence and conclude the chapter.
Nuclear Politics After Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Japanese nuclear history began before the U.S. atomic bombings in August 1945.
During the Second World War, the military government under General Hideki Tōjō
authorized two initiatives to build the bomb and win the war in the Pacific Theater.
They were the army’s Ni-Go project under physicist Yoshio Nishina and the navy’s
F-Go project led by his contemporary Bunsaku Arakatsu. A range of uranium
enrichment methods was explored from 1941–1945, including gaseous diffusion,
gas centrifuge development, and electromagnetic separation. Yet, neither Ni-Go
nor F-go was successful due to a lack of resources (Yamazaki 2001; Akiyama
2018). The reason was that both projects were considered relatively low priorities
compared to other elements of the war effort (Campbell and Sunohara 2004).
Japan has not had a technical program to actively pursue nuclear weapons since
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their termination (Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Bleek 2017).
Nevertheless, this section provides evidence of early thinking about security issues
and potential nuclearization among democratic leaders in post-war Japan. Such
considerations would later present challenges to Japan legally forswearing nuclear
arms in spite of the country’s experience with the deadly effects of these weapons.
The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki shaped Japanese security
policy and cultural norms regarding the atom. Though the number of casualties
remains unknown, up to 210,000 Japanese may have perished due to blast and
fire damage and lingering effects of radioactive fallout (Tomonaga 2019).305 While
Imperial Japan had briefly pursued the bomb, post-war Japanese leaders would
continuously confront a taboo, or “allergy,” against the possession or use of these
weapons among the public and many Diet members (Tanaka 1970; Mochizuki
2007; Rublee 2009). An activist community led by the Hibakusha—survivors of the
bombings—would also emerge to continually reinforce the powerful anti-nuclear
norm (Baron, Gibbons, and Herzog 2020; Thurlow 2020). Japanese nuclear history
thus became a story of conflicting pressures: the imperative to protect the nation
versus a pronounced aversion to nuclear weapons. Strong interest in civilian
nuclear energy would eventually also present the dual-use dilemma.
The U.S.-led allied occupation of Japan began after Tokyo’s
surrender on September 2, 1945, and lasted until 1952.306 On May 3, 1947, the
new pacifist Japanese constitution took effect with its Article IX indicating, “The
305

For a discussion of nuclear weapon effects see: Glasstone and Dolan 1977; Eden 2004.

306

For informative historical accounts of the occupation see: Schaller 1985; Sugita 2003.

240

Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation.”307 Debs
and Monteiro (2017, p. 361) note that this was done so that “Japan could reassure
foreign countries of its peaceful intentions.” Japan continued to appear as a likely
advocate of banning military nuclear weapons, making its future resistance to the
NPT seem surprising.
Despite Article IX of the constitution and the Japanese nuclear
“allergy,” General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers (SCAP), issued guidance to restrict Japan’s atomic research. SCAP
constraints limited Japan to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and prohibited isotope
separation except in “minute quantities to be used for research purposes only.”308
Meanwhile, the U.S. AEC heavily surveilled any activities with radioactive materials
and established export controls to prevent atomic transactions between Japan and
the communist countries.309
Even though the Harry Truman administration would not permit
nuclear autonomy, the SCAP sought some level of Japanese rearmament.
MacArthur viewed Japan as a key actor in East Asia to prevent the spread of
communism, particularly in the lead-up to the Korean War in June 1950. He
advocated for a Japan that could defend itself, which he interpreted as compatible
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with Article IX (van Sant, Mauch, and Sugita 2007). This line of reasoning from the
Americans sometimes led to tensions with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru
Yoshida, a skeptic of rearmament (Buckley 1985). Yoshida pursued the now
eponymous Yoshida Doctrine that called for Japan to rebuild its economy after the
war while relying on the United States for its national defense.
The signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.–Japan
Mutual Security Treaty in 1951 further entrenched Tokyo’s dependence on
Washington.310 While the U.S. occupation would end the following year, the
security relationship continued. The peace reached with the Allied Powers
effectively disarmed Japan, so Article I of the Mutual Security Treaty was an
agreement between the parties “to dispose United States land, air and sea forces
in and about Japan.” The treaty did commit Japan to take greater responsibility for
its defense on an unspecified timeline. Still, the United States maintained
sovereign control over the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands (including Okinawa).
Providing security for Japan created internal tensions in the U.S.
government in the nuclear domain. The State Department had an early
understanding of the prevalence of the nuclear taboo in Japan and would not allow
the JCS to deploy nuclear weapons on the Japanese mainland. This was the case
even before the conclusion of the Korean War in July 1953. Consequently,
“Strategic Air Command stationed planes at bases on the main islands, but kept
the nuclear components of their weapons at bases outside Japanese jurisdiction,
310
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primarily in Okinawa and Guam (Gallicio 2001, p. 122).” And in October 1953, the
navy sent the nuclear-equipped USS Oriskany carrier battle group to patrol the
Sea of Japan and the East China Sea (Ota 2018). Such efforts were part of a
pattern of increasing Japanese military and economic dependence on the United
States.311 This reliance only grew as the Soviet Union used its veto at the UNSC
to prevent Japan from joining the UN.312 The Japanese government required
constant reminders of U.S. protection.
And although nuclear weapons remained a delicate issue in the
alliance, President Dwight Eisenhower’s December 1953 Atoms for Peace speech
opened the door to commercial civilian nuclear cooperation. The speech was part
of a U.S. push in “distinguishing the ‘peaceful atom’ from the weapons used in
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Cold War arms race with the Soviet Union (Baron
and Herzog 2020, p. 2).” Before the initiative, such transactions were limited to
Japan’s receipt of small quantities of medical radioisotopes through the SCAP for
research purposes.313 Nuclear power made a great deal of sense for Japan given
fuel shortages, limited natural resources, and high energy consumption per
capita.314 Yoshida’s government soon began negotiating the terms of civilian
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nuclear cooperation with Washington. In March 1954, the government authorized
funds for researching nuclear reactors (Iwama 2019).
But that same month, the Lucky Dragon incident presented a setback
to Japan’s nuclear energy aspirations and the provision of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella. The detonation of a 15-megaton U.S. thermonuclear device, codenamed
Castle Bravo, at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands led to radiation poisoning of
Japanese fishers on the Daigo Fukuryū Maru vessel (F/V Lucky Dragon 5) some
85 miles away (Solingen 2007; Kusunoki 2008). Their illnesses and the eventual
death of one fisher led to disagreements over compensation between Japan and
the United States.315 Both houses of the Japanese Diet then unanimously passed
resolutions calling for the international control of nuclear energy under UN
auspices (Kurosaki 2019). The resolutions did not specifically call for a ban on
nuclear explosive tests, thereby avoiding further confrontation with Washington.
However, U.S. Ambassador John Moore Allison categorically rejected the idea of
deploying nuclear weapons to mainland Japan in the incident’s aftermath (Ota
2018). The idea that Japan might one day consider developing its own nuclear
weapons seemed an unlikely possibility at the time.
Yet, tensions over the Lucky Dragon incident coincided with U.S.
doubts over Tokyo’s reliability as an ally. In June 1954, the NSC warned that as
Soviet influence grew, “The long-term alignment of Japan with the free world is
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less certain.”316 Two months later, Ambassador Allison told Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles that Japan might opt for neutrality to avoid entrapment in a U.S.–
Soviet nuclear confrontation.317 These conclusions came even as Japan was the
second-largest recipient of U.S. military aid in Asia after Taiwan’s Kuomintang
government.318 In retrospect, the assessments are somewhat surprising given the
security reliance on Washington envisioned by the Yoshida Doctrine.
Ichirō Hatoyama rose to power to replace Yoshida in December
1954. A nationalist, he had been set to be prime minister in 1946 before the SCAP
barred him from politics for over five years for suspected ties to the former military
regime (Itoh 2003). When his conservative Japan Democratic Party merged with
the Liberal Party in November 1955, Hatoyama became the first leader of the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). He repaired ties with the USSR and pursued
revision of the constitution to permit Japan to build a military. The former enabled
Japan to join the UN in 1956 after the Soviets dropped their veto. Public opinion
and budgetary constraints prevented Hatoyama from accomplishing rearmament
(Kusunoki 2008).
Facing opposition to his rearmament plans, Hatoyama fell into line
with Eisenhower’s designs for Japan in order to protect the nation. He acquiesced
to the American announcement in January 1955 that the occupation of Okinawa
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would continue indefinitely (van Sant, Mauch, and Sugita 2007). And in March of
that year, Hatoyama told reporters that Japan should allow storage of U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons (TNWs) on its territory (Ota 2018). Such deployments were one
of the linchpins of the U.S. “New Look” policy and the massive retaliation strategy.
Hatoyama’s statements outraged Communists and Socialists in the Diet as well as
the public-at-large. The backlash forced him to quickly retract his comments in a
speech to the Upper House of the Diet on March 29, 1955:
There is no necessity to store nuclear weapons in
Japan, because the US military equips its naval
vessels with nuclear weapons […] without storing
nuclear weapons on Japanese land, we can maintain
peace through strength with the US possession of
nuclear weapons, I believe (qtd. in Ota 2018, p. 198).
While Hatoyama ruled out TNW deployments in mainland Japan, the U.S. bases
remained. They were not without their critics in the Diet, however, as a sizable
portion of Japanese elites believed they unjustly made Japan a nuclear target.319
Although military nuclear issues remained contentious, the
Hatoyama administration made progress on civilian nuclear energy following the
lifting of several SCAP restrictions (Akiyama 2018). Tokyo and Washington signed
the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Use of Atomic Energy in 1955
(Iwama 2019). According to the agreement’s details, the United States would
provide Japan with reactor technology and would lease it fuel for any reactors that
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were built.320 The Diet also passed the Atomic Energy Basic Act in 1955, which
established guidelines for research on nuclear reactors and fuel. The Atomic
Energy Basic Act prohibited non-peaceful nuclear activities (Solingen 2007). It led
to the establishment of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), the
Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission, and the Japan Atomic Energy Research
Institute (JAERI) (JAEC 1958).321 Under Hatoyama, Japan had begun to develop
the institutional infrastructure to support a major nuclear energy program.
After the short tenure of Hatoyama’s like-minded successor, Tanzan
Ishibashi, Nobusuke Kishi became the next prime minister in January 1957. Kishi
aggressively sought to revise the constitution to rearm Japan, even voicing support
for developing an autonomous nuclear arsenal (Hoey 2017). He told a Diet
committee: “I do not think so-called nuclear weapons are prohibited entirely by
constitution. In view of progress of science, we must have effective power to carry
out modern warfare within scope self-defense [sic].”322 Given Japan’s new interest
in nuclear energy and doubts about its trajectory as an ally, Kishi’s statements
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about proliferation triggered alarm bells in Washington. Documents from the time
reveal that the Eisenhower administration was already afraid that Japan and West
Germany might go nuclear if France did so.323
But like his predecessors, Kishi was forced to backtrack on his
statements in the face of U.S., Japanese public, and Diet pressure. He reassured
the Americans of “Japan’s dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to prevent
general war.”324 However, this decision was not without complication. Leaks about
possible U.S. nuclear bases on the mainland stoked anger in Japan,325 and both
houses of the Diet passed resolutions calling for an end to nuclear testing
(Kurosaki 2019).326 Kishi was thus compelled to inform the Diet that nuclear
proliferation was incompatible with the constitution and rejected the U.S. bases
(Kusunoki 2008). Further, he attempted without success to win support from
Eisenhower for a one-year moratorium on nuclear tests.327 Behind the scenes,
Saburo Ohta, the Japanese Ambassador to Poland, told Polish officials that Japan
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supported the Rapacki Plan’s idea for a Central European NWFZ. Ohta explained
that such principles were essential to keeping the superpowers’ nuclear weapons
out of their allies’ sovereign territory.328
Still, the civilian nuclear energy program was seen as a separate
entity and made further strides under Kishi. The JAEC’s first research reactors
using U.S. technology and fuel, JRR-1 and JRR-2, would come online in 1957 and
1960, respectively (Yamashita 2015). Initial IAEA safeguards monitoring in Japan
would begin in 1957 as well (Campbell and Sunohara 2004). And the earlier lifting
of SCAP restrictions provided the basis for a 1958 agreement with Britain and the
import of a graphite-moderated Magnox reactor running on natural uranium
(Iwama 2019). The reactor at Tokai-mura would first connect to the power grid in
1966, but it also began the process of Japan accumulating plutonium that could be
used to produce a nuclear weapon. The lack of evidence surrounding any nuclear
weapons hedging plans has led Iwama (2019, p. 153) to label ulterior military
motivations as “academically unproven.” Yet, as I show later in this section, the
pursuit of nuclear latency was actually present in Japanese defense planning
before the Magnox reactor went critical.
Regardless of public opposition, Kishi continued to push for changes
in the relationship with the United States. In June 1958, Foreign Minister Aiichirō
Fujiyama told the Americans Japan was prepared to negotiate a revised security
treaty, including provisions for consultation regarding deployment of U.S. nuclear
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forces (Debs and Monteiro 2017).329 This would mark a change from the 1952
treaty, which codified a one-sided defense relationship favoring Washington. A
year later, the Eisenhower administration briefly considered—but rejected—
providing Japan with classified design information to build its own nuclear
weapons.330 The new treaty was signed in Washington on January 19, 1960.331 It
created the system of “prior consultation” before U.S. nuclear weapons could be
deployed in Japan or U.S. forces could launch military operations from Japanese
territory (Ota 2018, p. 199). In secret, the Eisenhower and Kishi governments
agreed that many U.S. military activities, including transit of nuclear weapons
through Japanese ports, would not be governed by the treaty (Ota 2013, 2018;
Shinobu 2014). Okinawa also remained outside the treaty’s scope.
Even though the treaty provided Kishi with face-saving language
about preserving Japan’s autonomy, it was not without its critics. As Hoey (2017,
p. 164) explains, “Kishi’s efforts to force ratification of the revised treaty through
the Diet resulted in massive protests and his early resignation in 1960.” His
successor, Hayato Ikeda, was anything but a hawkish nationalist. Yet, even Ikeda
expressed some level of interest in nuclear weapons “to reduce Japan’s defense
budget (Green and Furukawa 2008, p. 349).” Japanese leaders were now
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seriously pondering the nuclear option, setting the stage for a complicated
trajectory with multilateral nuclear arms control.
Due to its sensitivity, consideration of developing nuclear weapons
took place in the Ikeda administration outside of public, media, and Diet view.
Prominent Japanese scholars and strategists, however, were advising LDP
politicians against proliferation in the early 1960s. In their view, extended
deterrence would provide a better defense for Japan (Kusunoki 2008). It appears
that the John F. Kennedy administration was not seriously concerned about
Japanese nuclearization. A National Intelligence Estimate from September 1961
concluded that Tokyo was “5–6 years after decision” from building its first bomb.332
The key phrase was “after decision,” as the document notes, “It is highly unlikely,
however, that Japan at this time has any serious intentions of undertaking a
nuclear weapons program of its own.”333 Doubts about Japan’s willingness to
proliferate were likely fueled by its pushing for a global nuclear test moratorium,
which often pitted Tokyo against Washington at the UN (Kurosaki 2019).
China’s first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, dramatically altered
Japanese threat perception. Ikeda had met with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
in the years before the test specifically to reaffirm the bilateral security
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relationship.334 And the U.S. State Department assessed that a Chinese nuclear
detonation would have only limited effects on Japanese foreign policy.335 Perhaps
the Americans overestimated Japanese faith in the credibility of U.S. protection.
Shortly after the test, Eisaku Satō, who would later describe China as a “madman
with a knife,” was elected prime minister (qtd. in Ota 2018, p. 200n20). Satō’s
cabinet ordered a study in December 1964 that called for Japan to achieve nuclear
latency “by way of investing in satellite and missile technology and nuclear power
plants (Lanoszka 2014, p. 205).” The Magnox reactor at Tokai-mura would assist
in these pursuits by generating plutonium byproducts. Simultaneously, the prime
minister aggressively sought a firm U.S. security commitment to defend Japan
against China (Ota 2018).
The Chinese test stirred great controversy among Japanese
strategists. Some feared entrapment in a U.S.–PRC conflict, while others believed
the eventual development of a Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
would erode the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence (Kase 2001; Yoshida
2019). Policy recommendations ranged from a declaration of neutrality, to
indigenous proliferation, to a closer relationship with Washington. Satō concluded
that the “Japanese public is not ready for” proliferation (qtd. in Kase 2001, p. 57),
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so he “seemed content with a restatement of US assurances (Debs and Monteiro
2017, p. 365).”
The Japanese leader traveled to Washington in January 1965 for
meetings with President Johnson. According to records of the conversations, Satō
“said that although he could see why it might be argued that if China has nuclear
weapons, Japan should also, this was not Japan’s policy.”336 For his part, Johnson
provided the first firm guarantee of the nuclear umbrella (Ota 2018), stating that “if
Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand
by its commitments and provide that defense.” He further reiterated that “Japan
need not give even a second thought to the dependability of its American ally.”337
The joint communiqué released after their meeting identified China as a threat and
emphasized that the United States would protect Japan (Nakatani 2019).
As the ENDC negotiations on the NPT began in Geneva in 1965,
Japan faced a dynamic and challenging security environment. A potentially
existential threat had emerged in the form of China’s nuclear program. But given
Japan’s complicated history with nuclear weapons, nuclearization was simply not
viable among the public or the Diet. Tokyo did have plans underway to develop a
latent nuclear capability alongside a nuclear security guarantee from Washington.
Choosing to remain in nuclear forbearance at a given time was much simpler than
joining a multilateral nuclear arms control treaty that would force Japan to legally
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forswear weapons that could ensure national survival. Japan’s support for the NPT
was far from assured. It was unclear whether Japan would be a treaty signatory or
a non-signatory. There were indications that Tokyo might signal its type as either
an advocate or a weapons dissenter, perhaps the most wildly divergent groups.
Views from Tokyo During the NPT Negotiations
Unlike the other three case study states in this dissertation (Egypt, Romania, and
Brazil), Japan was not a member of the ENDC during the NPT negotiations.338
Tokyo was, however, one of the co-sponsors of a December 1960 Irish resolution
on nuclear disarmament at the UNGA.339 Resolution 1576 advocated for “every
effort to achieve permanent agreement on the prevention of the wider
dissemination of nuclear weapons.” Some of its text is quite reminiscent of NPT
Articles I and II on NWS non-transfer and NNWS non-acquisition of nuclear
weapons.340 But yet, the documents and other evidence I present in this section
demonstrate that Japan was initially an NPT weapons dissenter. Tokyo rejected
the balance of power reified by the agreement. When the treaty opened for
signature in July 1968, Prime Minister Satō declined to sign it. I demonstrate below
that the driver of such security concerns was China’s burgeoning nuclear program,
introduced in the previous section. Satō and his advisors were unwilling to accept
an agreement that legitimized the PRC arsenal but disarmed Japan.
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While Japan was not directly involved in the ENDC negotiations on
the NPT in Geneva from 1965–1968, the Satō administration maintained a high
level of interest in the proceedings.341 Declassified Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) and U.S. State Department documents reveal bilateral
consultations with the United States and West Germany.342 Additionally, Japan
coordinated multilaterally with the FRG, India, Italy, and Sweden on positions to
take in opposition to the NPT (Quester 1973). MOFA documents reveal that
security was the predominant Japanese concern. For instance, one set of
Japanese talking points written as the ENDC negotiations were ongoing noted:
Full consideration should be given to the security
problems of non-nuclear weapons states. In view of the
fact that when a non-nuclear weapons state becomes
party to this treaty it is to renounce on a semipermanent basis the right to equip itself with nuclear
armament, and also of the fact that it is essential for the
effectiveness of this treaty to have the participation of
as many non-nuclear weapons states as possible, the
maximum possible considerations should be paid by
nuclear weapons states to the security needs of the
non-nuclear weapons states in concluding the
treaty.343
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This evidence indicates that, as I have discussed throughout the dissertation,
multilateral nuclear arms control for NNWS is tantamount to legally forswearing
nuclear weapons. And this action would be no easy task for the Japanese
government, given its security concerns.
Officials in Washington were not initially wary of growing Japanese
skepticism regarding the NPT. Their perspective was generally that Johnson’s
pledge to Satō in early 1965 was sufficient to ensure Tokyo’s endorsement of the
treaty. Even though Japan had lodged a sharp protest against China’s second
nuclear test in international fora in May 1965,344 the American position remained
intact. For example, two months later, State Department intelligence assessed:
Many of the defense problems which beset India also
afflict Tokyo, in that there is concern about long-term
Chinese Communist intentions. Nevertheless, Japan is
even further than India from taking serious steps to
develop its own nuclear weapons, and it relies heavily
on the American commitment to Japanese security.
With these factors in the background, as well as with
the mass Japanese aversions to nuclear weapons
dating from World War II experience, it is highly likely
that Japan would speedily adhere to a non-proliferation
treaty.345
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Fundamentally, the U.S. government had identified Japan as what this
dissertation’s theory would label as a treaty advocate. The nuclear umbrella and
the taboo seemed to encourage Tokyo to accept the NPT. But incorrectly
identifying an ally’s type may have consequences, including, in this case,
Washington’s failure to provide adequate reassurance.
Satō’s government had deep concerns about China that did not
relent in the immediate aftermath of that second test. The PRC’s continued testing
and nuclear weapons development only exacerbated such fears. By January 1966,
a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concluded that extended deterrence would
prevent Japanese nuclearization, but growing Chinese capabilities could lead to
doubts about the viability of the nuclear umbrella.346 The document still viewed
proliferation as unlikely but indicated that Japan was now capable of developing
an advanced nuclear weapons program. The JCS began to take a more
pessimistic stance soon thereafter, informing Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara that Japan was one of “the serious contenders” to proliferate in the
future.347 Concerns about Japanese proliferation only grew in May 1966, as China
carried out its first thermonuclear detonation at the Lop Nur test site (Herzog, Ko,
and Lee 2021). The event showed the growing threat posed by the PRC arsenal,
which was turning toward miniaturized warheads for delivery on ballistic missiles.
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Regardless, Satō showed marked nuclear restraint when consulting
with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer in July 1967. Satō assured his
American interlocutor that “Japan was not thinking of building own nuclear forces,
and would cooperate on question of nonproliferation [sic].”348 That same month,
reporters asked Secretary of State Dean Rusk if the United States would retaliate
with nuclear weapons against a nuclear attack on Japan. Rusk was unequivocal,
stating that “any such attack would be insane but that if it happened, the U.S. would
defend Japan with whatever was required.”349 The events of the month appeared
to show Tokyo moving toward signing the NPT as the ENDC negotiation continued.
This trajectory as a potential treaty advocate was short-lived. At first
glance, movement toward the NPT continued, with Satō telling the Lower House
of the Diet in March 1967 that he supported the treaty in principle. He also sent
special envoy Katsumi Ono to Washington to inform the Americans (Iwama 2019).
Yet, the U.S. intelligence community viewed this support as conditional given their
awareness of Japanese position papers and articles by top defense intellectuals.
The interpretation of these materials was that “while Japan should favor an NPT,
it should also reserve the right to produce nuclear weapons in the future.” Most
importantly, Japanese NPT decision-making would involve Tokyo adjudicating
whether the nuclear umbrella or indigenous proliferation would provide better
348
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protection against China.350 Because embracing the NPT would involve giving up
the latter option, Japan would either embrace the treaty as an advocate or reject
signature as a weapons dissenter.
Discussions about the planned U.S. Sentinel anti-ballistic missile
system in the fall of 1967 increased Japanese fears of abandonment.351 Great
concerns arose among Tokyo’s defense establishment that Washington would
prioritize defensive posture over the offensive deterrent posture that was critical to
protecting Japan (Yoshida 2019). In a November meeting in the U.S. capitol, Satō
pressed Johnson to recommit to the defense of Japan:
At my last visit to the US, President made a pledge to
protect Japan from any attack. Considering China has
developed nuclear weapons since then, I would like to
expect that the same commitment you made last time
will be applicable for any nuclear attack against our
nation (qtd. in Ota 2018, p. 202).
The U.S. President gave his word that the pledge remained firm.352
While the Japan–U.S. discussions about the umbrella were at the
forefront of Japanese deliberations on the NPT, they were not the only
consideration. Because Japan was not present at the ENDC, its official positions
on the treaty during this period usually receive scant attention in academic studies.
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However, Foreign Minister Takeo Miki made a speech to the General Assembly
on September 22, 1967.353 In it, he very clearly laid out Tokyo’s positions on the
treaty negotiations. Miki’s speech highlighted several Japanese reservations:
●

France and—especially—China had not given any indication
that they would accept the NPT or the LTBT. The treaty thus
could not prevent tests and future Lucky Dragon incidents.

●

The disarmament clauses for the NWS did not include
concrete measures to be taken.

●

The treaty’s nuclear safeguards provisions and allowing of
NWS–NWS cooperation on nuclear weapons did not make for
an equality of obligations between NNWS and NWS.

●

Negative security assurances would be necessary to
convince states like Japan they would be protected.

The remarks from Miki suggested great difficulties surrounding
Japan’s acceptance of the treaty. France and the PRC continued to object to the
NPT while carrying out further atmospheric nuclear test explosions (Herzog, Ko,
and Lee 2021). Furthermore, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, including Japan’s U.S.
patron, declined to include any of Tokyo’s suggestions in the draft and final NPT
treaty texts.354 Miki had provided conditions that would ease Japan into legally
forswearing nuclear weapons, but the ENDC rejected them. Japan also had
concerns about the commercial implications of Article III safeguards provisions on
353
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its civilian nuclear program (Quester 1970; Haginoya 1985). Still, the most difficult
part of accepting the NPT would be its codification of a world that forbids Japan
from the nuclear option. Indeed, Japanese government documents from the period
reveal that Tokyo’s support for review conferences of the treaty stemmed from a
desire to reconsider its stance on nuclearization every five years.355
It is initially puzzling to square these types of sentiments on the NPT
and the nuclear option with Satō’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Speaking before
the Diet in December 1967, the leader stated that Japan would not produce,
possess, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons onto its territory (Kusunoki
2008; Iwama 2019).356
With these principles, why then was Japan not certain to sign the
NPT as its negotiations were reaching their end? U.S. intelligence assessed that
irrespective of Satō’s sentiments, Japan would continue to keep the nuclear option
open.357 The NPT presented the “possibility of permanent self-denial” as well as
“permanent second-class power status.”358 This explanation would make Japan
either a possible weapons dissenter or a possible status dissenter to the treaty,
rejecting its balance of power in either case. Thus, the State Department predicted
355
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that Japan might sign the treaty but delay ratification while considering the
consequences of legally forswearing nuclear weapons. It is also important to note
that safeguards considerations discussed in this chapter were not yet prominent
at this time. These commercial considerations would become a much more
pressing issue after Tokyo’s signature. Industry would then have an expectation of
ratification and the coming onset of more stringent IAEA safeguards.
Although status concerns mattered, my analysis of the historical
record finds the more significant driver of Japan’s NPT decision-making was the
threat posed by China. This emphasis was even the case at the stage of signature.
Signaling Tokyo’s type as an advocate would endorse a world that allowed China
to remain nuclear but prohibited Japan from nuclearization. In the end, American
intelligence was correct about the result of Japan’s deliberations, though security
concerns were more determinative than status aspirations. Japan delayed its
ratification for six years while it debated the nuclear option. The process of the
prime minister signing the treaty also took time.
On January 30, 1968, Satō appeared to take a further step toward
the NPT by expanding the Three Non-Nuclear Principles into Four Nuclear
Policies. They included Japan adhering to the original three principles, advocating
for global nuclear disarmament, relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and
promoting the peaceful uses of civilian atomic energy (Rublee 2009; Tatsumi
2012). Yet, Satō himself was deeply conflicted, privately telling an aid prior to
declaring the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, “I should just come out and say that
nuclear weapons are necessary and then resign (qtd. in Hoey 2017, p. 167).” His
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statement is another observable implication of the centrality of security in
Japanese NPT diplomacy. Publicly declaring Japan’s non-nuclear intentions was
simply not the same as type signaling as an advocate for the NPT and the balance
of power created by allowing only five NWS, including China.
To that end, even as Satō declared that Japan would remain nonnuclear, his government undertook multiple studies during this period on the
ramifications and feasibility of proliferation. Fitzpatrick (qtd. in Bleek 2017, p. 32)
notes “at least five different government-related studies assessing the pros and
cons of developing nuclear weapons” took place from 1967–1972. The extent to
which the Americans were aware of the scope of such secret studies remains
unclear. Still, Satō’s public rhetoric and previous flirtation with the idea of
proliferation caused vacillating U.S. assessments of the NPT’s prospects in Japan.
In late April 1968, an internal State Department memorandum noted that “the
Japanese are now wandering all over the place but will undoubtedly end up
supporting and signing the treaty.”359
But shortly thereafter, in May 1968, the Japanese delegation to the
UNGA drew attention to its continuing reservations about the treaty.360 These
encompassed three main points. First, Japan again sought concrete nuclear
disarmament measures so that “all nuclear weapons are eliminated from the
national arsenals of all states.” This language was, of course, not included in the
359

See: “Memorandum From the Department of State’s Country Director for Japan (Sneider) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy),” Washington, DC, April 26,
1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIX, Part II, Japan, Doc. 120.

360

See: A/C.1/PV.1565. And for additional analysis see: Shaker 1980a.

263

final text of NPT Article VI on disarmament, which remained forward-looking but
vague.361 Second, Japan was interested in an equality of obligations between the
NWS and the NNWS (Hunt 2013; Iwama 2019). To accomplish this would include
amending Article V on PNEs to allow the NNWS to conduct them autonomously if
the technology for nuclear weapon tests and peaceful detonations became
differentiable in the future.362 As well, Japan wanted the IAEA to inspect the civilian
nuclear facilities of the NWS. The final treaty text accomplished neither objective.
Third, Tokyo wanted a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA equivalent to
the one being pursued by the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).
At that point, it seemed likely that the IAEA would recognize EURATOM’s existing
safeguards regime as equivalent to its own. This would allow the Europeans to
fulfill their Article III safeguards obligations predominantly through IAEA
observation. Japan desired a similar arrangement, although such discussions
gained greater attention after the country became an NPT signatory.363
Ultimately, the provisions of the NPT stirred great controversy within
the Satō administration and among Diet members. The above considerations
361
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notwithstanding, the predominant concern dealt with accepting a treaty that would
close the nuclear route to provide security to the nation. The Americans hoped that
preambular language in the final NPT text emphasizing the UN Charter’s call to
resolve disputes without the use of force would sufficiently attenuate Tokyo’s
security concerns.364 However, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Takeso
Shimoda, told Secretary of State Dean Rusk in June 1968, “there were still
concerns in Japan that it may be imprudent to sign the treaty in view of the threat
of Communist China.”365
When the NPT opened for signature on July 1, 1968, weapons
dissenter Japan was not among the 57 countries that signed that day. It was not
until February 3, 1970, that Satō signed. As Hunt (2013, p. 415) aptly explains, the
Japanese “pondered whether denying themselves the right to develop the ultimate
weapon and its attendant technologies represented a prudent or foolhardy
choice.”366 In keeping with my theory, as a weapons dissenter, Japan would not
sign the treaty and signal its type as an advocate of the accord’s distribution of
power until its national ambitions changed.
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Signing and Ratifying the NPT
The NPT faced an uphill battle in Japan after Satō decided not to sign in July 1968.
Quester (1970, p. 772) notes that 25 percent of Japanese citizens actively wanted
the bomb during this period, and 50 percent believed Japan would eventually go
nuclear. The previous section presented evidence showing that Satō was not
immediately prepared to sign the NPT and embrace the distribution of power it
codified. Consequently, it would take Japan more than one and a half years before
signing the NPT in 1970. The Japanese transition from weapons dissenter to
advocate was not without difficulties, and the Diet would not ratify until 1976. My
theory predicts the commitment signaling of ratification will present a particular
challenge to former weapons dissenters. States will not ratify multilateral nuclear
arms control treaties if they lack credible protection against serious security
threats. Satō was initially unsupportive of ratification due to security threats from
China, and an influential conservative faction of the LDP emerged as even more
dogmatically opposed. I show in this section that it took the government
comprehensively studying the weapons option alongside unquestionable public
U.S. security guarantees to achieve the commitment signal of ratification.
At first, Japan’s U.S. patron seemed unaware of the enormity of a
decision by Tokyo to move toward becoming a NNWS. President Johnson asked
Foreign Minister Miki in August 1968 when Japan would sign the treaty. Johnson
reported: “I was not able to get any commitment on timing of Japanese signature
of NPT although they are still moving in that direction.”367 Miki indicated that the
367
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delay in signing was due to the need to educate industry about safeguards
procedures and to pacify critics who wanted the right to conduct PNEs. The more
controversial rationale that a vocal minority of politicians and defense
establishment professionals were unwilling to give up the nuclear option remained
unstated. In October and November 1968, the U.S. government was still predicting
Japanese signature by the end of the year.368 In sharp contrast to the Romania
case in Chapter 4, Japan’s superpower patron did not attempt to coerce its client.
Without U.S. pressure, Japan had the freedom to maneuver vis-à-vis the NPT and
was not a subordinate state that was compelled to join.
The U.S. prediction of Japanese signature in 1968 did not occur, as
Satō authorized several classified studies on the feasibility of developing an
independent nuclear deterrent. The number of studies and their secrecy highlight
the importance the government placed on national survival. Among the at least five
studies conducted between 1967–1972 (Bleek 2017), the most prominent was the
Cabinet Information Research Office study commissioned in September 1968. The
first report in 1968 dealt with technical and economic aspects of a potential
program. The second report in 1970 dealt with geopolitical issues. Taken together,
they determined that Japan had the technical capabilities to build the bomb, but it
would be costly and create significant tensions with China and the USSR. The
studies recommended continued reliance on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence as
more cost-efficient and effective. The experts argued that developing nuclear
368
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weapons would diminish Japan’s security (Kase 2001; Rublee 2009; Debs and
Monteiro 2017; Akiyama 2018). Other conclusions included the idea that Japan
lacked the strategic depth to absorb a counterforce strike given its high population
density and small land area.369
As these studies were taking place, other developments further
highlighted Japan as a weapons dissenter. In February 1969, Cabinet Bureau
Legislation Chief Masami Takatsuji began repeating the old claim that nuclear
weapons were actually compatible with the Japanese Constitution (van Sant,
Mauch, and Sugita 2007). That same month, Japanese and FRG officials met to
discuss nuclear weapons and the NPT. According to the Germans, the Japanese
“suggested that the two countries should cooperate to become ‘super powers.’ The
Japanese side indicated they had the necessary technology and they could do it
in a relatively short time if they so decided (Iwama 2019, p. 155).” During this
period, Japan continued to pursue nuclear latency by developing spent fuel
reprocessing capabilities for plutonium separation (Herzog 2020).
The inauguration of Richard Nixon as the U.S. President in 1969
provided additional space for Japan to ponder the nuclear option. Nixon and his
National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, were much less concerned about the
NPT than their predecessors. Nixon’s NSC even considered that “the development
369
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of an independent nuclear weapons capability might be desirable in some cases”
like Japan to lessen U.S. defense expenditures and responsibilities.370
The Nixon administration’s efforts to gain Satō’s signature on the
NPT were considerably less aggressive than Johnson’s. National security officials
believed that helping Japan become a member of the ENDC would give Tokyo a
greater stake in arms control and ensure quick signature and ratification of the
NPT.371 Their thinking was that inclusion in the organization would offset any
negative feelings the Japanese had about not being a part of the treaty
negotiations (Quester 1970). With U.S. assistance, Japan joined the ENDC on July
3, 1969 (Shaker 1980a, p. 74). Regardless, Japan now faced a growing PRC
ballistic missile threat and frequent patrols of Soviet strategic bombers and
submarines near its sovereign territory (Akiyama 2018). Many reasons remained
for Japan to continue being a weapons dissenter to the NPT.
Yet,

as

further

studies

recommended

against

Japanese

nuclearization, the tide began to turn toward signing the NPT. This trend was
moved forward by two additional developments. First, the West Germans informed
Tokyo of their plans to sign the NPT in November 1969 (Iwama 2019). The impact
of Bonn’s signature cannot be overstated. The FRG was Japan’s closest ally on
nuclear nonproliferation issues due to its history, advanced industrial capabilities,
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safeguards concerns, and resistance to closing the nuclear option. Second, during
this same month, Satō and Nixon signed a joint communiqué that included the
reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control and a secret provision to allow the
introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons to the island in crises (Schaller 1997; Hoey
2015). Japan also committed to taking on increased responsibility for its defense
in exchange for extending the bilateral security treaty. Nixon would further
articulate the U.S. security guarantee throughout 1970.
The pieces had now fallen into place for Japan to signal its type as
an advocate of the NPT and the balance of power it enshrined. Satō and Miki had
input from expert studies that proliferation was not in Japanese interests, a
reaffirmed U.S. nuclear umbrella commitment, and the West German precedent.
From a political standpoint, it seemed prudent to signal that Japan endorsed the
NPT as a NNWS. In mid-November 1969, Satō’s secret emissary informed
Kissinger that Japan would sign the treaty, but it would take a while to make a final
decision on ratification (Iwama 2019).372
On February 3, 1970, Satō finally signed the treaty. Ota (2018) notes
that his reversal was only possible due to the U.S. extended deterrent pledge,
enabling Japanese leaders to imagine a future without possession of nuclear
weapons. However, the Japanese government highlighted several reservations
alongside the occasion of the signature. These included: China’s lack of
participation in the NPT, the need for negative security assurances and concrete
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steps toward nuclear disarmament, and the treaty’s potential to interfere with
civilian atomic research.373 Additionally, Japan warned that it could withdraw from
the NPT pursuant to Article X if its supreme national interests required.374
As my theory predicts from a former weapons dissenter, Japan’s
predominantly security-driven concerns pointed to a protracted ratification debate
to come. But, as Ambassador Masahiro Nisibori stated at the first NPT Review
Conference in 1975: “The government of Japan [...] agreed the spirit of the Treaty
and signed it [sic].”375 Nisibori’s statement epitomizes the concept of type signaling,
which is different from the commitment signaling of ratification. Legally closing the
door on nuclear weapons would pose a much more formidable challenge. Satō
signed the treaty and accepted its balance of power in principle, but he and his
advisors had little interest in speedy ratification. Commitment signaling, of course,
required Japan to bear ex-ante sovereignty costs of increased IAEA safeguards
verification. But more importantly, it also carried the powerful ex-post cost of legally
forswearing nuclear weapons that could ensure state survival in the face of serious
security threats. Relying on the credibility of U.S. protection was easier said than
done given the uncertainty of the future.
Despite Japanese type signaling as an advocate of the principles of
the NPT, the treaty also remained divisive in the Diet and the national security
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community (Quester 1970; Endicott 1977).376 Roughly two-thirds of Japanese
opposed nuclearization (Shaker 1980b, p. 825), but public opinion on the NPT was
also negative (Quester 1970). This polling points to the difference between
pursuing the bomb and legally forswearing it. Classified studies on the feasibility
of proliferation continued into 1972 (Bleek 2017) regardless, and some members
of the Diet publicly questioned the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella (Kase
2001). Because Japan faced serious security threats from China and—to a lesser
extent—the USSR, such sentiments increased the difficulty of ratification. For their
part, the Americans continued to try and mitigate such fears. Kissinger told Miki in
June 1970, for instance, “that Japan was so important that we couldn’t permit it to
be destroyed in a nuclear war.”377
Still, the Nixon administration’s actions often seemed to undercut the
credibility of U.S. assurances to Japan. Examples of policies that weakened
Washington as a patron included the Nixon Doctrine’s calling on Asian states to
take on more defense responsibilities, and especially, U.S. rapprochement with
China in 1971. The Japanese were livid about the latter, which raised questions
about the U.S. willingness to defend Japan. The Ambassador in Washington,
Nobuhiko Ushiba, remarked to his American counterparts:
Satō had over the years based his policy on the
Yoshida tradition of close collaboration with the US in
foreign policy, especially in the China issue, but the
charge would now be made that the US had pulled the
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rug out from under this policy by making this dramatic
move on China policy, not only without consulting but
even without any substantial prior notice to the
Japanese government.378
Compounding these fears, Washington dropped its veto and allowed China to take
over the permanent seat on the UNSC from Taiwan in 1971. And the following
year, the Americans adopted a relatively neutral stance on the Japan–China
dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Schaller 1997). When Kissinger visited Tokyo
in June 1972, he—unsurprisingly—met with current and former senior Japanese
officials who were skeptical of both the NPT and the U.S. nuclear umbrella.379
The politics of multilateral nuclear arms control were more complex
than Japanese security concerns alone. Commercial and industrial interests thus
present a possible alternative explanation to the narrative that security threats
delayed Japan’s NPT ratification. Japan had a growing civilian nuclear power
sector, whose critiques of the treaty gained prominence during the administrations
of Satō’s successors Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo Miki (the former foreign minister).
George Quester (1970) and T. V. Paul (2000) even go so far as to attribute the
delay in ratifying the NPT to issues of commercial nuclear safeguards. Such
considerations were less prominent during the signature phase, but the Japanese
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type signal as a treaty advocate worried some industrialists who feared that
compliance with more extensive IAEA safeguards was now imminent.
It is certainly true that segments of the nuclear industry were
unhappy about potential Article III safeguards obligations. Unlike many other
civilian nuclear powers, Japan’s technologies did not use English-language
interfaces or materials accounting. There were also concerns that the IAEA would
seek to ensure that no more than 2 percent of fissionable plutonium leaked, “but
Japanese electrical power company officers [had] suggested that anything greater
than 90% certainty in inspection will constitute an unbearable economic burden
(Quester 1970, p. 767).” For the IAEA, the fear was that a 10 percent uncertainty
margin could allow for a clandestine nuclear weapons program as plutonium
production grew. Japan also had its own national safeguards system (Imai 1969;
Haginoya 1985). But new civilian energy partners like Australia, Britain, Canada,
France, and the United States wanted IAEA inspections of facilities in Japan.
India’s “Smiling Buddha” PNE of 1974 only added further impetus to the
safeguards pressure. The solution for Tokyo was to seek equivalent treatment to
EURATOM, whose member states were permitted to fulfill their NPT obligations
primarily through IAEA oversight of European safeguards inspections.380
However, the historical evidence does not support the notion that
safeguards difficulties were the driving force behind the delayed ratification. In fact,
Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe (2020), one of Japan’s most noted arms control
experts, recalls that the nuclear power industry supported early ratification to
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obtain advanced energy technology from the Americans. By November 1974, the
U.S. State Department had assessed: “The primary argument against ratification—
that Japan should not foreclose its nuclear options—is so politically sensitive that
its proponents tend to hide behind the other lines of reasoning.”381 Safeguardsrelated arguments by Japanese leaders, diplomats, and hawkish members of the
Diet were one such example. This evidence provides support for my theory’s
predictions that ratification is a process driven by security considerations.
Safeguards may have contributed to some of the delay, but in the end, they were
not as pivotal as security considerations were for commitment signaling.
By February 1975, Japan had achieved safeguards parity with
EURATOM, and Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa had secured the support of
JAEC head Yoshitake Sasaki and Hiromi Arisawa of the Japan Atomic Industrial
Forum (Endicott 1977; Gibbons 2016). Still, opposition to the treaty remained,
again backing my theoretical expectation that security is central to ratification.
Prime Minister Miki’s administration identified that the cause of dissent was the
desire of LDP hawks in the far-right Seirankai faction for “a free-hand on nuclear
devices (Endicott 1977, p. 278).” The safeguards protocol agreed to in principle in
early 1975 was simply not enough to achieve Diet ratification, as security concerns
predominated in both houses of the body.382
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Miki, the head of the LDP, pursued two avenues to combat the
dissenting hawk faction from within his party. First, he denounced the free-hand
argument when speaking before the Diet in March 1975. Former Prime Minister
Satō came out in support of the treaty as well, telling the Asahi Shimbun, “We have
come to the time of ratifying the NPT. Our country should take a sensible action
quickly (qtd. in Endicott 1977, p. 280).” Second, Miki sent Miyazawa to Washington
to meet with President Gerald Ford’s Secretary of State, Kissinger. The two
released a joint public statement recommitting Washington to Japan’s security:
1) Both Japan and the U.S. are of the judgment that the
maintenance of the Security Treaty will be in the
interests of both sides, when viewed from a long-range
standpoint;
(2) U.S. nuclear war potential is an important deterrent
power toward aggression against Japan from the
outside;
(3) the U.S. attaches importance to its treaty
obligations that it will take charge of the defense of
Japan in the case of its being attacked by nuclear or
conventional weapons, and Japan will also continue to
carry out its obligations based on the Treaty (qtd. in
Endicott 1977, p. 282).
The timeline of events shows the importance of the assurances.
Miyazawa obtained the pledges from the Ford administration on April 12, 1975,
and Miki then submitted the treaty to the Diet for ratification on April 22 (Endicott
1977). Yet, even these assurances were not immediately sufficient to allay the
hawk faction’s security concerns (Lanoszka 2018a), and all Diet discussions of
foreign affairs were temporarily derailed over bribery scandals involving U.S.
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defense contracting firm Lockheed Martin. A protracted ratification debate over the
security implications of the NPT recommenced in 1976. The Socialist and Komeito
parties, alongside most LDP members, supported the treaty due to extended
deterrence providing security for Japan and Article VI promoting eventual nuclear
disarmament. The Communists, though a minority party, stood against the NPT
due to its failure to include concrete measures for operationalizing nuclear
disarmament of the NWS.383
But most importantly, the hawk faction of the LDP stressed the
nuclear threat from China as the key reason why Japan should not permanently
shut the door on the nuclear option.384 The Miki administration engaged in a
campaign on the Diet floor and behind the scenes to convince the faction of the
reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and ratification’s compatibility with Japanese
security interests. According to Abe (2020, p. 176), “One of the arguments [Miki
and Miyazawa] used to persuade the conservatives was that if the worst
happened, Japan could invoke Article X of the treaty to withdraw with three months’
notice.” Both houses of the Diet needed to approve for the commitment signaling
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of ratification to occur. The Lower House did so on April 28, 1976, and the Upper
House followed a few weeks later on May 24.385
On June 8, 1976, Japan deposited its instruments of ratification in
London, Moscow, and Washington. The Miki administration had successfully
convinced enough members of the hawk faction to support ratification by pledging
to negotiate an even stronger relationship with Washington. There had been
pervasive questions about Japan’s security under the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the
face of nuclear-armed China, and to a lesser extent, the USSR. As Abe (2020, p.
176) explains, “While a significant majority of the Japanese people were firmly
against the Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons, the conservative wing of the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party was reluctant to abandon future options to acquire
them.” Legally forswearing nuclear weapons through the commitment signaling of
ratification only became possible after extensive public U.S. nuclear security
assurances and expert study of the Japanese nuclear option.
In addition to the safeguards explanation, there are two other
alternative possibilities addressed in the literature for Japan’s delayed ratification.
Hymans (2011) attributes the delay to conservatives’ views about the unfairness
of the division of the world into NWS and NNWS. There was undoubtedly much
rhetoric of this nature on the Diet floor and communications between Tokyo and
Washington. However, the evidence I presented in this chapter shows that
385
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Japanese decision-makers—from prime ministers to diplomats and Diet
members—had concerns about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the
face of threats emanating from China. Japanese leaders certainly did not want the
state relegated to second-tier status, but the U.S. security guarantee was crucial
for national survival. Ratification proceedings began soon after a public recommitment of the United States to extended nuclear deterrence and protecting
Japan’s sovereignty. Likewise, Miki’s argument to the hawks that Japan could
withdraw from the NPT in the future if the threat environment changed further
confirms that security was the predominant driver of ratification.
Another potential alternative explanation comes from Solingen
(2007, p. 65), who argues, “Only domestic dynamics can explain why a certain
view prevailed over others leading to Japan’s ratification in 1976, about six years
after signature.” Solingen (2007, p. 65) bases her analysis on the idea that “the
decision to remain nonnuclear was prior to and not a consequence of the decision
to ratify the NPT.” Yet, my argument is that opting for nuclear forbearance at a
specific time is not equivalent to legally forswearing nuclear weapons. This section
showed that NPT signature and ratification are both costly and represent different
levels of obligation. It was difficult for Japanese decision-makers to signal the
state’s type as an advocate for a distribution of power that forbade them from
obtaining nuclear weapons. Costlier commitment signaling to abide by such
parameters did not occur until several years later. Initial studies on the feasibility
of the bomb before Satō signed the NPT were, in fact, followed by additional
research that began after signature. It is also true that the Diet settled NPT
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ratification per Japanese law. The evidence from the Diet debates supports my
theory: The protracted ratification debate focused predominantly on substantive
matters of security on the floor of both houses of the Diet. Commitment signaling
occurred once there was a consensus that Japan’s security environment allowed
the country to remain non-nuclear by renouncing the nuclear option. Credible U.S.
protection was indispensable to this future.
Post-NPT Nuclear Activities and the CTBT Context
In the era after NPT ratification, Japan remained under the protection of the U.S.
nuclear umbrella. Tokyo would also undertake efforts to build further reactors (both
for research and power production) and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. These included
investments in front-end capabilities—uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication—
and back-end capabilities—spent fuel reprocessing (Watanabe and Murase 1977;
Herzog 2020).386 Such developments enabled Japan to accumulate a large
stockpile of plutonium that could be used to build a nuclear weapon. Still, Japan
was firmly embedded in the NPT architecture as a vocal NNWS. Another
opportunity to participate in multilateral nuclear arms control would come about in
the mid-1990s with the CTBT. Having embraced the NPT and legally forsworn
nuclear weapons, Japan was quick to sign and ratify. The much faster timeline to
join the CTBT than the NPT provides further evidence to support my theory, as
Japan had credible U.S. protection. There were no barriers to its type signaling as
an advocate and subsequent commitment signaling.
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Not

all
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Japan’s

nuclear

development

occurred

without

controversy. The Indian PNE and the Brazil–FRG nuclear deal led to an increased
nonproliferation emphasis in the late 1970s under the U.S. administration of Jimmy
Carter. While Carter praised Japan for its ratification of the NPT, he was
apprehensive about supplying enriched nuclear fuel for its reactors that would then
be reprocessed by Britain, France, or Japan itself.387 Officials under Prime Minister
Yasuo Fukuda believed they were “being lumped in with Brazilians and Pakistanis”
despite their NPT commitment.388 It took multiple rounds of high-level discussions
in 1977 and for Fukuda to reassure Carter of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear
Principles and safeguards obligations before the U.S. President authorized the
reprocessing of fuel.389
Few nuclear disagreements between Tokyo and Washington
occurred after resolving the reprocessing controversy and as the Cold War wound
down. Much of this may be attributed to Japanese efforts to normalize relations
with China. When the Cold War ended, the Soviet threat to Japan had dissipated,
and China would soon accede to the NPT in 1992. Japan remained tied to the
United States for its security even as it faced a reduced level of threat.
387
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There were, however, some anomalies. Shortly before becoming
Prime Minister in 1991, former Foreign Minister Miyazawa acknowledged that, in
the future, young Japanese “may want to choose the lesser of two evils and opt to
build their own umbrella […] to be their own masters (qtd. in Solingen 2010, p.
133).” The Japanese also were at first resistant to the indefinite extension of the
NPT in 1995, fearing that it might eventually lead to the loss of U.S. extended
deterrence (Paul 2000). Tokyo ultimately accepted and endorsed the extension
(Graham 2002, Gibbons 2016). While the NPT extension was under consideration,
the Japanese defense establishment again studied the nuclear option in 1995. A
resulting report concluded that the U.S. umbrella and nuclear forbearance
remained the best policy choices for Japan’s national security (Campbell and
Sunohara 2004; Hughes 2007; Rublee 2009).
Among the most consequential events for non-nuclear Japan after
the Cold War was the negotiation of the CTBT at the CD in Geneva from 1993–
1996. Tokyo had a long history of opposing nuclear testing dating back to its
outrage at the Lucky Dragon incident, its support for the LTBT’s ban on
atmospheric testing, and its Diet resolutions calling for global testing moratoria
(Kurosaki 2019). The Hibakusha and other disarmament groups strongly backed
this anti-testing advocacy. Additionally, Japan’s experience with earthquakes and
volcanoes provided expertise in seismoacoustic monitoring techniques for
detecting nuclear tests. For example, in 1973, Japan had convened meetings to
assess the sensitivity of seismometers in monitoring underground test explosions
(Shaker 1980b). It was thus unsurprising that Japan’s representative at the CD,
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Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka, emerged as one of the most vocal proponents of
a CTBT (Johnson 2009).
Early Japanese positions on the treaty showed an evolution in
Tokyo’s nuclear politics. Japanese officials in Geneva understood that prohibiting
nuclear tests would have implications for disarmament. Yet, Japan was not
comfortable with the CTBT including the language of disarmament, which could
affect the provision of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This was quite a change from
Japan’s unsuccessful insistence that concrete disarmament measures should be
a part of NPT Article VI. Furthermore, Japan initially wanted the IAEA—rather than
the new CTBTO—to be responsible for monitoring and verification of nuclear tests
(Ramaker et al. 2003). The country that had long been skeptical of the IAEA and
its safeguards regime was now calling for expansion of the agency’s mandate.
Japan also no longer tried to preserve the right of the NNWS to
PNEs, which had lost credibility in the scientific community by the early 1980s.
Early in the negotiations, Ambassador Tanaka took to the floor at the CD and
stated: “Japan is of the view that any nuclear-weapon test explosion should be
prohibited, including those which are called ‘peaceful nuclear explosions.’”390The
Japanese delegation would accordingly support Australian treaty language that
banned PNEs.391 When the treaty opened for signature, its text banned all nuclear
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explosions, regardless of their purpose, in all environments—underground,
underwater, and in the Earth’s atmosphere.392
Several Japanese positions also appeared to be intended to
constrain China, Tokyo’s most prominent regional rival. Not only had China sought
to allow PNEs by the NWS, but Beijing also wanted the ability to conduct low-yield
tests that would likely have little military significance for weapons development
(Ramaker et al. 2003; Johnson 2009). These proposals were unacceptable to the
Japanese, who took note of China’s limited number of previous nuclear tests. In
the Japanese view, such loopholes might have allowed China to continue making
progress on weapons development and gathering data for high-performance
computing simulations used to design warheads.393 Consequently, Japan fought
hard for a zero-yield test ban, a sensitive IMS that could detect events with yields
as low as one kiloton, and the right of states to contribute information gained from
NTM to the CTBTO (Ramaker et al. 2003; Johnson 2009).394 Japan also began
hosting multilateral CTBT verification conferences outside the auspices of the
CD.395 Tokyo similarly supported procedures for intrusive OSI after the treaty’s
entry-into-force, a policy that aroused concern among the Chinese delegation.
Japan actively participated in the CTBT negotiations, and many of its
proposals became a part of the test ban regime. The Japanese, however, were on
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the losing side of the treaty’s entry-into-force procedures. As Tanaka articulated,
Japan did not want any single state to have the right to obstruct the CTBT from
coming into force.396 Japan accordingly objected to proposals for the treaty to
require all five NPT-designated NWS to ratify before entry-into-force. Instead,
Japan wanted a simple number of 30 states—whether NNWS or NWS—to ratify
(Ramaker et al. 2003; Johnson 2009). But this was intolerable to the NWS, who
would not accept a treaty that might prevent some states from testing while
allowing their nuclear-armed rivals to do so. In the end, the negotiating parties
reached an agreement on Annex 2 and its requirement that the 44 “nuclearcapable” states with research reactors or nuclear power programs ratify before
entry-into-force.397 Japan is among the 44 Annex 2 states.
Before the treaty had even opened for signature, France challenged
Japan’s commitment to the CTBT. In 1995, French President Jacques Chirac
ordered a series of six test explosions in French Polynesia to gather weaponsrelated data before joining the CTBT. Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and his
advisors were stunned. They strongly condemned France at the UN and even
threatened to cut off all trade (Graham 2002). The French tests occurred 1995–
1996, regardless, and it took some time for bilateral relations to recover.
When the CTBT opened for signature on September 24, 1996, the
Japanese Prime Minister at the time, Ryūtarō Hashimoto, was one of the first world
leaders to sign. Ratification by the Diet occurred relatively quickly, taking place on
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July 8, 1997. The ratification debate in the Diet was pro forma and can hardly be
called a debate, in striking contrast to the protracted discussions over the NPT and
national security. That Japan type signaled as an advocate of the CTBT and had
little difficulty in commitment signaling was unsurprising. Having already legally
forsworn nuclear weapons by ratifying the NPT, a prohibition on nuclear tests was
a continuation of Japanese arms control advocacy and history opposing testing.
Further, Tokyo had a reliable patron in the United States and the administration of
Bill Clinton. Commitment signaling was eased by this relationship and the fact that
the CTBT placed significant restrictions on Chinese vertical nuclear proliferation.
As per Annex 1 to the CTBT’s protocol, Japan hosts ten IMS facilities
that continuously monitor the globe for nuclear explosions despite the treaty’s nonentry-into-force.398 These include six seismic stations, one infrasound station, two
radionuclide stations, and one radionuclide processing laboratory.399 All of these
facilities have been certified by the CTBTO and are operating, as confirmed by
their role in detecting the six North Korean nuclear tests and providing data on the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster.400
Conclusion
Japan’s nuclear history has been dynamic over the past 75 years. The only country
targeted in atomic bombings also studied the feasibility of building its own nuclear
weapons. Japan also relies heavily on the nuclear umbrella of the United States,
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which attacked Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for its security. Today, Tokyo also has a
robust civilian nuclear energy program that some scholars warn may allow for rapid
proliferation if U.S. assurances wane in the face of threats from China and North
Korea (Debs and Monteiro 2018). Yet, the nuclear taboo remains strong among
the public in this threshold state. One recent study showed that 75 percent of the
Japanese public supports nuclear disarmament (Baron, Gibbons, and Herzog
2020). Another indicated that a staggering 85 percent of Japanese would not
support U.S. use of nuclear weapons against North Korea, even if that country
launched a nuclear strike on Japan (Allison, Herzog, and Ko 2021).
But the common thread in Japan’s nuclear history is clear: The
prevailing narrative is one of security and national sovereignty. Domestic politics,
norms, civilian nuclear energy aspirations, and other factors covered in the
literature were undoubtedly present. These considerations were less prominent,
however, due to a core focus on ensuring national survival.
In the case of the NPT, this chapter demonstrates that security
interests—combined with the disparate signaling effects of signature and
ratification—provide the best explanation for Japan’s nuclear diplomacy. Satō
could not immediately type signal as an advocate for the treaty because it would
mean acceptance in principle of Japanese disarmament. Japan was a weapons
dissenter that could only become an NPT advocate in 1970 once its leaders could
accept the treaty’s distribution of power. This occurred in part due to preliminary
expert studies and U.S. security assurances. Signing a treaty is less costly than
ratifying and legally forswearing nuclear weapons on a permanent basis.
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Commitment signaling of this nature was contentious, taking years of further study
and obtaining more iron-clad public U.S. nuclear security guarantees. After a
nearly six-year delay, the Diet finally ratified in 1976 during Prime Minister Miki’s
administration. Japan then became a more active player and leader in international
nuclear arms control and nonproliferation diplomacy.
Tokyo was at the forefront of the negotiation and early ratification of
the CTBT, although the treaty has not entered into force. Whether Japan remains
a non-nuclear state remains to be seen, but my dissertation’s theory predicts that
this will long remain the case given the significant costs entailed in withdrawing
from arms control treaties.
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion
In this concluding chapter, I highlight four central takeaways of the dissertation.
First, I revisit and summarize the key concepts and principles of my process-based
theory of state entry into multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. Second, I
summarize the data and primary contributions of my comparative historical case
studies of Egypt, Romania, Brazil, and Japan. Third, I discuss the dissertation’s
implications for the current and future scholarly investigation of nuclear weapons.
Finally, I offer insights for policy-making and analysis of nuclear politics, including
thoughts on the TPNW of 2017—popularly known as the Nuclear Ban Treaty.
Core Elements of the Argument
This dissertation presented the first process-based theory of why states legally
forswear nuclear arms that can guarantee national survival. It did so by
investigating causal mechanisms that lead advanced nuclear states—potential
proliferators—to sign and ratify multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. These
treaties make illegal state pursuit of nuclear weapons or prohibit essential
elements of nuclearization like nuclear explosive testing. By focusing on “hard
cases” for arms control, those countries with notable civilian nuclear energy
programs or weapons aspirations that considered building the bomb, the
dissertation offered a theory that generalizes to the central participants in the game
of nuclear diplomacy. Such countries also have security interactions with nucleararmed states and the economic and scientific resources necessary for
proliferation. The behavior of states without these civilian nuclear capabilities or
weapons aspirations often conforms to the theory’s logic. But there are other times,
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however, when small developing states simply lack the resources or interest to
prioritize nuclear issues. Their signature and ratification timelines can be less
predictable and fall outside the scope of this dissertation.
The main differentiator between my theory and past studies of the
NPT or other agreements is its focus on process. Existing literature has shown that
factors such as norms, security, and treaty-contingent benefits played a part in
states’ evaluation of agreements. Such explanations contribute to the scholarly
understanding of nuclear politics. Yet, they leave room for three fundamental areas
for improvement. First, the literature offers only limited generalizability, as national
treaty narratives may vary considerably. Second, such studies show the presence
of the aforementioned factors without thoroughly adjudicating between the
magnitude of different potential causes. Third, scholars have not distilled the
process of arms control into its components of signature and ratification, instead
choosing to focus on either one or the other. Many of these shortcomings are no
fault of the authors, as their coverage of treaty behavior is epiphenomenal to their
study of nuclear proliferation. They are not seeking to explain signature and
ratification decisions systematically.
My theory of legally forswearing nuclear weapons via multilateral
nuclear arms control supplies ample space for multifarious national narratives. Its
emphasis on process subsumes other explanations in the literature. The reason
why, as the dissertation demonstrates, is that signature, ratification, and accession
(when necessary) decisions are both identifiable and generalizable. They conform
to social scientific logic and present clear patterns. Each of the two steps in the
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process carries different legal weight and consequences. If signing is saying “No”
to nuclear weapons, nuclear testing, or fissile material production, ratifying is
saying “Never.” As this dissertation has shown, ratification is often a much more
imposing decision than signature. Scholars and policy-makers should thus not be
surprised by frequent time-lag delays between these actions.
Signing a treaty is a type signal wherein national decisions to be a
signatory or non-signatory send messages to the international community. A
state’s allies and adversaries will surely take note. Indeed, a decision to sign or
abstain from doing so showcases state views with respect to the balance of power
codified by the treaty. Signatories will endorse the principles of the agreement
either because they are advocates that support the envisioned balance of power
or subordinates whose patron coerces them. Non-signatories show their
dissatisfaction with the treaty’s balance of power. They are either status dissenters
that have prestige rationales or weapons dissenters that have security rationales.
National ambitions and perceptions of the treaty’s distribution of power must evolve
before non-signatories may then become signatories.
Unlike signature, treaty ratification is a commitment signal that
finalizes the process of legally forswearing nuclear weapons. Ratification also
subjects the state to intrusive verification and consequences for violation or
withdrawal. Consequently, security is the main driver of ratification decisions.
States will not ratify multilateral nuclear arms control treaties if they lack credible
protection against a serious security threat. Commitment signaling will occur if no
such threats exist or adequate measures are taken to mitigate threats.
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Lastly, an accession decision once a treaty has entered into force
but may no longer be signed by states, is a joint signal. Accession has the same
legal recognition as ratification, but state decisions must simultaneously address
the rationales for type signaling and commitment signaling. In fact, there are
states—such as Brazil—that confronted no serious security threats but did not
accede to treaties until overcoming type signaling barriers to endorsement.
The theory is one of necessary conditions. Policy-making about
accepting arms control treaties can be immensely complicated. Special attention
from scholars is necessary to avoid oversimplifying the phenomenon in pursuit of
a parsimonious monocausal theory. My focus on the process of arms control
concedes that there are multiple inputs involved in such decisions, several of which
may have contributed to states entering into treaties. However, the categories I lay
out for type and commitment signaling are necessary conditions and the
predominant drivers of decision-making.
Revisiting the Cases
The dissertation demonstrated the applicability of the theory by examining
representative cases from among the 35 potential proliferators identified in the
scholarly literature. As I showed, the theory maps on to four cases with diverse
regime types, economic standing, alliance structures, regional environments, and
more. Each case epitomizes a state type in my typology with respect to signing
multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. In the dissertation, the treaties
spotlighted are the most universal of this kind of accord: the NPT of 1968 and the
CTBT of 1996. Egypt was an advocate for the NPT, much like other countries such
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as Poland and Sweden. Romania was a subordinate, as was West Germany and
the former Yugoslavia. Brazil was a status dissenter like Argentina and Chile.
Japan was a weapons dissenter alongside India and Israel. CTBT decisions were
simpler for countries that had already forsworn nuclear weapons via the NPT,
although the case of Egyptian non-ratification suggests this is hardly universal.
There are further examples, of course, but the logic of type and
commitment signaling has broad applicability. Additionally, the archival findings
and original elite interviews of the dissertation challenge existing explanations of
state behavior. This project thus contributes a new theory, data, and non-canonical
case explanations to the literature. Its focus on national decisions in an important
but understudied context introduces new evidence, narratives, and coverage of
events that are not present in the extant literature.
Egypt was an advocate for the NPT because its leaders believed the
treaty would constrain Israel, its chief regional rival. While Egypt quickly signed the
NPT in 1968, it held out on ratification until 1981 due to disappointment at Israel’s
rejection of the accord. My dissertation shows that Cairo’s main motivation for
reversing course was not nuclear power reactor acquisition, as previous studies
have suggested. Rather, the Camp David Accords of 1978 were pivotal in setting
the stage for dissipation of the perceived Israeli security threat. Egyptian leaders
also believed—incorrectly—at the time that Israel might soon accede to the NPT.
Anger at the continued rejection of the treaty and revitalized fears of Jerusalem’s
arsenal shaped Egyptian behavior toward the CTBT. While Cairo signed the test
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ban as an advocate in 1996, to this day it has yet to ratify the accord, which has
not entered into force.
Romania was a subordinate that objected to the NPT but was
pressured into endorsing it by the Soviet Union. Bucharest viewed the treaty as an
unequal agreement and fought hard to spoil its negotiation. Conventional accounts
hold that Romanian officials changed their minds and signed the treaty in 1968
once opposing it became futile, and ratified in 1970 to obtain civilian nuclear
energy. But the dissertation indicates that, behind the scenes, the USSR and the
other members of the Warsaw Pact threatened to isolate and abandon the
Romanians. Though the Soviets allowed Romania to dissent to some communist
initiatives related to economics, Bucharest’s NPT stance was a bridge too far. In
the end, Romania signed the treaty on the day it opened for signature.
Commitment signaling followed in 1970, with ratification occurring once it became
clear that the Soviets would continue to provide security to Bucharest. Romania
would not fall victim to an invasion like other Warsaw Pact states that desired
autonomy. Since Romania had already legally forsworn nuclear weapons and
faced no serious security threats, CTBT signature (1996) and ratification (1999)
were merely pro forma matters.
Brazil was a status dissenter to the NPT for over 30 years. Leaders
in Brasília were unhappy with the balance of power codified by the treaty and its
prohibitions on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. When Brazil finally
reversed course and acceded in 1998, many observers attributed the decision to
the country’s process of democratization that had begun in the 1980s. However,
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my research demonstrates that regime type was not determinative. The main
causal drivers were the autonomous mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and
changing global perceptions of the NPT. Holdouts now incurred status costs
reserved for suspected proliferators. Joining the treaty under these conditions
would enhance Brazil’s status while also allowing the state to maintain a latent
nuclear capability. This new set of circumstances finally enabled joint signaling
through accession. Though Brasília also ratified the CTBT in 1998, the test ban
was a less controversial agreement. Brazil had already given up its quest for
autonomous PNEs as scientific studies showed their lack of utility, allowing the
country to sign the CTBT as an advocate on the day it opened for signature:
September 24, 1996.
Japan was a weapons dissenter and did not sign the NPT when it
opened for signature in 1968, despite the powerful legacy of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Instead, Tokyo took until 1970 to preliminarily study the feasibility of
developing its own nuclear arsenal. Japanese leaders decided that U.S. extended
deterrence was a better arrangement for the country. Regardless, ratification did
not occur until 1976, when further studies, internal discussions, and especially,
robust U.S. assurances allowed Tokyo to finally forswear the bomb. Although
some studies have pointed to non-nuclear norms and safeguards considerations
as the key enablers of this commitment signal, I find otherwise. I argue that security
was the primary driver. As with other states that ratified the NPT, signing and
ratifying the CTBT—in 1996 and 1997—were not difficult for Tokyo.
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Implications for the Scholarly Literature
This dissertation has several implications for the academic study of nuclear
politics. It offers insights into the phenomenon of why advanced nuclear states
forswear nuclear weapons in a legally binding manner. Much of the scholarship
during the ongoing renaissance in nuclear security studies has illuminated different
causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation. The present study, however,
focuses on a different but related dependent variable. Reasons why states decide
not to pursue nuclear weapons at a given time do not fully explain decisions to
legally rule out the nuclear option. My dissertation offers a first theory explaining
this hand-tying phenomenon through its investigation of state entry into multilateral
nuclear arms control treaties. Hopefully, its subject matter focus also helps to build
bridges between the vibrant ongoing study of nuclear proliferation and arms
control, a policy field that continues to progress even with relatively limited
academic input.
My examination of this topic contributes to literature in international
relations by disaggregating arms control treaty entry into a two-step process. As
the dissertation makes explicit, signature and ratification often have different
underlying motivations. Previous scholarship studying one step or the other usually
views arms control treaty membership through an inaccurate binary lens:
participation in a treaty or not. Additionally, the logic of type, commitment, and joint
signaling has application to broader phenomena outside the nuclear domain. The
substantive rationales behind such signals will likely vary based on the nature of
the agreement—human rights, environment, trade, etc.—while still conforming to
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this dissertation’s main theoretical logic. The difference between multilateral
nuclear arms control and these other areas is the legal forswearing of nuclear
weapons. While studies on other topics have argued that joining international
agreements is “cheap talk,” I demonstrate that arms control decision-making is
costly. Both signature and ratification carry such costs. For this reason, delays
between when a treaty opens for signature, when states sign, and when states
ratify are common among advanced nuclear countries.
Next, it is instructive to recall that the study of nuclear proliferation
now contains many security-based explanations for state pursuit of the bomb. The
bilateral arms control literature is moving in this direction, transcending solely
cooperative explanations for treaty behavior. But the multilateral literature, on the
other hand, remains focused on norms, treaty-contingent benefits, and domestic
politics. I show with causal process observations that these previous explanations
may certainly matter in some cases of entry into treaties, but security matters more.
In fact, credible protection against serious security threats is a prerequisite to the
commitment signaling of ratification. For non-signatory weapons dissenters,
security is also the key element motivating their type signaling of dissatisfaction.
I derive my arguments from careful historical analysis of four states’
behavior with respect to signing, ratifying, and/or acceding to the NPT and CTBT.
In doing so, I introduce new data to the literature. These data are three-fold. First,
I discuss many historical archival documents associated with the pre-negotiation,
negotiation, and post-negotiation phases of arms control, covering events and
national narratives not addressed in the literature. Second, I refer to documents
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that likewise reveal insights into national debates over the phenomena of type and
commitment signaling on nuclear arms control. Third, I provide data from original
elite interviews I conducted in order to provide further context and perspectives to
scholarly discussions. In sum, these data are a contribution to the historical
coverage of the literature by themselves, independent of my theory. They also
enable me to interrogate dominant explanations regarding several case studies,
yielding new narratives and understandings.
This dissertation leaves room for further contributions to the
literature. In the future, researchers could improve scholarly understanding of
many additional states by focusing on their arms control signaling behavior. Such
studies could produce further refinement of the theoretical types I introduce.
Another interesting puzzle that remains to be studied is the logic of
decisions by those states that lie outside the dissertation’s scope conditions. Many
small states like Andorra, Guyana, Namibia, and Saint Kitts and Nevis did not sign
the NPT before its entry-into-force, acceding decades later. It is true that most of
the time such states did not view nuclear arms control issues as a priority, and they
were subject to limited or no pressure from great powers to engage in the signaling
game of nuclear diplomacy. Regardless, a systematic study of small states’ arms
control behavior would be quite useful. Proponents of the new TPNW believe that
the participation of these states is essential to create strong disarmament and
nonproliferation norms.
Additionally, signaling is by its nature a multi-party phenomenon with
senders and receivers. Whether arms control signaling is effective and interpreted
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properly is outside the scope of the dissertation. The case studies discussed herein
show examples of times when such signaling succeeded as intended and times
when signaling failed. A key area of future research would be for scholars to
investigate how a state’s allies and adversaries, and neutral third-parties, interpret
arms control type, commitment, and joint signals. As I show below, misperception
can have marked policy implications since the game of arms control involves
multiple state types. For instance, a state that rejects a treaty for reasons of status
could face consequences if its interlocutors believe its motivations stem from a
desire to nuclearize.
The Future of Global Nuclear Diplomacy
In addition to the dissertation project’s scholarly contributions, it offers four
important lessons for policy-makers. It also has ramifications for the TPNW, a
treaty that may have monumental effects on future nuclear diplomacy. I describe
each of these areas below.
First, the differential levels of engagement with arms control revealed
by my research matter for understanding nuclear forbearance. Policy-makers
should not assume that a state’s signature of a multilateral nuclear arms control
treaty means that it has ruled out the nuclear option.401 As my research shows, the
type signaling of signature carries considerably less weight than the commitment
signaling of ratification. Incidents of treaty non-compliance or withdrawal by
countries that have commitment signaled are relatively rare due to the associated
401

I find this to be the case even for some States Parties to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which forbids signatories from taking actions to undermine the core purpose of an
agreement before their ratification.
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costs and expected punishments. However, my work clearly indicates that it is not
uncommon for states to continue studying and even pursuing the nuclear option
after signing a treaty. Ratification sets the course of a state’s nuclear policy much
more firmly than signature does.
Second, a related conclusion is that it would be unwise to assume
that not signing necessarily implies an intent to proliferate. Treaty non-signatories
come in two varieties: status dissenters and weapons dissenters. Status dissenters
are more focused on how distributions of power enshrined by treaties affect their
presence on the international stage than they are on possessing the weapons
themselves. Likewise, when a leader says a treaty is unfair or discriminatory for
permitting some states to have military or civilian nuclear capabilities, but not
others, this does not automatically equate to an acquisition plan. Weapons
dissenters may wish to have time to consider the nuclear option, which again, is
not by default the same thing as nuclear pursuit. Nuclearization is an expensive,
time-consuming process. Feasibility studies are just as—if not more—likely to lead
to forbearance as they are to lead to attempted nuclear proliferation.
Third, both of the above reflections point to the imperative to carefully
interpret arms control treaty signaling given potential heterogeneity. One-size-fitsall policy solutions may carry counterproductive consequences. For example,
sanctioning a status dissenter for refusing to sign a treaty might only serve to
prolong that state’s timeline to embrace the accord.
Fourth, security is paramount in ratification commitment signaling
decisions to legally forswear nuclear weapons. Sticks and carrots packages
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focusing on elements like economic sanctions are unlikely to be impactful since
national survival is at stake. Instead, proponents of arms control should consider
options for mitigating serious security threats. This can occur through bilateral side
negotiations, pledges of credible protection by a third-party patron, or threats of
abandonment by a third-patron patron that outweigh the benefits of potential
nuclearization. The logic discussed above matters as far as achieving the entryinto-force of the CTBT, the universalization of the NPT, and the realization of a
future FMCT or MENWFZ.
Finally, since I began working on this dissertation, 122 states
negotiated the adoption of the TPNW at the UNGA.402 The Nuclear Ban Treaty
“outlaws all activities related to nuclear weapons: building them, possessing them,
testing them and threatening their use (Gibbons and Herzog 2020).” Predictably,
the agreement has created a great divide between nuclear-armed states and their
allies, on one hand, and states that lack nuclear umbrella guarantees on the other
(Potter 2017; Gibbons 2018; Ritchie and Egeland 2018). Ban advocates also seek
to turn the publics of the former group against nuclear weapons by stigmatizing the
bomb (Mekata 2018). Polls already show that 65 percent of Americans (Herzog,
Baron, and Gibbons 2021) and 75 percent of Japanese may support the treaty
(Baron, Herzog, and Gibbons 2020). The TPNW entered into force on January 22,
2021, after achieving 50 ratifications. Its impact remains to be seen, but the treaty
402

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, A/CONF.229/2017/8 (7 July 2017).
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has the potential to create sharp, lasting divisions in nuclear diplomacy, which will
almost inevitably manifest at the August 2021 NPT Review Conference.403
My process-based theory has implications for the future of the
TPNW. Most importantly, an immediate ban on nuclear weapons would represent
a very different balance of power than that reified by the NPT and the CTBT. Due
to the lack of timeframe and concrete measures specified in NPT Article VI on
nuclear disarmament, these treaties have somewhat of a freezing effect on global
nuclear power. If the objectives of the TPNW were realized, the shift in the status
quo would be remarkably more dramatic than that of the NPT or CTBT. For this
reason, my theory would predict that many advanced nuclear states will continue
to be non-signatories for years to come. The balance of power represented by the
Ban Treaty will almost surely lead the NWS and the NNWS with nuclear umbrella
protection to be long-term weapons dissenters.
Weapons dissenters to the TPNW will not be able to type signal as
advocates until their perceptions of nuclear weapons and the Ban Treaty’s
resultant balance of power change. This might take a long time. For example, after
the accord’s negotiation, American, British, and French officials released a press
statement chastising it and saying, “We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become
party to” the TPNW (qtd. in Gibbons 2019, p. 30). The other nuclear-armed states
followed suit, with their allies quickly falling in line. While the Ban Treaty may stoke
divisions between states and begin to create foundations of a nuclear non403

NPT Review Conferences have occurred every five years since 1975, but the 2020 conference
was pushed back to 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
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possession norm, this dissertation’s theory predicts that global near-universality is
unlikely to occur anytime soon.
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